Easter v. McNabb

• Decision Date: 08 October 1975
• Docket Number: No. 11889,11889
• Citation: 97 Idaho 180,541 P.2d 604
• Parties: Homer EASTER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Murl McNABB, Defendant, Counterclaimant-Appellant, v. Homer EASTER et al., Counterdefendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 604

541 P.2d 604

97 Idaho 180

Homer EASTER, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Murl McNABB, Defendant, Counterclaimant-Appellant, v. Homer EASTER et al., Counterdefendants-Respondents.

No. 11889.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Oct. 8, 1975.

Dennis M. Olsen, Petersen, Moss, Olsen & Beard, Idaho Falls, for appellant.

E. W. Pike and Jay B. Gaskill, Albaugh, Smith & Pike, Idaho Falls, and Thomas E. Moss, Stout & Moss, Blackfoot, for respondents.

DONALDSON, Justice.

This is an action for damages for injuries sustained by appellant Murl McNabb. McNabb was injured when the truck he was driving was struck by a car driven by Irwin Stoddard. Respondents, Homer Easter, Sam Cucchiara and Eugene Berry were passengers in the Stoddard vehicle. Stoddard and the respondents had just completed a three day fishing trip and were returning to their homes in Blackfoot when Stoddard crossed over the center of the highway and collided with McNabb. Stoddard was killed and Cucchiara, Easter and Berry was injured.

Stoddard's estate filed a negligence action against McNabb. McNabb counterclaimed and joined Cucchiara, Easter and Berry as additional counterdefendants on a theory of joint enterprise-arguing Stoddard's negligence should be imputed to them as members of the joint enterprise.

Easter and Cucchiara each filed separate actions against McNabb and McNabb counterclaimed in both cases, again under the theory of joint enterprise.

Cucchiara, Berry and Easter filed motions for summary judgment as to McNabb's claim against them in all three casses. The three were consolidated and the court granted the motions stating there was no genuine and material issue of fact involving the claim against the respondents and found as a matter of law that respondents were not engaged in a joint enterprise and thus the negligence, if any, of the driver Stoddard could not be imputed to them. McNabb appeals.

The Court is thus faced with the question of whether the negligence of the driver-owner will be imputed to the other occupants of the car. To answer this question requires a reexamination of the decisions formulated by this Court regarding the doctrine of joint enterprise. It is upon the basis of these opinions that appellant McNabb asserts that the respondents were vicariously liable for the injuries he sustained upon the theory that respondents and Stoddard had undertaken a trip of common purpose and that all had an equal right of control over the conduct of each other. Respondents urge that the proper test for finding a joint enterprise requires that the common purpose be a pecuniary one.

This Court first faced the issue of joint enterprise in Griffin v. Clark, 55 Idaho 364, 42 P.2d 297 (1935), wherein the Court stated:

'* * * The general rule appears to be that in order to constitute a joint enterprise with relation to the operation of an automobile there must be a joint interest or community of interest in the purpose of the undertaking, and an equal right, express or implied, to exercise some control over the conduct of each other in respect thereto. * * *.' Griffin v. Clark, supra, 375, 42 P.2d at 302.

It appears that with the exception of Griffin, the Idaho courts have only found a joint enterprise to exist when there has been some commercial purpose shared by the occupants of the vehicle. In Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714 (1968), the occupants were both insurance salesmen, while in Grant v. Clarke, 78 Idaho 412, 305 P.2d 752 (1957), the occupants were a motel owner and bookkeeper returning with books to the place of business. Thus, while Griffin established the defenition of joint enterprise to include occasions of community interest, this court has since limited the doctrine to occasions of commercial interest. In addition, it should be noted that liability in Griffin did not rest solely on a theory of joint enterprise, but rather it was found that the occupants of the car were engaged in a 'common and unlawful enterprise' in that the damages were the proximate result of false imprisonment committed by the defendant occupants. Griffin v. Clark, supra, 55 Idaho at 378, 42 P.2d 297.

In the instant case there is no alternative basis of liability, as there was in Griffin, and there is no pecuniary or commercial interest, as there was in Fawcett and Grant. The Court, faced with the prospect of applying the doctrine of Griffin as originally stated and without any limiting factors, will reconsider the doctrine of joint enterprise...