Williams v. Baker

Decision Date07 April 1988
Docket NumberNo. 84-1508.,84-1508.
Citation540 A.2d 449
PartiesJoyce L. WILLIAMS, et al., Appellants, v. Mark BAKER, M.D., et al., Appellees.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Linda S. Matlin, with whom Robert D. Sokolove, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellants.

Laurence T. Scott, with whom Leo A. Roth, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellees.

Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, BELSON, Associate Judge, and REILLY, Senior Judge.

REILLY, Senior Judge:

Despite the old maxim that "money brings no solace to those that grieve," there is a school of thought which would have us believe that the voice of lamentation can be stilled by judgments compensating the grievant for emotional distress. The established rule in this jurisdiction, however, is that "there can be no recovery for negligently caused emotional distress, mental disturbance, or any consequences thereof, where there has been no accompanying physical injury." District of Columbia v. Smith, 436 A.2d 1294, 1296 (D.C. 1981), citing Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 (D.C. 1980); Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 59 App.D.C. 42, 44, 32 F.2d 938, 940, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 577, 50 S.Ct. 31, 74 L.Ed. 627 (1929).1

We are now urged to overrule this line of authority on the ground that it is an archaic principle of torts law, repudiated in recent years by the appellate courts of numerous jurisdictions where it once prevailed. After examining the decisions upon which appellant relies, we are unpersuaded by the rationale set forth by the authors of the majority opinions in those cases, and decline to discard the rule which has long guided this court and its predecessors. Accordingly, we affirm the order granting summary judgment to the defendants on appellant's claim.2

According to the allegations of the complaint and supporting affidavits, the events which prompted appellant to bring an action for damages against Children's Hospital and Mark Baker, M.D., may be summarized as follows:

One August afternoon, appellant brought her son — then about three years old — to the emergency room of Children's Hospital, as she had observed such symptoms of illness as fever (102°), sore throat, and gagging. The little boy, while sitting in his mother's lap, was examined by a staff physician, Dr. Baker, who concluded that the child was suffering from a minor virus3 which did not require hospitalization. He released the child to his mother's home care, prescribing a specified quantity of aspirin and other tablets.

Late that night, the child was seized by a coughing spell, then choking and loss of consciousness. Appellant summoned an ambulance to Capitol Hill Hospital where the symptoms, severe respiratory distress and stupor, were diagnosed as "acute epiglottitis."4 The staff alleviated the child's inability to breathe by inserting a tube in his throat. He was transferred to Children's Hospital still in critical condition, placed in the intensive care unit for three days, and then treated for a further period of ten days in another part of the hospital.

Almost two years later, mother (appellant) and son, commenced an action by filing a complaint, captioned "negligence action for damages for medical malpractice and negligent infliction for emotional distress." The gravamen of the mother's claim — she demands the sum of $1,000,000 in damages — is that the asserted misdiagnosis of Dr. Baker was the product of a negligent examination, thereby causing appellant severe emotional distress from which she is still suffering.5 She stresses the fact that she was with her son throughout the episode and stayed at the hospital where her son was confined during his subsequent medical emergency and treatment.

In describing the lasting effects of her emotional distress, appellant specifies, inter alia, that after being told that her son had survived a life threatening episode, she continued to feel hysterical and worried "about the possibility of brain damage," paced the floor during the first night the child was in the hospital, could not sleep the following forty-eight hour period, refused to leave the hospital, and was unable to eat for several days. For months after her son returned home, her anxiety and nervousness continued, manifesting itself in sleeplessness and digestive problems. She eventually sought out a psychiatrist to help her overcome her emotional distress.

After filing an answer, defendants below moved for summary judgment on the mother's claim, pointing out that it was predicated solely upon emotional distress or psychic injury as distinguished from physical injury. In granting the motion, the court gave no reasons for its conclusion, but presumably relied upon the line of authorities, supra, holding that there can be no recovery for negligent infliction of emotional or nervous distress. Pursuant to Super.Ct. Civ.R. 54(b), this order was certified by the trial judge as a final judgment. Upon such certification, the order became appealable even though it was a judgment which was final only as to one plaintiff.6

The rule against recovery for the consequences of negligent infliction of emotional distress, e.g., fright, nervous shock, anxiety, grief, etc., was adopted at least ninety years ago in this jurisdiction, when its highest court reversed a jury award to a plaintiff injured in a trolley car collision to the extent that it was based upon an impairment of the nervous system. Washington and Georgetown R.R. Co. v. Dashiell, 7 App.D.C. 507, 514-15 (1896). That decision was cited and followed some thirty-four years later by the same court in the leading case of Perry v. Capital Traction Co., supra, 59 App.D.C. at 42, 32 F.2d at 938. There, notwithstanding evidence that as a result of nervous shock when the collision occurred, the plaintiffs suffered from crying spells, headaches, loss of sleep, mental anguish, etc., the court affirmed a ruling forbidding jury consideration of damages for these ailments. According to the court:

The reason underlying the rule announced in the Dashiell Case, 34 years ago (a rule supported by the great weight of authority), is that mere fright is easily simulated and difficult to disprove, and that impairment of the nervous system is of such an intangible character that there is no practical standard by which the extent of the impairment may be determined. Where there has been a substantial physical injury, medical testimony and common knowledge may furnish a guide for measuring the pain and suffering incidental to the injury; but when, as here, there has been no substantial physical injury, a jury ought not to be permitted to indulge in conjecture and speculation as to the effects of alleged nervous shock or fright.

Id. at 43-44, 32 F.2d at 939-40.

In 1966, the Federal Court of Appeals for this circuit clarified the Perry opinion by holding in an automobile negligence case (trial without a jury) that the trial court had erred in refusing to consider evidence that plaintiff's physical injuries (lacerations of left arm and injury to right shoulder, for which more than nominal damages were awarded) had given rise to a neurotic condition disabling her from continuing in employment, on the ground that the physical injury must be "substantial." Parrish v. United States, 123 U.S. App.D.C. 149, 357 F.2d 828 (1966) (per curiam). Thus, plaintiffs seeking damages for mental disorder need no longer plead or prove that the causative physical injury was substantial. See dicta in Waldon v. Covington, supra, 415 A.2d at 1076 n. 20; Garber v. United States, 188 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 173 n. 2, 578 F.2d 414, 415 n. 2 (1978).

The Parrish holding has led some litigants (including appellant here) to characterize the governing limitation on recovery for mental disorders in this jurisdiction as equivalent to the "impact" rule. Such rule has been depicted by critics as illogical and artificial, who point to decisions in other states where damages for consequential mental disturbances have been allowed where the physical injury is trivial, e.g., a slight blow or jar, dust in the eye, smoke inhalation, and the like.7 The rule in this jurisdiction cannot be assailed on this score, for the Parrish opinion requires more than minimal physical injury. As the court in that case put it — after noting that the trial court should have determined "whether appellant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that her nervous troubles were attributable to the injuries sustained in the accident" — the test is not whether the physical injury is substantial, but whether the "alleged psychiatric disorders are a proximate result of the physical injuries. . . ." Parrish, supra, 123 U.S.App.D.C. at 150, 357 F.2d at 829 (emphasis supplied).

The District of Columbia was by no means the only jurisdiction to restrict the scope of claims for mental disorders not caused by physical injury resulting from the negligent conduct of another. Such claims, when first advanced, were deemed noncompensable in England,8 New York,9 Massachusetts,10 and other industrial states.11

In denying recovery for physical ailments stemming from fright or nervous shock, several courts, in addition to the grounds expressed in the Perry and Dashiell cases, supra, reasoned that such illnesses are not the normal consequence of fright or other mental disturbance. The court in Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) — for generations cited as a "leading" case, perhaps because of the concurrence of Holmes, then the Chief Justice of Massachusetts — conceded that "[g]reat emotion may . . . produce physical effects. . . . The action of the heart, the circulation of the blood . . . as well as the nerves and the appetite, may all be affected." Id. at 288, 47 N.E. at 88-89. Notwithstanding, the court went on to say:12

It would seem, therefore, that the real reason for refusing damages...

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  • Williams v. Baker
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