Jones v. Walker
| Decision Date | 20 August 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-13562.,04-13562. |
| Parties | Melvin C. JONES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Victor WALKER, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Matthew Dexter Richardson (Court-Appointed), Alston & Bird, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Jones.
Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, GA, for Walker.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and TJOFLAT, ANDERSON, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES, BARKETT, HULL, MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
In August 1996, Petitioner-Appellant Melvin Jones was convicted in Georgia state court of felony murder and cruelty to a child, in connection with the death of his infant daughter. On February 28, 2003, Jones filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, contending he was forced to represent himself at trial in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The district court denied the petition, but a panel of this Court reversed. We granted en banc review to determine whether Jones validly waived his right to counsel.
Reviewing Jones' claim de novo, we conclude Jones voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Moreover, because he failed to meet his burden of proving the waiver was unknowing, we conclude Jones is not entitled to habeas relief. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
On July 25, 1995, Melvin Jones' three-month-old daughter, Jennifer Andrews, died while in her father's care. An autopsy revealed her death was caused by a subdural hematoma, resulting from blunt force trauma to her head and face.
Several months later, Jones was indicted for felony murder and cruelty to a child, and experienced public defender Claudia Saari was appointed to represent him. Trial was set for March 25, 1996.
From the beginning, Jones took issue with Saari's management of his case, and on February 8, 1996, he moved for new counsel. In a written order, the trial court denied the motion without hearing, explaining:
Although Defendant is entitled to counsel, he is not entitled to counsel of his own choosing. The Court has already informed Defendant of this fact when he previously requested private counsel be appointed. Ms. Claudia Saari of the DeKalb County Public Defendant's Office is well-qualified to represent the Defendant, and the Court is satisfied with her representation.
One month later, Saari requested a hearing to address the question of representation; on March 14, 1996, a hearing was convened. When Saari explained that Jones was expressing dissatisfaction with her representation, the court turned to Jones and stated simply:
Not satisfied with the court's response, Jones argued:
Jones: Your Honor, it seems to me that under the Constitution it guarantees me the right to have a sufficiency of counsel all through the proceedings. I'm not waiving this right to have counsel assist me. I just do not want her because she's ineffective assistance.
Despite the court's admonition, Jones continued to debate Saari's merits as counsel.
The court was not swayed:
The exchange between the court and Jones continued in this vein, with the court insisting it would not appoint another lawyer, and Jones insisting he was not waiving his right to counsel:
Court: [Y]ou can figure out what you want to do. If you don't want her to represent you, you're not going to have a lawyer.
Jones: Well, I'm not waiving my right to have counsel assist me, and I'm not proceeding pro se. I do not wish to proceed pro se.
Jones:—And I do not wish to proceed pro se.
Court: Well, you'll be pro se. If you don't want her you're going to be pro se.
A short time thereafter, Jones' mother arrived in court. In Jones' presence, the judge spoke to her at length, explaining the situation and asking her to talk to her son about accepting Saari's representation. The judge emphasized Saari's qualifications, stating:
I've appointed him a lawyer. She is a fine lawyer. She's recently tried a death penalty case up here and got the guy out of the death penalty. For some reason he doesn't want her to represent him. And I don't have any choice, I'm required to furnish him a lawyer. I've furnished him a fine lawyer, and apparently he doesn't want her. So he's either going to have her as his lawyer or he'll have to represent himself. I've tried to explain that to him umpteen times, and I cannot get through to him. So he decided this morning that he'd rather represent himself, I gather, than having [sic] Ms. Saari to represent him. So I thought maybe you might could talk to him or something. If I were charged with a crime myself, I don't know of anybody I'd prefer to have represent me more than Ms. Saari.
The court urged Jones' mother to speak with her son about his decision; however, Jones would have none of it. After renewing his barrage of complaints against Saari, Jones engaged in the following exchange with the court:
Jones: I'm not waiving my right to have counsel assist me, but I do not want ineffective assistance, and I did want the record to reflect that.
Court: You don't want Ms. Saari? Just tell me that.
Jones: I'm not waiving—I'm not waiving my right to have counsel—counsel assist me.
Court: Well, you're either going to have her or you're not going to have her, and you're going to make that decision.
Instead of making his decision, Jones continued providing unresponsive statements critical of his lawyer. When the judge had heard enough, he turned to Saari, stating:
Well, I'm tired. I've been wrestling with him I don't know how long. I'm going to send—if he don't want you, you just don't represent him, that's all there is to it.
And with that, Saari was discharged.
Trial was rescheduled for May 25, 1996.
On May 13, 1996, Jones had a change of heart, and wrote to the court asking to have Saari reappointed to his case. In his letter, Jones explained:
I'm writing to let you know that I have talked with Ms. Saari and we have come to an agreement. Your Honor I am not totally equipt [sic] to defend myself, being unfamilliar [sic] with the rules of evidence. I'm not saying that I agree with every choice she has made in my case, but I do hope she will avoid any futher [sic] conflict. Because I'm left no choice I do [sic] wish to proceed with Ms. Saari instead of proceeding alone. Your Honor with all do [sic] respect I do hope that you will allow Ms. Saari to proceed to trial with me.
The court granted the request, Saari was reappointed, and the trial was again rescheduled, this time for August 19, 1996.
From May until August the case proceeded without incident. Then, in early August, Jones again began complaining about the quality of Saari's representation. On August 8, 1996, a second hearing was convened before the district court. At that hearing, Jones challenged Saari's decision not to call as witnesses his nine-year-old cousin and a medical expert whose cause of death determination differed only slightly from the testimony of the Government's expert witness. Saari, in turn, objected to Jones' attempts to dictate trial strategy:
Mr. Jones had requested that I do certain things, in particular file a motion to suppress his statement [to the police] .... I informed him at that time that I would not do anything or suppress anything if I felt that it was going to help his case, and likewise I would not do anything, even if he requested it, that I felt might hurt his case. I explained to him that I will certainly always listen to his opinions, but when it comes down to what sort of motions [sic] file, when it comes down to the trial of this case, that is where my education, my experience come into play, and those are the kind of decisions that I'll be making. His decisions are if he wants to plead guilty or not guilty, if he wants a jury trial, if he wants to testify. Those are all of his rights to make that decision [sic], but anything else I would make the decision on whether or not to file a motion to suppress evidence that I think might help his case.
After exploring Jones' complaints and determining Saari was handling the case responsibly, the judge once again offered Jones two options:
[Y]ou're going to do one of two things. You're either going to have her to represent you or you're going to represent yourself. Now, you're going to have to figure out what you're going to do, and you're going to have to decide it today.
Jones continued to argue his lawyer was incompetent and had a conflict of interest that prevented her from representing him properly. The exchanges between the trial judge and Jones mirrored those at the March 14 hearing, and reveal the court's mounting frustration...
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