Engine Mfrs. Assn. v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-1343.,02-1343.
• Parties: ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT ET AL.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

541 U.S. 246

ENGINE MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT ET AL.

No. 02-1343.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued January 14, 2004.

Decided April 28, 2004.

Respondent South Coast Air Quality Management District (District)—the California subdivision responsible for air pollution control in the Los Angeles metropolitan area—enacted six Fleet Rules prohibiting the purchase or lease by various public and private fleet operators of vehicles that do not comply with requirements in the Rules. Petitioner Engine Manufacturers Association sued the District and its officials, claiming that the Fleet Rules were pre-empted by § 209 of the federal Clean Air Act (CAA), which prohibits the adoption or attempted enforcement of any state or local "standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines," 42 U. S. C. § 7543(a). In upholding the Rules, the District Court found that they were not "standard[s]" under § 209 because they regulate only the purchase of vehicles that are otherwise certified for sale in California, and distinguished decisions of the First and Second Circuits pre-empting similar state laws as involving a restriction on vehicle sales rather than vehicle purchases. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Held:

1. The Fleet Rules do not escape pre-emption just because they address the purchase of vehicles, rather than their manufacture or sale. Neither the District Court's interpretation of "standard" to include only regulations that compel manufacturers to meet specified emission limits nor its resulting distinction between purchase and sales restrictions finds support in § 209(a)'s text or the CAA's structure. The ordinary meaning of language employed by Congress is assumed accurately to express its legislative purpose. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U. S. 189, 194. Today, as when § 209(a) became law, "standard" means that which "is established by authority, custom, or general consent, as a model or example; criterion; test." Webster's Second New International Dictionary 2455. The criteria referred to in § 209 relate to the emission characteristics of a vehicle or engine. This interpretation is consistent with the use of "standard" throughout Title II of the CAA. Defining "standard" to encompass only production mandates confuses standards with methods of enforcing standards. Manufacturers (or purchasers) can be made responsible for ensuring that vehicles comply with emission standards, but the standards themselves are separate from enforcement techniques. While standards target vehicles and engines, standard-enforcement efforts can be directed toward manufacturers or purchasers. This distinction is borne out in the enforcement provisions immediately following CAA § 202. And § 246, which requires federal purchasing restrictions, shows that Congress contemplated the enforcement of emission standards through purchase requirements. A purchase/sale distinction also makes no sense, since a manufacturer's right to sell federally approved vehicles is meaningless absent a purchaser's right to buy them. Pp. 252-258.

2. While at least certain aspects of the Fleet Rules appear to be pre-empted, the case is remanded for the lower courts to address, in light of the principles articulated here, questions neither passed on below nor presented in the certiorari petition that may affect the ultimate disposition of petitioners' suit. Pp. 258-259.

309 F. 3d 550, vacated and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 259.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Jed R. Mandel, Timothy A. French, Jeffrey T. Green, Eric A. Shumsky, Kenneth S. Geller, Andrew J. Pincus, and John J. Sullivan.

Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Sansonetti, Deputy Solicitor General Hungar, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Clark, Jeffrey P. Minear, Greer S. Goldman, John A. Bryson, and R. Justin Smith.

Seth P. Waxman argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent South Coast Air Quality Management District were C. Boyden Gray, Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Luke A. Sobota, Daniel P. Selmi, Fran M. Layton, and Barbara Baird. Gail Ruderman Feuer and Christopher J. Wright filed a brief for respondents Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al.^*

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent South Coast Air Quality Management District (District) is a political subdivision of California responsible for air pollution control in the Los Angeles metropolitan area and parts of surrounding counties that make up the South Coast Air Basin. It enacted six Fleet Rules that generally prohibit the purchase or lease by various public and private fleet operators of vehicles that do not comply with stringent emission requirements. The question in this case is whether these local Fleet Rules escape pre-emption under § 209(a) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 81 Stat. 502, as renumbered and amended, 42 U. S. C. § 7543(a), because they address the purchase of vehicles, rather than their manufacture or sale.

I

The District is responsible under state law for developing and implementing a "comprehensive basinwide air quality management plan" to reduce emission levels and thereby achieve and maintain "state and federal ambient air quality standards." Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 40402(e) (West 1996). Between June and October 2000, the District adopted six Fleet Rules. The Rules govern operators of fleets of street sweepers (Rule 1186.1), of passenger cars, light-duty trucks, and medium-duty vehicles (Rule 1191), of public transit vehicles and urban buses (Rule 1192), of solid waste collection vehicles (Rule 1193), of airport passenger transportation vehicles, including shuttles and taxicabs picking up airline passengers (Rule 1194), and of heavy-duty on-road vehicles (Rule 1196). All six Rules apply to public operators; three apply to private operators as well (Rules 1186.1, 1193, and 1194).

The Fleet Rules contain detailed prescriptions regarding the types of vehicles that fleet operators must purchase or lease when adding or replacing fleet vehicles. Four of the Rules (1186.1, 1192, 1193, and 1196) require the purchase or lease of "alternative-fuel vehicles,"¹ and the other two (1191 and 1194) require the purchase or lease of either "alternative-fueled vehicles"² or vehicles that meet certain emission specifications established by the California Air Resources Board (CARB).³ CARB is a statewide regulatory body that California law designates as "the air pollution control agency for all purposes set forth in federal law." Cal Health & Safety Code Ann. § 39602 (West 1996). The Rules require operators to keep records of their purchases and leases and provide access to them upon request. See, e. g., Rule 1186.1(g)(1), App. 23. Violations expose fleet operators to fines and other sanctions. See Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 42400-42410, 40447.5 (West 1996 and Supp. 2004).

In August 2000, petitioner Engine Manufacturers Association sued the District and its officials, also respondents, claiming that the Fleet Rules are pre-empted by § 209 of the CAA, which prohibits the adoption or attempted enforcement of any state or local "standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines." 42 U. S. C. § 7543(a).⁴ The District Court granted summary judgment to respondents, upholding the Rules in their entirety. It held that the Rules were not "standard[s]" under § 209(a) because they regulate only the purchase of vehicles that are otherwise certified for sale in California. The District Court recognized that the Courts of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits had previously held that CAA § 209(a) pre-empted state laws mandating that a specified percentage of a manufacturer's in-state sales be of "zero-emission vehicles." See Association of Int'l Automobile Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Mass. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 208 F. 3d 1, 6-7 (CA1 2000); American Automobile Mfrs. Assn. v. Cahill, 152 F. 3d 196, 200 (CA2 1998).⁵ It did not express disagreement with these rulings, but distinguished them as involving a restriction on vehicle sales rather than vehicle purchases: "Where a state regulation does not compel manufacturers to meet a new emissions limit, but rather affects the purchase of vehicles, as the Fleet Rules do, that regulation is not a standard." 158 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1118 (CD Cal. 2001).

The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the reasoning of the District Court. 309 F. 3d 550 (2002). We granted certiorari. 539 U. S. 914 (2003).

II

Section 209(a) of the CAA states:

"No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part. No State shall require certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the control of emissions . . . as condition precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment." 42 U. S. C. § 7543(a).

The District Court's determination that this express pre-emption provision did not invalidate the Fleet Rules hinged on its interpretation of the word "standard" to include only regulations that compel manufacturers to meet specified emission limits. This interpretation of "standard" in turn caused the court to draw a distinction between purchase restrictions (not pre-empted) and sale restrictions (pre-empted). Neither the manufacturer-specific...