Pichler v. Unite

• Decision Date: 09 September 2008
• Docket Number: No. 06-4522.,No. 06-4721.,06-4522.,06-4721.
• Citation: 542 F.3d 380
• Parties: Elizabeth PICHLER; Kathleen F. Kelly; Russell Christian; Deborah Brown; Seth Nye; Holly Marston; Kevin Quinn; Jose L. Sabastro; Deborah A. Sabastro; Thomas Riley; Amy Riley; Russell Daubert; Carrie Daubert v. UNITE (Union Of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees, AFL-CIO), A New York Unincorporated Association; Bruce Raynor, A New York Resident; International Brotherhood of Teamsters AFL-CIO, Does 1-10. Unite Here, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

542 F.3d 380

Elizabeth PICHLER; Kathleen F. Kelly; Russell Christian; Deborah Brown; Seth Nye; Holly Marston; Kevin Quinn; Jose L. Sabastro; Deborah A. Sabastro; Thomas Riley; Amy Riley; Russell Daubert; Carrie Daubert v. UNITE (Union Of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees, AFL-CIO), A New York Unincorporated Association; Bruce Raynor, A New York Resident; International Brotherhood of Teamsters AFL-CIO, Does 1-10 Unite Here, Appellant.

No. 06-4522.

No. 06-4721.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued December 6, 2007.

Filed: September 9, 2008.

Paul R. Rosen, David B. Picker (Argued), Spector Gadon & Rosen, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Lawrence T. Hoyle, Jr. (Argued), Arlene Fickler, Arleigh P. Helfer III, John R. Timmer, Hoyle, Fickler, Herschel & Mathes LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

This case presents several issues of first impression in this court of appeals regarding application of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (the DPPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725. After certifying a class to proceed against the defendant-labor union, the District Court construed certain provisions of the DPPA and granted summary judgment to all but three of the named plaintiffs (plaintiffs). The court found that the union's labor organizing activities violated plaintiffs' privacy rights under the DPPA and awarded monetary and injunctive relief. However, the court granted the union summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims for punitive damages and dismissed the claims of the three other plaintiffs. The court deferred judgment as to classwide relief, awaiting appellate clarification on the novel issues raised. Both sides have appealed. We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I.

In the fall of 2002, the Union of Needletrades, Industrial & Textile Employees AFL-CIO (UNITE)¹ decided to launch a union organizing campaign targeting Cintas Corporation (Cintas). Cintas, the largest domestic employer in the industrial laundry industry, is philosophically opposed to unions and union organizing. UNITE was concerned with what it saw as Cintas' low wages, poor benefits, unsafe working conditions, discriminatory practices, and violations of various labor laws. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters AFL-CIO (Teamsters) already represented some Cintas employees, and the two unions therefore agreed to work together on the campaign.²

From its inception, a major component of the campaign to organize and unionize Cintas workers was finding potential legal claims against Cintas. UNITE sought to use litigation as a means of raising the standards in the industrial laundry industry, and to demonstrate to Cintas' employees the effectiveness and usefulness of labor organizing. UNITE believed that house calls were essential to the campaign's success because it thought workers would be reluctant to talk to union organizers at work for fear of retaliation by Cintas management. In order to contact employees, UNITE compiled lists of names and addresses of presumed Cintas workers from a variety of sources. Among these sources, UNITE used license plate numbers on cars found in Cintas parking lots to access information contained in state motor vehicle records relating to those license plates. This technique is known as "tagging."

Generally, UNITE organizers would enter or observe a Cintas parking lot and either write down or dictate into a tape recorder the license plate numbers on cars seen parked in, entering, or leaving the lot. The organizers would then take their lists of license plate numbers and access motor vehicle records either by using a Westlaw database or through private investigators or "information brokers." Appendix (App.) 229. The information brokers would — either directly or through intermediaries — obtain the information by applying to state motor vehicle bureaus.

Through these methods, UNITE accessed the motor vehicle records of the plaintiffs and a plaintiff class estimated by the parties to consist of between 1,758 and 2,005 Cintas employees, or relatives or friends of Cintas employees. UNITE visited the homes of many of these class members as well. During one such home visit on February 7, 2004, two women approached the house of plaintiff Kevin Quinn and rang his doorbell. When Quinn opened the door, they asked for him by name. He replied "That's me." App. 238. When the women informed him that "they were organizing a union campaign against Cintas," he told them he was not interested and shut the door. Id. The women returned to their car and departed.

In addition to Quinn, plaintiffs include other individuals employed by Cintas at all times relevant to this case — Elizabeth Pichler, Jose Sabastro, Thomas Riley, Seth Nye, and Russell Daubert.³ Plaintiffs also include several non-Cintas employees — Russell Christian, Deborah Sabastro, Carri Daubert, Holly Marston, and Amy Riley. Russell Christian is the boyfriend and housemate of Cintas employee Kathleen Kelly (who the District Court dismissed for lack of standing).⁴ Christian owns the car Kelly drives and is the person whose motor vehicle records UNITE accessed. When a UNITE organizer came to their home, he asked to speak to Christian. Holly Marston is the mother of Seth Nye, and the two co-own the car whose records were accessed (thereby obtaining the identities of both individuals). Amy Riley is Thomas Riley's wife, and they co-own the car whose records were searched as well. Deborah Sabastro and Carri Daubert are the wives of Jose Sabastro and Russell Daubert, but UNITE accessed only their husbands' motor vehicle records as their cars were registered to their husbands. The court dismissed both wives' claims for lack of standing.

The original complaint in this case was filed on June 28, 2004. App. 27. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs filed a one-count amended class action complaint alleging that the Teamsters, UNITE, and UNITE's President, Bruce Raynor, violated the DPPA.

On May 31, 2005, the court certified a class to proceed against UNITE, though not against Raynor, and dismissed the claims of Kathleen Kelly, Carri Daubert, and Deborah Sabastro for lack of standing. See Pichler v. UNITE, 228 F.R.D. 230 (E.D.Pa.2005) (Pichler I). On August 30, 2006, the court granted summary judgment against UNITE and awarded the plaintiffs $2,500 each, and granted summary judgment in favor of Raynor. See Pichler v. UNITE, 446 F.Supp.2d 353 (E.D.Pa.2006) (Pichler II). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the court also certified the case for appellate review, deferring the questions about class-wide and injunctive relief. Finally, on October 17, 2006, the court amended its previous judgment and granted UNITE summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. See Pichler v. UNITE, 457 F.Supp.2d 524 (E.D.Pa.2006) (Pichler III). The court also granted separate awards to Thomas Riley and Amy Riley, co-owners of a vehicle whose records UNITE searched,⁵ and permanently enjoined UNITE and its employees from using or disclosing any of the plaintiffs' personal information obtained by UNITE in violation of the DPPA. This appeal followed.

II.

The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this federal question action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction over this appeal from the final decision of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.⁶

We review the District Court's construction of federal statutes de novo. Chao v. Cmty. Trust Co., 474 F.3d 75, 79 (3d Cir.2007). We also review a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the District Court. Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir.2007). Summary judgment is only appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); DL Res., Inc. v. FirstEnergy Solutions Corp., 506 F.3d 209, 216 (3d Cir.2007). On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court construes facts and draws inferences "in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made." Samuelson v. LaPorte Cmty. Sch., 526 F.3d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted). The court may not, however, weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations as "these tasks are left for the fact-finder." Pertruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir.1993).

III.

Plaintiffs contend that the District Court erred in granting defendants' summary judgment motion on the issue of punitive damages and that they were denied their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on that issue.⁷

A.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment with the District Court, and submitted certain jointly stipulated facts for purposes of disposing of the motions. The court properly granted summary judgment as to UNITE's liability (except as noted in section V, infra) on the grounds that uncontroverted evidence established that UNITE acted for an impermissible purpose, in violation of the DPPA. Pichler III, 457 F.Supp.2d at 531.

Regarding the issue of summary judgment on plaintiffs' request for punitive damages, however, the District Court seems to have applied an inappropriate standard. The court assumed that awarding remedies was simply "in its discretion." Id. at 527. Specifically, rather than determining whether there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether UNITE willfully or recklessly contravened the DPPA as § 2724(b)(2) requires, the court found that "[t]he DPPA plainly gives us the discretion to award or to deny punitive damages, even if UNITE violated the DPPA and did so willfully and recklessly. We must craft an appropriate award bearing in mind the purposes of the statute and the relevant jurisprudence on punitive damages." Id....