DAVIS, ETC. v. Maine Endwell Central School Dist., 80-CV-257

• Citation: 542 F. Supp. 1257
• Decision Date: 01 July 1982
• Docket Number: 80-CV-915.,No. 80-CV-257,80-CV-257
• Parties: Norman DAVIS, on Behalf of his infant son, James DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. MAINE ENDWELL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Lawrence Rice, in his official capacity as President of the Board of Education for the Maine Endwell Central School District, William O'Connor, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools for the Maine Endwell Central School District, John Oakes, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Committee of the Handicapped, Defendants. Norman DAVIS and Harriet Davis, for themselves and on behalf of their infant son, James DAVIS, Plaintiffs, v. MAINE ENDWELL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Eugene Murphy, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; Lawrence Rice, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; David Bohl, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; Wanita Griffin, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in her official capacity; Joseph Pastore, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; Arthur Smith, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; Ray Kwak, Superintendent of Schools, Individually and in his official capacity, John Oakes, Chairman of the Committee on the Handicapped, Individually and in his official capacity; and Donald Conning, Principal of the Maine Memorial School, Individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

542 F. Supp. 1257

Norman DAVIS, on Behalf of his infant son, James DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. MAINE ENDWELL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Lawrence Rice, in his official capacity as President of the Board of Education for the Maine Endwell Central School District, William O'Connor, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Schools for the Maine Endwell Central School District, John Oakes, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Committee of the Handicapped, Defendants.

Norman DAVIS and Harriet Davis, for themselves and on behalf of their infant son, James DAVIS, Plaintiffs, v. MAINE ENDWELL CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Eugene Murphy, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; Lawrence Rice, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; David Bohl, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; Wanita Griffin, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in her official capacity; Joseph Pastore, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; Arthur Smith, Member of the Board of Education, Individually and in his official capacity; Ray Kwak, Superintendent of Schools, Individually and in his official capacity, John Oakes, Chairman of the Committee on the Handicapped, Individually and in his official capacity; and Donald Conning, Principal of the Maine Memorial School, Individually and in his official capacity, Defendants.

Nos. 80-CV-257, 80-CV-915.

United States District Court, N. D. New York.

July 1, 1982.

Ronald R. Benjamin, Binghamton, N.Y., for plaintiffs.

Hogan & Sarzynski, Binghamton, N.Y., for defendants; Edward J. Sarzynski, Jr., Binghamton, N.Y., of counsel.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

McCURN, District Judge.

On November 17, 1981, the day before this case was ordered to proceed to trial before a jury, the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint as to all causes of action alleged therein except the cause of action for deprivation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights.¹ This memorandum sets forth the basis for the Court's decision in that regard.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff James Davis, a thirteen year old boy with special education needs, was first classified as being in need of special education services in 1976. It was the determination of the School District Committee on the Handicapped COH that, at that time, James suffered from learning disabilities. That classification was later changed by the COH to Emotionally Handicapped. It is that re-classification and the resultant placement of James which gave rise to these two lawsuits.

Believing that the COH's classification of James was caused by financial considerations rather than by James' educational needs, the plaintiffs filed suit in this Court to challenge that placement. Davis v. Maine Endwell Central School District, 80-CV-257. While in the process of pursuing their administrative remedies pursuant to the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction from this Court placing James in what plaintiffs believed to be an appropriate placement. That request was denied by order of this Court dated May 6, 1980 on the Court's findings that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. The denial of the preliminary injunction was upheld on appeal by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980). That Court, however, remanded the case to this Court for consideration of plaintiffs' claim to monetary relief. Judge Moore dissented from that portion of the opinion which remanded the case to this Court, it being his opinion that the complaint did not set forth a valid claim for monetary relief in either law or fact.

Still unhappy with the defendants' handling of James' educational needs, the plaintiffs filed a second suit in this Court on March 24, 1980 to challenge the classification and placement of James. Davis v. Maine Endwell Central School District, 80-CV-915. On April 2, 1981 plaintiffs filed an application with this Court for a preliminary injunction, the effect of which would be to change James' placement within the school district. Defendants cross moved for dismissal on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as well as failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Once again the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. This denial was upheld by the Second Circuit on appeal, 671 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1981).

Following a series of motions and meetings of the parties with the Court, this case came on to be tried in November of 1981. Because of a failure to exhaust administrative remedies in relation thereto the plaintiffs at that time withdrew their claim for injunctive relief. There then remained the plaintiffs' claim for money damages based on the defendants' alleged violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420; The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Prior to trial the Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs remaining claims except that alleging a violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The case then continued on to trial on the sole issue of whether a First Amendment violation had occurred. The trial lasted in excess of three weeks and culminated in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs as against the Maine Endwell Central School District. Damages were assessed at $50,000.

DISCUSSION

EDUCATION FOR ALL HANDICAPPED CHILDREN ACT

Plaintiffs first claimed that the defendants had violated James' right to a free and appropriate education as established by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420 EAHCA. That Act mandates that each state participating in this voluntary program have "in effect a policy that assures all handicapped children the right to a free and appropriate public education." 20 U.S.C. § 1412. New York has elected to participate in this program and has, therefore, assumed the responsibility of providing a free and appropriate education to its resident handicapped children between the ages of three and twenty-one. Id. There is no question in the instant case that James Davis is a handicapped child within the meaning of the Act and that he is entitled to a free and appropriate education. The controversy centers on whether the education provided him by the defendants was appropriate. Plaintiffs claim that the education was not appropriate and that they are, therefore, entitled to money damages from the defendants as a result of the alleged misclassification and misplacement of James.

Plaintiffs base their claim for money damages on the language of section 1415 of the EAHCA. That section sets out the procedural safeguards established by the Act and provides aggrieved parties access to the state and federal courts after exhaustion of administrative remedies.² Section 1415 provides that "in any action brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). Plaintiffs read this section as authorizing the Court to award monetary damages when an improper classification or placement decision has been made. Conversely, the defendants contend that damages are not an appropriate remedy within the meaning of the EAHCA.

Resolution of this dispute necessarily turns on the language of the statute. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 689, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1953, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The Court's focus is not limited to merely the words of the statute, however. As the Second Circuit recently stated:

to construe a statute we look first to the words actually used by the drafters, remembering that words are but signs that point to ideas. We may also examine the statute's legislative history to ensure that the meaning we have ascribed to these words fits their purpose, as that was what Congress intended.

Pompana v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 680 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir. 1982). Finding that the signs in the statute under review are less than clear, an examination of the legislative history is necessary to fully understand their meaning. In conducting this examination, the Court views the analysis of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981) as persuasive.

The Anderson court first noted that neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history contain any mention of damages. Id. at 1211; see also Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F.Supp. 110, 114 (D.Conn. 1979). Looking at the "mischief to be corrected and the goals to be attained" citing Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155, 158, 55 S.Ct. 46, 47, 79 L.Ed. 254 (1934), the Court concluded that a damage remedy was not "consistent with the goals of the statute." 658 F.2d at 1213. This Court agrees.

As noted by the Anderson court, the main goal of Congress in enacting the EAHCA was to meet the needs of handicapped children; the focus of the Act is insuring that handicapped children receive an appropriate education through proper classification and placement. Congress did not fail to recognize the difficult task it was delegating to the states. Not only does such an endeavor impose financial obligations upon the states, it also requires them to make difficult educational judgments with respect to the children in their care.

Congress sought to aid the states in implementing the EAHCA. First, it established a program of federal financial assistance through the Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411. Second, Congress established a...