540 U.S. 551 (2004), 02-811, Groh v. Ramirez
|Docket Nº:||No. 02-811|
|Citation:||540 U.S. 551, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068, 72 U.S.L.W. 4160|
|Party Name:||Groh v. Ramirez|
|Case Date:||February 24, 2004|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued November 4, 2003
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Petitioner, a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agent, prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search respondents' Montana ranch, which stated that the search was for specified weapons, explosives, and records. The application was supported by petitioner's detailed affidavit setting forth his basis for believing that such items were on the ranch and was accompanied by a warrant form that he completed. The Magistrate Judge (Magistrate) signed the warrant form even though it did not identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize. The portion calling for a description of the "person or property" described respondents' house, not the alleged weapons; the warrant did not incorporate by reference the application's itemized list. Petitioner led federal and local law enforcement officers to the ranch the next, day but found no illegal weapons or explosives. Petitioner left a copy of the warrant, but not the application, with respondents. Respondents sued petitioner and others under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming, inter alia, a Fourth Amendment violation. The District Court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding no Fourth Amendment violation and finding that even if such a violation occurred, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed except as to the Fourth Amendment claim against petitioner, holding that the warrant was invalid because it did not describe with particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. The court also concluded that United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, precluded qualified immunity for petitioner because he was the leader of a search who did not read the warrant and satisfy himself that he understood its scope and limitations and that it was not obviously defective.
1. The search was clearly "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 557-563.
(a) The warrant was plainly invalid. It did not meet the Fourth Amendment's unambiguous requirement that a warrant "particularly describ[e] . . . the persons or things to be seized." The fact that the application adequately described those things does not save the warrant; Fourth Amendment interests are not necessarily vindicated when another
document says something about the objects of the search, but that document's contents are neither known to the person whose home is being searched nor available for her inspection. It is not necessary to decide whether the Amendment permits a warrant to cross-reference other documents, because such incorporation did not occur here. Pp. 557-558.
(b) Petitioner's argument that the search was nonetheless reasonable is rejected. Because the warrant did not describe the items at all, it was so obviously deficient that the search must be regarded as warrantless, and thus presumptively unreasonable. This presumptive rule applies to searches whose only defect is a lack of particularity in the warrant. Petitioner errs in arguing that such searches should be exempt from the presumption if they otherwise satisfy the particularity requirement's goals. Unless items in the affidavit are set forth in the warrant, there is no written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable cause for a search as broad as the affiant requested. The restraint petitioner showed in conducting the instant search was imposed by the agent himself, not a judicial officer. Moreover, the particularity requirement's purpose is not limited to preventing general searches; it also assures the individual whose property is searched and seized of the executing officer's legal authority, his need to search, and the limits of his power to do so. This case presents no occasion to reach petitioner's argument that the particularity requirements' goals were served when he orally described the items to respondents, because respondents dispute his account. Pp. 558-563.
2. Petitioner is not entitled to qualified immunity despite the constitutional violation because "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted," Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202. Given that the particularity requirement is stated in the Constitution's text, no reasonable officer could believe that a warrant that did not comply with that requirement was valid. Moreover, because petitioner prepared the warrant, he may not argue that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate's assurance that it contained an adequate description and was valid. Nor could a reasonable officer claim to be unaware of the basic rule that, absent consent or exigency, a warrantless search of a home is presumptively unconstitutional. "[A] warrant may be so facially deficient . . . that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. This is such a case. Pp. 563-565.
298 F.3d 1022 affirmed.
STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined., post, p. 566. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SCALIA, J., joined, and in which REHNQUIST, C.J., joined as to Part III, post, p. 571.
Petitioner conducted a search of respondents' home pursuant to a warrant that failed to describe the "persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const., Amdt. 4. The questions presented are (1) whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, and (2) if so, whether petitioner nevertheless is entitled to qualified immunity, given that a Magistrate Judge (Magistrate), relying on an affidavit that particularly described the items in question, found probable cause to conduct the search.
Respondents, Joseph Ramirez and members of his family, live on a large ranch in Butte-Silver Bow County, Montana. Petitioner, Jeff Groh, has been a Special Agent for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) since 1989. In February, 1997, a concerned citizen informed petitioner that on a number of visits to respondents' ranch the visitor had seen a large stock of weaponry, including an automatic rifle, grenades, a grenade launcher, and a rocket launcher. Based on that information, petitioner prepared and signed an application for a warrant to search the ranch. The application stated that the search was for
any automatic firearms or parts to automatic weapons, destructive devices to include but not limited to grenades, grenade launchers, rocket launchers, and any and all receipts pertaining to the purchase or manufacture of automatic weapons or explosive devices or launchers.
App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a. Petitioner supported the application with a detailed affidavit, which he also prepared and executed, that set forth the basis for his belief that the listed items were concealed on the ranch. Petitioner then presented these documents to a Magistrate, along with a warrant form that petitioner also had completed. The Magistrate signed the warrant form.
Although the application particularly described the place to be searched and the contraband petitioner expected to find, the warrant itself was less specific; it failed to identify any of the items that petitioner intended to seize. In the portion of the form that called for a description of the "person or property" to be seized, petitioner typed a description of respondents' two-story blue house rather than the alleged stockpile of firearms. The warrant did not incorporate by
reference the itemized list contained in the application. It did, however, recite that the Magistrate was satisfied the affidavit established probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed on the premises, and that sufficient grounds existed for the warrant's issuance.
The day after the Magistrate issued the warrant, petitioner led a team of law enforcement officers, including both federal agents and members of the local sheriff's department, in the search of respondents' premises. Although respondent Joseph Ramirez was not home, his wife and children were. Petitioner states that he orally described the objects of the search to Mrs. Ramirez in person and to Mr. Ramirez by telephone. According to Mrs. Ramirez, however, petitioner explained only that he was searching for "`an explosive device in a box.'" Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1026 (CA9 2002). At any rate, the officers' search uncovered no illegal weapons or explosives. When the officers left, petitioner gave Mrs. Ramirez a copy of the search warrant, but not a copy of the application, which had been sealed. The following day, in response to a request from respondents' attorney, petitioner faxed the attorney a copy of the page of the application that listed the items to be seized. No charges were filed against the Ramirezes.
Respondents sued petitioner and the other officers under Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and Rev.Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising eight claims, including violation of the Fourth Amendment. App. 17-27. The District Court entered summary judgment for all defendants. The court found no Fourth Amendment violation, because it considered the case comparable to one in which the warrant contained an inaccurate address, and in such a case, the court reasoned, the warrant is sufficiently
detailed if the executing officers can locate the correct house. App. to Pet. for Cert. 20a- 22a. The court added that even if a constitutional violation occurred, the defendants were entitled to qualified...
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