Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa

• Citation: 539 U.S. 90
• Decision Date: 09 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-679.,02-679.
• Parties: DESERT PALACE, INC., DBA CAESARS PALACE HOTEL & CASINO v. COSTA.
• Court: United States Supreme Court

539 U.S. 90

DESERT PALACE, INC., DBA CAESARS PALACE HOTEL & CASINO v. COSTA.

No. 02-679.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued April 21, 2003.

Decided June 9, 2003.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it an "unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . ., because of . . . sex." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228, this Court considered whether an employment decision is made "because of" sex in a "mixed-motive" case, i. e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision. Although the Court concluded that an employer had an affirmative defense if it could prove that it would have made the same decision had gender not played a role, it was divided on the question of when the burden of proof shifts to an employer to prove the defense. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring in the judgment, concluded that the burden would shift only where a disparate treatment plaintiff could show by "direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the [employment] decision." Id., at 276. Congress subsequently passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act), which provides, among other things, that (1) an unlawful employment practice is established "when the complaining party demonstrates that... sex. .. was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice," 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(m), and (2) if an individual proves a violation under § 2000e-2(m), the employer can avail itself of a limited affirmative defense that restricts the available remedies if it demonstrates that it would have taken the same action absent the impermissible motivating factor, § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Respondent, who was petitioner's only female warehouse worker and heavy equipment operator, had problems with management and her co-workers, which led to escalating disciplinary sanctions and her ultimate termination. She subsequently filed this lawsuit, asserting, inter alia, a Title VII sex discrimination claim. Based on the evidence she presented at trial, the District Court denied petitioner's motion for judgment as a matter of law and submitted the case to the jury. The District Court instructed the jury, as relevant here, that if respondent proved by a preponderance of the evidence that sex was a motivating factor in the adverse work conditions imposed on her, but petitioner's conduct was also motivated by lawful reasons, she was entitled to damages unless petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have treated her similarly had gender played no role. Petitioner unsuccessfully objected to this instruction, claiming that respondent had not adduced "direct evidence" that sex was a motivating factor in petitioner's decision. The jury awarded respondent backpay and compensatory and punitive damages, and the District Court denied petitioner's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. A Ninth Circuit panel vacated and remanded, agreeing with petitioner that the District Court had erred in giving the mixed-motive instruction. The en banc court, however, reinstated the judgment, finding that the 1991 Act does not impose any special evidentiary requirement.

Held: Direct evidence of discrimination is not required for a plaintiff to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Title VII. The starting point for this Court's analysis is the statutory text. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-254. Where, as here, the statute's words are unambiguous, the judicial inquiry is complete. Id., at 254. Section 2000e-2(m) unambiguously states that a plaintiff need only demonstrate that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to any employment practice. On its face, it does not mention that a plaintiff must make a heightened showing through direct evidence. Moreover, Congress explicitly defined "demonstrates" as to "mee[t] the burdens of production and persuasion." § 2000e-2(m). Had Congress intended to require direct evidence, it could have included language to that effect in § 2000e-2(m), as it has unequivocally done when imposing heightened proof requirements in other circumstances. See, e. g., 42 U. S. C. § 5851(b)(3)(D). Title VII's silence also suggests that this Court should not depart from the conventional rule of civil litigation generally applied in Title VII cases, which requires a plaintiff to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence using direct or circumstantial evidence. This Court has often acknowledged the utility of circumstantial evidence in discrimination cases and has never questioned its adequacy in criminal cases, even though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. Finally, the use of the term "demonstrates" in other Title VII provisions tends to show that § 2000e-2(m) does not incorporate a direct evidence requirement. See e. g., § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Pp. 98-102.

299 F. 3d 838, affirmed.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 102.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.

Mark J. Ricciardi argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Roger K. Quillen, Paul A. Ades, and Corbett N. Gordon.

Irving L. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae. On the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorneys General McCallum and Boyd, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Dennis J. Dimsey, and Teresa Kwong.

Robert N. Peccole argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Eric Schnapper.^*

JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before us in this case is whether a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act). We hold that direct evidence is not required.

I

A

Since 1964, Title VII has made it an "unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . ., because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 78 Stat. 255, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), the Court considered whether an employment decision is made "because of" sex in a "mixed-motive" case, i. e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the decision. The Court concluded that, under § 2000e-2(a)(1), an employer could "avoid a finding of liability . . . by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed gender to play such a role." Id., at 244; see id., at 261, n. (White, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 261 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). The Court was divided, however, over the predicate question of when the burden of proof may be shifted to an employer to prove the affirmative defense.

Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four Justices, would have held that "when a plaintiff.. . proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's gender into account." Id., at 258 (emphasis added). The plurality did not, however, "suggest a limitation on the possible ways of proving that [gender] stereotyping played a motivating role in an employment decision." Id., at 251-252.

Justice White and JUSTICE O'CONNOR both concurred in the judgment. Justice White would have held that the case was governed by Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U. S. 274 (1977), and would have shifted the burden to the employer only when a plaintiff "show[ed] that the unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action." Price Waterhouse, supra, at 259. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, like Justice White, would have required the plaintiff to show that an illegitimate consideration was a "substantial factor" in the employment decision. 490 U. S., at 276. But, under JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S view, "the burden on the issue of causation" would shift to the employer only where "a disparate treatment plaintiff [could] show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the decision." Ibid. (emphasis added).

Two years after Price Waterhouse, Congress passed the 1991 Act "in large part [as] a response to a series of decisions of this Court interpreting the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U. S. 244, 250 (1994). In particular, § 107 of the 1991 Act, which is at issue in this case, "respond[ed]" to Price Waterhouse by "setting forth standards applicable in `mixed motive' cases" in two new statutory provisions.¹ 511 U. S., at 251. The first establishes an alternative for proving that an "unlawful employment practice" has occurred:

"Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(m).

The second provides that, with respect to "a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m)," the employer has a limited affirmative defense that does not absolve it of liability, but restricts the remedies available to a plaintiff. The available remedies include only declaratory relief, certain types of injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).² In order to avail itself of the affirmative defense, the employer must "demonstrat[e] that [it] would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." Ibid.

Since the passage of the 1991 Act, the...