Quality Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.

• Citation: 542 F.2d 466
• Decision Date: 27 September 1976
• Docket Number: 75-1602,Nos. 75-1489,s. 75-1489
• Parties: 1976-2 Trade Cases 61,086 QUALITY MERCURY, INC., Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Page 466

542 F.2d 466

1976-2 Trade Cases 61,086

QUALITY MERCURY, INC., Appellant, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Appellees.

Nos. 75-1489, 75-1602.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 11, 1976.

Decided Sept. 27, 1976.

Charles A. Cox, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant; Michael J. Hoover, Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief.

Henry Halladay, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees Ford Motor Co. and Ford Marketing Corp. Lynn Krominga, Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief.

Harold D. Field, Jr., Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees Prestige Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., N. Grossman and H. I. Grossman; Charles A. Mays, Minneapolis, Minn., on the brief.

Before LAY, HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Quality Mercury, Inc. appeals from the district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).

The pleaded facts may be summarized as follows. Quality is an automobile dealer in Bloomington, Minnesota, a suburb of Minneapolis. It sells Mercury automobiles, which are manufactured by defendant Ford Motor Co. and marketed by the Lincoln-Mercury division of defendant Ford Marketing Corp. Under an agreement with Quality, Lincoln-Mercury may franchise another Mercury dealer only if the other dealer's place of business is more than ten miles from Quality's.

Defendant Prestige Lincoln-Mercury, operated by defendants N. Grossman and H. I. Grossman, sells Mercury and Lincoln automobiles in St. Louis Park, Minnesota, within the Minneapolis area but more than ten miles from Quality.

Quality, which has not been franchised to sell Lincolns, contends that no franchise has been allowed because in 1962, before Quality was in existence, Ford bound itself not to create another Lincoln dealership in the Minneapolis area without Prestige's consent. Quality contends that this in effect grants Prestige a contract in perpetuity and unlawfully prevents Ford from awarding Quality a Lincoln dealership.

Quality asserts further that this agreement is an unlawful combination and conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. As a result Quality contends it has been damaged, and "the public has and will continue to be injured by being deprived of a needed Lincoln outlet for sales, leasing and service in a large and significant trade area and the benefits of competition that would result from such an outlet." Quality prays for treble damages and injunctive relief.

The Prestige defendants (Prestige and the two Grossmans) filed an answer denying many of Quality's allegations. They admitted that, to induce the Grossmans to operate a Lincoln dealership, Ford promised not to open any Lincoln dealerships in Minneapolis for two years, and thereafter to do so only if "Lincoln penetration of Price Class in Minneapolis locality is less than District Average." ¹ In fact, Prestige asserts, Ford allowed two Lincoln dealerships in the Minneapolis area after it franchised Prestige. The Ford defendants filed a separate answer, substantially denying all of the allegations of the complaint.

Prestige and Ford both moved for judgment on the pleadings. Their motions were granted and Quality has appealed.

I.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, reads, in part, as follows:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. . . .

In Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958), the Supreme Court discussed the general purpose of the antitrust laws:

The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.

Id. at 4, 78 S.Ct. at 517.

We must construe all well pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw in favor of Quality all reasonable inferences and intendments from these facts. See National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 65 S.Ct. 354, 89 L.Ed. 383 (1945). In so construing the complaint, we find it alleges that Ford and Prestige have bound themselves to an arrangement whereby a horizontal competitor (Prestige) has a perpetual veto power over all applications for Lincoln franchises in the Minneapolis area, thus interfering with the "unrestrained interaction of competitive forces" in the Minneapolis automobile market.

With this construction of the complaint we must decide whether the plaintiff has stated a proper claim for relief under the antitrust laws.

Our initial inquiry is whether plaintiff has alleged, under § 1 of the Sherman Act, a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" in restraint of trade. If Ford's refusal to deal with Quality was merely a unilateral or independent decision there would be no such contract. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 39 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ed. 992 (1919). However, if more than mere unilateral action was involved, then Ford has created a combination. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 869, 19 L.Ed.2d 998 (1968); and United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 80 S.Ct. 503, 4 L.Ed.2d 505 (1960).

In order for Quality to show a "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy," it was not necessary to plead a formal agreement between Ford and Prestige. An allegation that their conduct was "joint or collaborative" was sufficient. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 86 S.Ct. 1321, 16 L.Ed.2d 415 (1966); Reed Brothers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 525 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055, 96 S.Ct. 787, 46 L.Ed.2d 645 (1976); American Motors Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975); and Ford Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc.,361 F.2d 874 (1st Cir. 1966). Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,388 U.S. 365, 391 n. 12, 87 S.Ct. 1856, 18 L.Ed.2d 1249 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Thus, whether an unlawful combination or conspiracy existed was to be judged by Ford's and Prestige's words and actions and not by the terms of the agreement. See United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra ; and American Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 365 F.Supp. 1073, 1090 (D.N.J.1973), aff'd in part, 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975). Accepting Quality's allegations as true and applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that Ford's action in denying Quality's application was not taken unilaterally, but rather "jointly or collaboratively" with its franchisee, Prestige.

However, not all "contracts, combinations . . . or conspiracies" in restraint of trade are unlawful. We must therefore determine whether the alleged restraint has some factual underpinning upon which it might be declared unreasonable. ²

In holding that vertical agreements granting exclusive franchises to dealers were not violative of antitrust laws, the district court relied on several decisions which have held that a manufacturer may terminate a distributorship held by one party and transfer it to another without violating the Sherman Act. Moreover, the manufacturer may consult with the new distributor, and, prior to termination of the old distributor, reach agreement with him about the termination and transfer. See Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062, 90 S.Ct. 752, 24 L.Ed.2d 755 (1970) and cases there cited; Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 100 U.S.App.D.C. 161, 243 F.2d 418 (1957); Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., 138 F.Supp. 899 (D.Md.), aff'd, 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823, 78 S.Ct. 30, 2 L.Ed.2d 38 (1957). The essential reasoned analysis behind these cases is that it is not an unreasonable restraint of trade for a franchisor to exercise his independent judgment as to with whom he chooses to deal. As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., supra, 388 U.S. at 376, 87 S.Ct. at 1864:

(A) manufacturer of a product other and equivalent brands of which are readily available in the market may select his customers, and for this purpose he may "franchise" certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his goods. Cf. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, (39 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ed. 992) (1919). If the restraint stops at that point if nothing more is involved than vertical "confinement" of the manufacturer's own sales of the merchandise to selected dealers, and if competitive products are readily available to others, the restriction, on these facts alone, would not violate the Sherman Act.

Most of the decisions dealing with further restraints, the issue left unanswered by Schwinn, have dealt with terminations or cancellations of dealers by a manufacturer pursuant to an agreement with either a competing or succeeding dealer. In Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson Sales Corp., supra, and Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., supra, manufacturers terminated dealerships pursuant to an agreement or understanding with a competing dealer. Both courts held that a manufacturer has a right to select his customers and may agree with one to exclude another, if: (1) the agreement is not a horizontal one between competitors; (2) the manufacturer is not using it to establish market dominance; or (3) the manufacturer is not using it to promote a monopoly.

The Packard decision was not unanimous. In his dissent Judge Bazelon emphasized that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict that the cancellation was not a unilateral decision by the manufacturer, but...