54 N.E. 903 (Ill. 1899), Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Sittig

Citation:54 N.E. 903, 181 Ill. 111
Opinion Judge:CARTER, J.
Attorney:John A. Post and John B. Brady, for plaintiff in error. Thornton & Chancellor, for defendant in error.
Case Date:October 13, 1899
Court:Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 903

54 N.E. 903 (Ill. 1899)

181 Ill. 111




Supreme Court of Illinois

October 13, 1899

Error to appellate court, First district.

Action by Hannah M. Sittig against the Fidelity & Casualty Company on a policy of accident insurance. From a judgment of the appellate court affirming a judgment of the lower court in favor of plaintiff (79 Ill.App. 245), defendant brings error. Affirmed.

John A. Post and John B. Brady, for plaintiff in error.

Thornton & Chancellor, for defendant in error.


The appellate court has affirmed a judgment recovered by appellee in the superior court of Cook county against appellant on a policy of accident insurance. The insured, Herman C. Sittig, was accidentally killed while attempting to board a suburban train of the Illinois Central Railroad Company. The appellate court, [181 Ill. 112] in stating the case, said: 'The evidence tends to show that he reached the neighborhood of the steps of the station platform just after the train had started; that he threw his valise on the platform of the car, seized the railing, and attempted to climb on, but either lost his hold or fell after being carried some distance, or else was knocked off and killed by coming in contact with a small building used as a ticket office, which stood very near the track, and distant about one hundred and forty feet from the station platform.' The evidence shows that this is a fair statement of the accident. The insured was a traveling salesman, and so described in the policy, which stated that 'this insurance covers injuries received in travel by regular passenger or mail trains.' The policy also contained this clause: 'This insurance does not cover * * * voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger;' and the contention of the appellant is that the insured met his death by exposing himself voluntarily to unnecessary danger, and that for that reason the judgment cannot be sustained. So far as the assignment of error embraces the question of fact involved in the decision of the appellate court, such decision is, by virtue of the statute, final, and we shall not, therefore, follow appellant's counsel in their argument upon the facts. But at the close of the evidence the defendant asked the court to instruct the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, and took an exception to the court's refusal to give the instruction, and...

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