Ramos v. Lamm
Citation | 539 F. Supp. 730 |
Decision Date | 26 March 1982 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 77-K-1093. |
Parties | Fidel RAMOS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Richard D. LAMM, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Edwin S. Kahn, Kelly, Haglund, Garnsey & Kahn, Denver, Colo., for plaintiffs.
Tarquin J. Bromley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, Colo., for defendants.
After several years of litigation,1 this case is now before me on plaintiff's application for attorney fees. Because the current law on attorney fees is unsettled and sometimes contradictory, I will explicate it before reaching the details of this case. Although I will consider cases from other jurisdictions, I will focus on Tenth Circuit cases because they are controlling.
In the United States the traditional rule has been that attorney fees are not awardable to a prevailing party, absent a specific statute authorizing them. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1616, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975).2 Under this rule the trial court may award attorney fees in the absence of an authorizing statute only in a few specific cases. If a trustee or party recovers a fund for the benefit of himself and others, he may include attorney fees in his costs recoverable from the common fund. See id. at 257, 95 S.Ct. at 1621. If a losing party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons" the prevailing party may be entitled to attorney fees. See id. at 258-59, 95 S.Ct. at 1622 (citations omitted). In addition, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920, 1923 permit the trial court to award some minimal attorney fees.
In the early 1970's many lower federal courts and state courts exercised their traditional equity powers to award attorney fees under the "private attorney general" concept even though there was no statutory authorization for such awards. See S.Rep. No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 4, 1976 U.S.Cong. & Ad.News 5908, 5911. In 1975 the supreme court held this practice impermissible, absent express congressional authorization. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. at 262, 95 S.Ct. at 1624.
Before the Alyeska decision at least 29 federal statutes authorized trial courts to award attorney fees. Id. at 260 n.33, 95 S.Ct. at 1623 n.33. Since then the growth in the number of federal attorney fee statutes has been proliferate. Currently, about 120 different federal statutes authorize attorney fee awards.3 These include an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which now authorizes trial courts, in their discretion, to award "a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs," in civil rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 and under Title XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4
Although it is now largely settled in what types of actions a federal trial court may award attorney fees, there is still frequent dispute on when a party is a "prevailing party," as used in the attorney fees statutes. See, e.g., Lanner v. Wimmer, 662 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1981) ( ). If the parties enter into a consent decree before the trial court issues a final judgment, the plaintiffs will still be deemed to be prevailing parties if "they vindicate rights." Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2574, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d 782, 791-92 (10th Cir. 1980); Chicano Police Officer's Association v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 130-31 (10th Cir. 1980).5 But cf. Pearson v. Western Electric Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 1976) ( ).
When plaintiffs prevail on some, but not all, of the issues asserted at trial, it is more difficult to calculate the attorney fees to which they are entitled. Plaintiffs' attorneys are entitled to compensation for legal work "reasonably calculated" to promote the clients' interests, even if unsuccessful. Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729, 733 (10th Cir. 1981); Gurule v. Wilson, 635 F.2d at 793-94. On the other hand, plaintiffs' attorneys are not entitled to compensation for work done on issues that were frivolous or brought in bad faith. Id. at 794. Nor are they entitled to compensation for work done on "substantial separate issues" which plaintiffs raised but upon which they did not prevail. Id. (emphasis in original).
Christiansburg Garmet Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978). The Tenth Circuit has not yet clearly specified how trial courts are to apply this test. In Cottrell v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 590 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1979), the court summarily affirmed the trial court's finding that plaintiff's action was not frivolous or without foundation and therefore that defendant was not entitled to attorney fees. In EEOC v. Fruehauf Corp., 609 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 965, 100 S.Ct. 2941, 64 L.Ed.2d 824 (1980), the court reversed the trial court's award of attorneys fees to the defendant:
The Tenth Circuit apparently reached this conclusion because plaintiff's deposition did not establish or reinforce essential allegations in his complaint. The opinion is somewhat curt and does not enunciate what standard of review was being applied to the trial court's factual finding.6 Judge Doyle dissented, stating that the appellate court should have applied the usual "plain error" standard to the trial court's factual findings. Id. at 854-55. Finally, in Nulf v. International Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553, 564 (10th Cir. 1981), the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's decision to award the defendant attorney fees. The appellate court again did not enunciate what standard of review it was applying, but apparently independently determined the essential facts. Because the issue of whether an action is frivolous or groundless is a question of fact, it is unclear why the Tenth Circuit does not apply the established "clearly erroneous"7 standard to trial court findings on that issue.
After several years of flux, rules on liability for attorney fees are becoming stable. Congress has determined the types of causes of action for which courts may award attorney fees. Standards are beginning to evolve about when a party is entitled to attorney fees under those causes of action. In contrast, the rules on calculation of attorney fees have remained unsettled. The appellate opinions on this subject are unclear and frequently contradictory. Compare In re Permian Anchor Services, Inc., 649 F.2d 763, 768 (10th Cir. 1981) ( ) with In re King Resources Co., No. 80-1301 (10th Cir. April 1, 1981) ( )(trial court's award of attorney fees in bankruptcy proceeding reversed without any explicit application of or citation to the Johnson criteria). See also Bowie v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hospitals, Civil Action No. 78-M-1186 (D.Colo. July 24, 1981) at 7 ( ).
The Supreme Court has stated that civil rights plaintiffs are ordinarily entitled to attorney fees. Northcross v. Board of Education, 412 U.S. 427, 93 S.Ct. 2201, 37 L.Ed.2d 48 (1973) (per curiam); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968).8 In addition, the Tenth Circuit has stated that the trial court must hear evidence on a reasonable attorney fee before making an award. Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 782 (10th Cir. 1979). However, neither court has enunciated clear guidelines on the calculation of attorney fees. I therefore find it necessary to summarize the case law on the calculation of attorney fees.
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Major v. Treen
......School District No. 186, 465 F.Supp. 749, 758 (S.D.Ill.1978). Similarly, travel time with no work claimed is not compensable, Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F.Supp. 730, 745 (D.Colo.1982), or compensable at a low hourly rate. Cruz v. Beto, 453 F.Supp. 905 (S.D.Tex.1977), aff'd, 603 F.2d ......
-
Bhandari v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce
...questions raised by Hensley and Blum. See, e.g., Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 889-90 (D.C.Cir.1980) (en banc); Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F.Supp. 730, 735-38 (D.Colo.1982), vacated and remanded, 713 F.2d 456 (10th Cir.1983); Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is "Reasonable"?, 126 U......
-
Ramos v. Lamm, s. 82-1531
...opinions for being inconsistent and pleaded for specific guidelines for district courts to apply in setting fee awards. Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F.Supp. 730 (D.Colo.1982). We agree that more specific guidelines are necessary, and we proceed to set forth standards for district courts to follow in ......
-
George v. Gte Directories Corp.
...circuits. See Def. Br. at 6-7 (citing to DeVito v. Hempstead China Shop, Inc., 831 F.Supp. 1037, 1045 (E.D.N.Y.1993); Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F.Supp. 730, 745 (D.Col.1982); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors, 1996 WL 537859, * 6 (W.D.Va.1996)). Defendant's reliance on these cases is both misplac......
-
ARTICLE 17 ATTORNEY FEES
...1984); Carnal v. Dan Coleman, Inc., 727 P.2d 412 (Colo. App. 1986). For discussion of amount of attorney fee award, see Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730 (D. Colo. 1982). Trial court was without authority to award attorney fees for plaintiff's initial appeal, absent direction to do so by the ......
-
ARTICLE 17
...1984); Carnal v. Dan Coleman, Inc., 727 P.2d 412 (Colo. App. 1986). For discussion of amount of attorney fee award, see Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730 (D. Colo. 1982). Trial court was without authority to award attorney fees for plaintiff's initial appeal, absent direction to do so by the ......
-
Recovery of Attorney Fees and Costs in Colorado
...awards if party withdraws claim within reasonable time after party knew or should have known would not prevail]. 44. See Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F.Supp. 730 (D.Colo. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 713 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983) (court's decision lists statutes). 45. CRS § 38-22-128. 46. CRS......
-
Rationalizing costs in investment treaty arbitration.
...Act permits an award of costs but does not permit shifting without contractual authorization). (117.) See e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730, 755-57 (D. Colo. 1982) (listing statutory exceptions to the American Rule); see also Vargo, supra note 108, at 1578-90 (discussing (118.) Reliasta......