Marriage of Gallagher, In re

Decision Date25 October 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-1272,94-1272
Citation539 N.W.2d 479
PartiesIn re the MARRIAGE OF John J. GALLAGHER and Amy Sue Gallagher Upon the Petition of John J. Gallagher, Appellant, And Concerning Amy Sue Gallagher, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Robert L. Stuyvesant of Stuyvesant & Benton, Carlisle, for appellant.

David Odekirk and Van T. Tran, Legal Services Corp., Waterloo, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

HARRIS, Justice.

A few weeks before trial of this dissolution of marriage proceeding it was revealed that the husband was not the natural father of a child who is the subject of this custody dispute. In Petition of Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400, 403 (Iowa 1993), we rejected the equitable parent doctrine. The husband in the present case, pursuing parental rights regarding a child born during the marriage and whom he had considered his own, asks that we reconsider the rejection announced in Ash. In the alternative, he asks that the mother be equitably estopped from denying he is the father of the child. We conclude that Ash is not controlling under the circumstances here. We therefore reverse and remand.

John and Amy Gallagher were married in 1988. In 1991, while the parties were residing together as husband and wife, a child, Riley, was conceived and born. John was listed on the official birth certificate as the child's natural father. Understandably, John considered the child to be his own, and the two developed a father/daughter relationship. Sometime during 1992 John and Amy started to experience marital problems, and in 1993 John filed a dissolution of marriage petition. Before trial the district court placed joint custody of Riley in both John and Amy.

John and Amy agreed to have a home study performed for the purposes of recommending child placement. The home study concluded John would be the appropriate parent for custody of Riley. Subsequently, only three weeks prior to trial, Amy for the first time informed John he was not Riley's natural father. Blood tests confirmed this and the parties so stipulated.

On Amy's application for adjudication of law points the trial court held that John, as neither biological nor adoptive father, had no parental rights. The court also expressly rejected the theory of equitable estoppel and granted summary judgment against John. We granted John permission to bring this interlocutory appeal from that ruling. Other issues in the dissolution proceeding remain pending in district court.

Our review of the trial court's legal conclusions is on error. Lihs v. Lihs, 504 N.W.2d 890, 892 (Iowa 1993). Crucial factual issues are uncontroverted. Other unresolved controverted facts cannot form a basis for the adjudication and on review must therefore be presumed in favor of the party against whom the adjudication was entered. See Rasmussen v. Nebraska Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 170 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Iowa 1969).

I. In prior cases we have rejected the equitable parent doctrine. In doing so under the facts in Ash, we pointed out that Ash

is a stranger to the child. He is an interested third party. He is not the child's biological father. He is not her adoptive father. He is not her stepfather. He is not her foster parent. He never married the child's mother. He is merely a man who lived with--and cared for--her mother, and who, understandably, became smitten with fatherhood after the child's birth.

507 N.W.2d at 404. We also said that no common law or statutory authority for the doctrine existed under those circumstances. We explained:

Straining to legitimize such an action under current law would foster a superfluity of claims by parties who shared a special relationship with children based neither upon affinity nor consanguinity.

Id. Later, in In re Halvorsen, 521 N.W.2d 725, 728 (Iowa 1994), we refused to apply equitable estoppel because the claimant "failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he had a lack of knowledge of the true fact that he was not the biological father...."

The facts assumed in the adjudication here are far different. Here the biological fact of nonpaternity appeared unexpectedly in contradiction of an existing family relationship. In every way, Riley was received by both John and Amy as their daughter, and the family relationship developed accordingly. John was no stranger, or even a mere stepfather. The facts here demonstrate how different it is when a child is born into a marriage, even though (unknown to the father) it is conceived outside it.

The relationship between the husband and child in such a situation is highly likely to be much closer than those between a child and a man whose relationship is derived only as an adjunct to that man's relationship with the child's mother. Where both the child and the husband reasonably believe they share a biological relationship, the bonding should--and can be expected to--develop to such a stage that its rupture might be devastating to both. Devastation to the child is of course the first and paramount concern because the best interest of the child is the dominating consideration in all child custody disputes. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(15). See Halvorsen, 521 N.W.2d at 729.

Ash furnished no factual basis for adoption of the equitable parent doctrine in Iowa. Applying general equitable principles, however, we believe equitable parenthood may be established in a proper case by a father who establishes all the following: (1) he was married to the mother when the child is conceived and born; (2) he reasonably believes he is the child's father; (3) he establishes a parental relationship with the child; and (4) shows that judicial recognition of the relationship is in the child's best interest.

In Ash we carefully contrasted the facts from those in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich.App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516 (1987). Focusing on the best interest of the child, we expressed great concern with the lack of any obligation on the part of a stepparent claimant to pay child support. Ash, 507 N.W.2d at 404. Of course, willingness to support the child, though an important one, is only one factor in the determination of a child's best interest. But we think it is significant that John has supported Riley from her birth and is struggling by this action to become obligated to continue doing so. Willingness to support the child, though an incomplete test of a child's best interest, is surely a crucial consideration in the determination. The point was made in In re Paternity of D.L.H., 142 Wis.2d 606, 419 N.W.2d 283, 288 (App.1987), as follows:

Whereas in most cases estoppel will not lie because of the necessity for financial support from the biological father, we note here the availability of support from the husband and his apparent willingness to provide it. The guardian ad litem's recommendation should also be considered by the trial court for this purpose.

II. To apply the equitable parent doctrine under these facts is entirely consistent with the principles underlying equitable estoppel. Issues of paternity, child custody, and child support are determined by a court of equity. Metten v. Benge, 366 N.W.2d 577, 579 (Iowa 1985); Bruce v. Sarver, 472 N.W.2d 631, 632 (Iowa App.1991); see also Iowa Code chs. 252A (child support), 598A (child custody), 600B (paternity). Courts of equity may exercise broad powers in applying equitable principles. Sixty-Seventh Minn. State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187, 191, 92 S.Ct. 1477, 1481, 32 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (1972); State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 244 Iowa 785, 818-19, 56 N.W.2d 173, 191 (1952) (stating the authority of a court to grant relief to avoid injustice is inherent in the broad discretionary power of equity); Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296, 311-12, 41 N.W.2d 60, 70 (1950) (stating the inherent power of a court of equity over infants is very wide). One such equitable principle is the doctrine of estoppel.

Estoppel was long available in certain situations converse to the one appearing here; more than a century ago we held that one who marries a woman known by him to be enceinte is regarded by the law as adopting the child into his family at its birth, and he becomes liable for its support as a parent, and an action against the natural father for its support will not lie. State v. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343, 344, 17 N.W. 589, 589-90 (1883). We reasoned that such a child

is received into the family of the husband, who stands as to it in loco parentis. This being the law, [the child] enters into the marriage contract between the mother and the husband. When this relationship is established, the law raises a conclusive presumption the husband is the father of the wife's ... child.

Id. We need not hold that any such presumption exists today. But we do note that a number of jurisdictions have estopped the husband from denying paternity in divorce proceedings. See Annotation, Liability of Mother's Husband, Not the Father of Her Illegitimate Child, For its Support, 90 A.L.R.2d 583 (1963); 14 C.J.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock § 33 (1991); 10 Am.Jur.2d Bastards § 69 (1963). And the number of jurisdictions applying equitable estoppel in paternity situations is growing. See Allan Stephens, Annotation, Parental Rights of Man Who Is Not Biological or Adoptive Father of Child but Was Husband or Cohabitant of Mother When Child Was Conceived or Born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655 (1991); 14 C.J.S. Children Out-of-Wedlock § 33 (1991). We left the door open for such application in Halvorsen, 521 N.W.2d at 728 (elements of equitable estoppel in a paternity case not met by clear and convincing evidence).

Equitable estoppel is a doctrine based on fair dealing, good faith, and justice. The elements of equitable estoppel are as follows:

1. A false representation or concealment of a material fact;

2. A lack of knowledge of the true facts on the part of the actor;

3. The intention that the representation or concealment be acted upon; and

4. Reliance thereon by the...

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