City of Rocky River v. State Employment Relations Bd.

Citation539 N.E.2d 103,43 Ohio St.3d 1
Decision Date10 May 1989
Docket NumberNo. 87-157,87-157
Parties, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2952, 1989 SERB 4-41 CITY OF ROCKY RIVER, Appellant, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellees.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. The binding mandate provided in R.C. 4117.14(I) is not an unlawful delegation of legislative authority as it serves the purpose of promoting orderly public sector labor relations, contains sufficient procedural standards and safeguards and provides for effective judicial review.

2. The Ohio Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, R.C. Chapter 4117, and specifically R.C. 4117.14(I), are constitutional as they fall within the General Assembly's authority to enact employee welfare legislation pursuant to Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution. Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, the home-rule provision, may not be interposed to impair, limit or negate the Act.

The facts of this case are undisputed. In 1983, Ohio enacted the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act, which is codified in R.C. Chapter 4117. The Act, which took effect on April 1, 1984, included provisions for the representation of public employees [1989 SERB 4-42] by "exclusive representatives." R.C. 4117.04 and 4117.05.

Appellee, Rocky River Firefighters Association, Local 695, is the exclusive representative of firefighters employed by appellant, the city of Rocky River. In 1984, appellant and appellee commenced negotiations for the first collectively bargained employment contract between appellant and appellee's members. When the parties failed to reach an agreement, they requested mediation assistance from appellee State Employment Relations Board ("SERB") pursuant to R.C. 4117.14(C)(2). 1 The mediation process failed to resolve the parties' disagreement on numerous issues, so the parties proceeded to the next step: submission of the issues to a fact-finding panel under R.C. 4117.14(C)(3). 2 The panel held a hearing and issued recommendations favoring appellant's positions on all disputed issues except salary, on which appellee firefighters' proposal was recommended. Appellant exercised its option under R.C. 4117.14(C)(6) 3 to reject the panel's recommendation. This rejection triggered the conciliation requirements of R.C. 4117.14(D)(1). 4 After hearing testimony from the parties, the conciliator issued an order choosing appellee's final salary offer over the offer of appellant. Appellant, even before the conciliator issued any final order, refused to recognize the validity of any such order, and commenced the instant action seeking a declaration that R.C. 4117.14(I) violates the Ohio Constitution by mandating binding arbitration between a city and its safety forces in the event of a collective bargaining impasse. 5 The court of common pleas granted appellee's motion for summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of R.C. 4117.14(I). The court of appeals, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed.

Appellant appealed to this court and the case came before us pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record. The issues were extensively briefed and oral argument was held on March 8, 1988. On November 2, 1988, this court, in a four-to-three split decision, issued our opinion and judgment reversing the judgment of the court of appeals and entering final judgment for appellant. Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 196, 530 N.E.2d 1 ("Rocky I "). A plethora of motions was filed for rehearing and/or clarification.

The motions for rehearing and/or clarification were submitted to the court on December 13, 1988. In an opinion, decided December 22, 1988 and published in the Ohio Official Reports Advance Sheets on January 23, 1989, the court issued a clarification of its decision in Rocky I and concluded by stating: "In all other respects, the motions for reconsideration [sic ] 6 and clarification are overruled as they [1989 SERB 4-43] have raised no germane arguments that were not considered by the court in the disposition of appellant's appeal." Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 606, 533 N.E.2d 270, 271-272 ("Rocky II "). The vote of the court was again split, four to three.

Subsequently, on January 3, 1989, appellee, Rocky River Firefighters Association, Local 695 of the International Association of Firefighters, moved this court for "reconsideration of the denial of motion for rehearing." This motion was supported by two amici curiae and was opposed by appellant and two amici curiae.

In a decision released February 10, 1989, this court, again in a four-to-three vote, granted the motion of appellee Local 695 for reconsideration " * * * as to all issues in this cause. * * * " Rocky River v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 602, 535 N.E.2d 657 ("Rocky III "). The court further ordered that the case would be decided on the merit briefs previously filed and that there would be no further oral argument.

Pursuant to the foregoing, this case, "Rocky IV," is now before the court for further consideration.

Calfee, Halter & Griswold, Mark I. Wallach, William E. Coughlin, John E. Gotherman and Russell A. Olson, Cleveland, Law Director, for appellant.

Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Loren L. Braverman, Columbus, for appellee State Employment Relations Bd.

Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Associates Co., L.P.A., Joseph W. Diemert, Jr., Cleveland, and William F. Schmitz, Chardon, for appellee Rocky River Firefighters Assn., Local 695.

Berkman, Gordon, Murray & Palda, George W. Palda and Lorraine R. Baumgardner, Cleveland, for appellee AFSCME Ohio Council 8.

Conway, Barclay, Deyo & Kurant Co., L.P.A., and Donald K. Barclay, Cleveland, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Mun. League.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

I The Procedure

There have been a number of questions presented in both public and private forums concerning the procedure by which this case is again before us for decision. Considering the concurring statement of Justice Brown and the dissenting statements of Chief Justice Moyer and Justice Holmes in Rocky III, supra, we conclude that it would serve no useful purpose for any more to be written concerning motions for rehearing, clarification or reconsideration or to write further concerning time limits, past precedents on such motions or who voted how and when or why on such motions. Suffice it to say that this case has consumed a considerable amount of the time of all the members of this court and the moment has now come to place at rest the issues presented by this case.

II Stare Decisis

Different from the procedural intricacies of this case is the question of stare decisis.

"Stare decisis " is, of course, shorthand for stare decisis et non quieta movere--"stand by the past decisions and do not disturb settled things." See Black's Law Dictionary (5 Ed.Rev.1979) 1261. The heritage of the law is built like a wall--brick by brick. The spirit of the Anglo-Saxon law is, in part, the impact of the cases as they come down through the years. Each case as it is decided supplies another brick for the wall and gives us the taught tradition of the law. This tends to provide the stability necessary for an organized society to deal with its everyday affairs.

Uniformity and continuity in law are necessary for us to deal with our daily pursuits. We need to preserve the integrity of contractual agreements, wills, conveyances of property and our dealings in the commercial marketplace. The applications of the principles of tort cannot be an ever-changing concept. What is negligence in the morning must also be negligence in the afternoon. To permit such standards to be in a continual state of flux would invite havoc.

The doctrine of stare decisis provides solid rocks upon which men and women can build and arrange their affairs with confidence. The doctrine serves to remove the capricious element from the law and lends stability to society. Stare decisis is a strong tie which our future has with our past.

But the doctrine as it is generally applied (and as discussed in the foregoing) concerns the interpreting and deciding of the common law and the construction of statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations. The doctrine does not apply with the same force and effect when constitutional interpretation is at issue.

Accordingly, for at least three reasons, the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to the case at bar. Because of the extensive discussion within the court among its members, and the widespread commentary in legal circles and in the press, 7 we find it necessary and appropriate to set forth, in some detail, these reasons.

A

If stare decisis has any efficacy at all in this case, it is that the majority in Rocky I should have followed this court's prior holdings in State, ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Pension Fund, v. Bd. of Trustees of Relief Fund (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 105, 41 O.O.2d 410, 233 N.E.2d 135 (hereinafter "Pension Fund "); State, ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44, v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 1, 22 OBR 1, 488 N.E.2d 181 (hereinafter "Dayton F.O.P.") and Kettering v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 26 Ohio St.3d 50, 26 OBR 42, 496 N.E.2d 983. These cases long ago settled the home-rule amendment argument pitting Sections 3 and 7, Article XVIII versus Section 34, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, to be discussed in more detail infra. Also settled were the questions of whether the collective bargaining law is a law of general nature and whether the Act was enacted pursuant to the police power of the state to promote the general safety and welfare, thereby prevailing over laws of a municipality adopted in the exercise of its powers of local self-government. In these previous cases, both questions were answered in the affirmative.

[1989 SERB 4-44] Therefore, if the doctrine of stare decisis applies to Rocky River, it...

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