Davis v. Dallas County, Tex.
| Decision Date | 06 March 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-0318-D. |
| Citation | 541 F.Supp.2d 844 |
| Parties | Elizabeth DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Tina Marie Hall, Law Offices of Tina M. Hall, Terrell, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Mary Anne Haren Gallagher, Dolena T. Westergard, Peter L. Harlan, Robert Schell, Dallas County District Attorney's Office, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs move for leave to amend their complaint. Defendant Atos Origin, Inc. ("Atos Origin") moves to dismiss the claims against it under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and it moves for a protective order staying discovery until the court rules on its motion to dismiss. Concluding that plaintiffs have demonstrated good cause to amend, and that the amended complaint is sufficient to withstand Atos Origin's motion to dismiss, the court grants plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend, denies Atos Origin's motion to dismiss, and denies as moot Atos Origin's motion for protective order staying discovery.
In 2005 defendant Dallas County, with the assistance of defendant Info Integration, Inc. ("Info Integration"), installed a new computer system — known as the Adult Information System ("AIS") — for the Dallas County Jail ("Dallas Jail").1 At Dallas County's request, InfoIntegration designed AIS, which was intended to keep track of inmate information, including release dates, and to communicate this information among the various Dallas County agencies responsible for arrests, detentions, and releases: the Sheriffs Office, the jail system, the District Attorney's Office, and the District and County Clerk's Offices. Defects in AIS prevented Dallas County officials from receiving relevant inmate information, causing plaintiffs Elizabeth Davis ("Davis"), Billie Sue Byrd ("Byrd"), and Ronald Weathers ("Weathers") to be detained at the Dallas Jail beyond their correct release dates.
Plaintiffs sued Dallas County and InfoIntegration in state court, alleging that both were liable for common law negligence and that Dallas County was liable for civil rights violations. Defendants removed the case to this court. The court later granted InfoIntegration's motion to designate Atos Origin — the technology support contractor that Dallas County hired to integrate AIS into the existing Dallas County network — as a responsible third party under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004 (Vernon 1997). The court also granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint to join Atos Origin as a defendant. Plaintiffs then filed their first amended complaint. In the first amended complaint, plaintiffs allege that Atos Origin negligently integrated, programmed, and installed AIS, causing breakdowns in the communication of inmate information at the Dallas Jail that ultimately led to plaintiffs' wrongful incarceration.
Atos Origin now moves to dismiss plaintiffs' negligence claim against it under Rule 12(b)(6). Atos Origin argues that plaintiffs' first amended complaint fails to state a negligence cause of action on which relief can be granted because it does not adequately plead that Atos Origin owed plaintiffs a duty of care or that Atos Origin's negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Atos Origin also moves for dismissal of this claim on the ground that it is barred by limitations. Plaintiffs have responded to the motion and have also moved for leave to file a second amended complaint. In Atos Origin's reply brief, it directs arguments to both plaintiffs' first amended complaint and their proposed second amended complaint.
The court first considers whether plaintiffs are entitled to file a second amended complaint because, if they are, the court need not address Atos Origin's challenges to the sufficiency of the first amended complaint.
The court entered a scheduling order that set July 2, 2007 as the deadline for a party to file a motion for leave to amend the pleadings. Thus plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint — which was filed after the July 2, 2007 deadline — implicitly requests that the court amend this scheduling order.
When the deadline to amend pleadings has expired, a court considering a motion to amend must first determine whether to modify the scheduling order under the Rule 16(b)(4) good cause standard. See S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., N.A., 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir.2003); Am. Tourmaline Fields v. Int'l Paper Co., 1998 WL 874825, at *1 (N.D.Tex. Dec.7, 1998) (Fitzwater, J.). If the movant satisfies the requirements of Rule 16(b)(4), the court must next determine whether to grant leave to amend under the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a)(2), which provides that "[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Rule 15(a)(2); S & W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536; Am. Tourmaline Fields, 1998 WL 874825, at *1.
The court assesses four factors when deciding whether to grant an untimely motion for leave to amend: "(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice." S & W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend does not address the Rule 16(b)(4) standard or the four good cause factors. Instead, plaintiffs construed defendant's arguments that the first amended complaint inadequately alleges the elements of duty and proximate cause as a Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement. Atos Origin points out that plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once, and they have not even offered an explanation for their failure to timely move for leave to amend. Atos Origin's principal argument in opposition to granting leave to amend is that the amendment would be futile, because the defects in the first amended complaint — inadequately pleading the elements of duty and proximate cause and being barred by the statute of limitations — are also present in the second amended complaint. Finally, Atos Origin contends that granting plaintiffs leave to amend will prejudice them because a second amended complaint would force them to incur the additional expense of drafting another motion to dismiss.
Notwithstanding plaintiffs' failure to explain their reasons for not timely filing their motion for leave to amend, the court concludes that there is good cause to allow them to amend after the deadline established in the scheduling order. Although plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once, they first asserted their negligence claim against Atos Origin in the first amended complaint. Thus the second amended complaint represents only the first time that plaintiffs have amended their claims against Atos Origin.
The supplemental allegations in the proposed second amended complaint do not refer to any facts that were unavailable to plaintiffs before the deadline for amending the pleadings. But plaintiffs joined Atos Origin as a defendant in response to Info Integration's motion to designate Atos Origin as a responsible third party, only a week before the July 2, 2007 scheduling order deadline for filing motions for leave to amend.
Atos Origin will not be prejudiced by granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend because, if the motion is granted, the court will analyze the sufficiency of the second amended complaint in light of Atos Origin's arguments raised in its pending Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Although Atos Origin's motion to dismiss predates plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend, "the court may nevertheless treat defendant's motion as directed to the [second] amended complaint because the defects in [plaintiffs' amended] complaint reappear in the" [second] amended complaint." Holmes v. Nat'l Football League, 939 F.Supp. 517, 523 n. 7 (N.D.Tex.1996) (Fitzwater, J.); see also Pattern Elec. Co. v. Rampart Air, Inc., 777 F.Supp. 704, 713 (N.D.Ind.1991) () (quoting 6 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 at 556-58 (2d ed.1990)). Atos Origin argues that the second amended complaint contains the very same defects as are present in the first amended complaint. Atos Origin therefore contends that granting plaintiffs leave to file the second amended complaint would be futile. Moreover, in highlighting the inadequacy of plaintiffs' pleadings, Atos Origin repeatedly refers to the second amended complaint in its reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss. Thus if the court grants plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint, it will apply Atos Origin's Rule 12(b)(6) arguments to plaintiffs' second amended complaint. Therefore, granting plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend will not prejudice Atos Origin because Atos Origin will not be required to incur the additional expense of drafting another motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs' amendment to their pleadings is important to their case. If plaintiffs' alleged pleading defects are not cured, their claims against Atos Origin will be dismissed. Although Atos Origin attacks the importance of the amendment on the basis "that plaintiffs' amendment will be futile, for the reasons stated infra at § III-IV, the court disagrees.
Considering the factors in toto, the court concludes that there is good cause to permit plaintiffs to amend their complaint after the deadline established by the scheduling order. The court also discerns no compelling reason to deny granting leave under the more liberal Rule 15(a)(2) standard. Accordingly, the court grants plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.2
The court now...
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