Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel School Dist.

Citation540 F.3d 752
Decision Date02 September 2008
Docket NumberNo. 08-1139.,No. 07-3437.,07-3437.,08-1139.
PartiesChris LOWRY, by, through, and with his Mother, Wendy CROW; Colton Dougan, by, through, and with his Father, Frank Dougan and his Mother, Leigh Dougan; Michael Joseph, by, through, and with his Mother, Heidi Joseph; Wendy Crow; Frank Dougan; Leigh Dougan; Heidi Joseph, Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. WATSON CHAPEL SCHOOL DISTRICT; Charles Daniel Knight, Watson Chapel School District Superintendent, in his individual and official capacities, Defendants/Appellants, Charles Daniels, Watson Chapel School Board President; Sandra C. Boone, Vice President, in her individual capacity; Donnie Hartsfield, Secretary, in his individual capacity; Danny Holcomb, member, in his individual capacity; Jim Johnson, member, in his individual capacity; Maxine Nelson, member, in her individual capacity; John Treglown, in his individual capacity, Defendants, Henry Webb, in his individual and official capacities as Principal of Watson Chapel Junior High, Defendant/Appellant.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Michael J. Dennis, argued, Brandon C. Robinson, on the brief, Pine Bluff, AR, for appellants.

Rebekah J. Kennedy, argued, Fort Smith, AR, Holly Dickson, ACLU, on the brief, Little Rock, AR, for appellees.

Before SMITH and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges, and ROSENBAUM,1 District Judge.

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Chris Lowry, Colton Dougan, and Micheal Joseph (collectively "plaintiffs"),2 students in the Watson Chapel School District ("school district") during the events in question, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the school district, the school district's superintendent, the principal of Watson Chapel Junior High, and the school district's school board members (collectively referred to as "defendants")3 violated plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. At the beginning of the trial, the district court4 held that plaintiffs had established a violation of their constitutional rights and, accordingly, submitted only the issue of damages to the jury. The jury found that plaintiffs had proven neither compensatory nor punitive damages and awarded each plaintiff zero dollars—subsequently the district court granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment to reflect an award of nominal damages. The district court also issued a permanent injunction and granted plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and expenses. Defendants now appeal, arguing that the district court erred in: (1) holding that plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were violated; (2) granting plaintiffs' motion to amend the jury verdict to reflect nominal damages; (3) making the preliminary injunction permanent in part; and (4) awarding plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs. We affirm.

I. Background

In the summer of 2006, the school district implemented a mandatory school uniform policy ("the policy"), with specific provisions focused on grades seven through twelve. The school board intended the policy to "promote equal educational opportunity through economical access to appropriate school clothing and orderly, uniform apparel standards for students." The policy required students to "wear the school uniform while in school, on school buses, and at designated school bus stops." Paragraph 17 of the policy stated that "any attempt to defeat the uniformity intended by this policy is prohibited."

Several students and parents opposed the policy or the way it was enforced, and some of these parents and students organized a protest. On September 30, 2006, these parents and students handed out black armbands to be worn to school in protest of the policy on October 6, 2006. On that day, several junior and senior high school students wore the black armbands but did not wear them over any part of the school uniform. The school construed the student's conduct as an attempt to defeat the uniformity intended by the policy and disciplined the students who wore the armbands citing their violation of the uniform policy. On its face, the school uniform policy allows students to wear jewelry, including wristbands,5 "but the jewelry may not overlap any part of the uniform."6 Plaintiffs each wore the armbands to school either on the wrist, forearm or biceps and none wore the armband over any part of the uniform. Each plaintiff was disciplined for wearing the armband.

Lowry also handed out a flyer critical of the school uniform policy without obtaining approval from the principal before doing so. The one-line 2006-2007 student literature review policy prohibited the "distribution of petitions or other printed matter not approved in advance by the principal." Lowry was also disciplined for violation of the student literature review policy.

On October 10, 2006, plaintiffs filed a complaint claiming that defendants violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by punishing plaintiffs for wearing black armbands as a symbol of protest. The complaint requested declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Plaintiffs simultaneously moved for a preliminary injunction to stop defendants from: (1) disciplining plaintiffs in any way for wearing the black armbands; (2) taking any further disciplinary action against plaintiffs on account of the black armbands; and (3) excluding plaintiffs from participation in school clubs or extracurricular activities. The motion also requested that defendants be ordered to expunge the discipline of plaintiffs related to wearing the black armbands from all student records. The district court granted the motion and ordered that defendants be preliminarily enjoined from disciplining any student who wore a band substantially similar to plaintiffs' around the wrist.

On February 22, 2007, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which included three new claims for relief in addition to the original claim, which was count one: (1) discipline of students for wearing armbands violated the First Amendment; (2) the student apparel policy violated the First Amendment; (3) defendants' enforcement of the student apparel policy violated plaintiffs' right to due process; (4) the student literature policy violated the First Amendment.

Subsequently, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment arguing that the school board members and administrators were entitled to qualified immunity on all of the claims against them in their individual capacities. The motion was granted in part and denied in part. In its order and opinion addressing this motion, the district court found that the student uniform policy contravened no provision of the Constitution and that, in the alternative, a reasonable school board member would not have known that the policy was unconstitutional. As to the student literature review policy, the district court surmised that we, the Eighth Circuit, would likely hold the 2006-2007 student literature review policy unconstitutional, but the district court could not find that the law was so clearly established that school board members should have known that it was unconstitutional. Therefore, the school board members were entitled to qualified immunity on that issue. Because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Knight and Webb imposed discipline to suppress a viewpoint, the court denied summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity with respect to the claims against Knight and Webb in their individual capacities. The court found that there was evidence that the discipline was imposed to suppress a particular viewpoint and that, absent evidence that wearing the armbands or distributing the flyers would substantially interfere with the work of the school, the right of the students to engage in such conduct was established in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969).

As the trial began on September 11, 2007, defendants stipulated that: (1) the discipline imposed on plaintiffs for wearing black armbands to school on October 6, 2006, was imposed because the black armbands signified disagreement with the student apparel policy; and (2) the wearing of the black armbands caused no material disruption or substantial interference with school. Based on these stipulations, the district court held that the facts necessary to establish a violation of plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment as outlined in Tinker were no longer in dispute, leaving damages as the only factual issue for the jury.7 The district court instructed the jury, without objection, "If you find that the plaintiffs' damages have no monetary value, then you must return a verdict for the plaintiffs in the nominal amount of One Dollar ($1.00)."

On September 13, 2007, the jury found, in relevant part, that plaintiffs each had proven zero dollars in damages by a preponderance of the evidence. The next day, the court entered judgment in favor of Knight and Webb on plaintiffs' claims against them in their individual capacities for money damages. In the weeks following, plaintiffs timely filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment to reflect an award of one dollar in nominal damages. The court granted the motion.

On October 31, 2007, the district court held that the previously entered preliminary injunction would be made permanent in part and dissolved in part. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from disciplining any student for wearing a band substantially similar to plaintiffs' armband around the wrist or any part of the arm not touching or covering any part of the school uniform. The court dissolved as moot that portion of the injunction enjoining defendants from using the events of October 6, 2006, in progressive discipline or to the detriment of plaintiffs. The district court also declined to enjoin the 2006-2007 student literature policy because that policy was no longer in effect.

Two weeks...

To continue reading

Request your trial
73 cases
  • Johnson v. Charps Welding & Fabricating, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • 7 Febrero 2020
    ...Ass’n. v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. , 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866(1989). See also Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist. , 540 F.3d 752, 765 (8th Cir. 2008). In such situations, "the congressional intent to limit fee awards to prevailing parties requires that these......
  • Clary v. City of Cape Girardeau
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 29 Febrero 2016
    ...other parties; (3) whether the movant proves actual success on the merits; and (4) the public interest.Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist. , 540 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Forest Park II v. Hadley , 336 F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir.2003), and citing, among other cases, Datap......
  • Langford v. City of St. Louis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 5 Marzo 2020
    ...parties; (3) whether the movant proves actual success on the merits; and (4) the public interest." Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist. , 540 F.3d 752, 762 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Forest Park II v. Hadley , 336 F.3d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 2003), and citing, among other cases, Datapha......
  • McGehee v. Hutchinson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas
    • 31 Mayo 2020
    ...361, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968) (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist. , 540 F.3d 752, 761 n.8 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that defendants' voluntary change of potentially unconstitutional student apparel policy did no......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Prisoners' Rights
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • 1 Agosto 2022
    ...$1 in nominal damages for § 1983 claim, but attorney’s fees limited by PLRA’s 150% cap); Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 764-65 (8th Cir. 2008) (plaintiffs entitled to attorney’s fees, despite only receiving nominal damages, because injunction obtained benef‌it......
  • Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, Nominal Damages, and the Roberts Stratagem
    • United States
    • University of Georgia School of Law Georgia Law Review (FC Access) No. 56-3, 2022
    • Invalid date
    ...First Amendment rights).218. 837 F.3d 564, 567 (5th Cir. 2016) (detailing the consent decree); see also Lowry v. Watson Chapel Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 752, 765 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the student's "free speech right vindicated was not readily reducible to a sum of money," so nominal dam......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT