Maciel v. City of Los Angeles, CV 06-00249 RSWL (CWx).

Citation542 F.Supp.2d 1082
Decision Date21 March 2008
Docket NumberNo. CV 06-00249 RSWL (CWx).,CV 06-00249 RSWL (CWx).
PartiesEdward MACIEL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants.
CourtUnited States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California

Fenja Klaus, Gregory G. Petersen, M. Alim Malik, Jackson DeMarco Tidus Petersen & Peckenpaugh, Irvine, CA, Herbert Hafif, Miguel G. Caballero, Herbert Hafif Law Offices, Claremont, CA, Michael A. Jenkins, Castle Petersen and Krause, Newport Beach, CA, for Plaintiff.

Brian P. Walter, Connie M. Chuang, David A. Urban, Geoffrey S. Sheldon, Jolina A. Abrena, Theodore Oliver Yee, Liebert Cassidy Whitmore A Professional Law Corporation, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant.

TRIAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

RONALD S.W. LEW, Senior District Judge.

This case involves Plaintiff Edward Maciel's various claims against the City of Los Angeles for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The alleged violations are based on the Los Angeles Police Department's ("LAPD") policy of not compensating for donning and doffing activities and LAPD's alleged failure to ensure Edward Maciel received his required meal breaks.

On January 15, 2008, the above matter commenced in a bench trial before this Court. The trial lasted seven days and included the presentation of multiple witnesses and the submission of various exhibits. Having considered all the evidence admitted at trial, as well as the closing briefs submitted by both parties, THE

COURT NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On December 14, 2005, Jay Vucinich and Edward Maciel filed a claim against the City of Los Angeles and others1 for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (hereafter "FLSA"), various State Labor Codes and California's Business and Professional Code on behalf of themselves and "other employees similarly situated." (See State Court Complaint.) The Complaint was properly removed to Federal Court on January 13, 2006.

On July 21, 2006, the Court GRANTED Defendant City's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and DISMISSED each of Plaintiffs' state law claims. (See July 21, 2006 Order.)

On March 27, 2007, Plaintiff Jay Vucinich voluntarily dismissed his claims against Defendant, leaving only Plaintiff Maciel's individual claims. (Hereafter "Plaintiff" or "Maciel".)

On September 27, 2007, this Court GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART the parties' cross motions for summary judgment. As a result of this Order, the Court determined that the donning and doffing of the standard police uniform, excluding the utility or Sam Browne belt and Kevlar vest, was not compensable. Moreover, the Court DISMISSED each of Defendant's state law affirmative defenses as well as any reliance on an advice of counsel defense.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff has been employed by the LAPD since 1994 and is currently a Patrol Officer II. (1/15/2008 [Vol.1] at 96:10-11.)2 During his relevant3 employment, Plaintiff was assigned to Newton Station and Central Division in Los Angeles. (Id. at 21:13-19; 97:4-9.) As a patrol officer, Plaintiff was predominantly assigned to a patrol car in which he and his partner would patrol an assigned area. (1/15/2008 [Vol.1] 25:10-17.) From 2004-2005, Maciel was stationed at Parker Station, which is a fixed post location where he acted as security. (Id. at 139:1-10.) Maciel was occasionally placed on "hospital duty" which was an assignment involving escorting and monitoring arrestees who needed medical attention. (1/16/2008 [Vol.1] at 31:2-19.)

During the relevant time period, the terms of LAPD employment were covered under collective bargaining agreements. (See 1/23/2008 [Vol.II] at 19:10-18; see also Exhs. 207-209.) The LAPD has two separate collective bargaining agreements relevant to the instant matter. The first covers all sworn officers at the ranks of Sergeant and below; this would include Officer Maciel. (Ex. 207.) There is also a separate agreement covering the ranks of Captain and above. (Ex. 207.)

The standard patrol uniform consists of trousers, shirt, boots/shoes, and the officer's personal safety equipment.4 Each officer who testified said that they performed at least some of the donning and doffing activities at the assigned police station. (See, e.g., 1/23/2008 [Vol.II] at 31:7-12.) Officers have individual lockers located at the police station which can be used to store their uniform and equipment. (1/15/2008 [Vol.I] at 30:22-25.) Per the collective bargaining agreements, the LAPD does not compensate employees for any time spent donning or doffing the standard police issue uniform. (1/15/2008 [Vol.I] at 25:1-6; Ex. 207.)

The LAPD operates on 28-day "deployment periods," which include two pay periods. (1/24/2008 [Vol.II] at 167:12-22; 172:13-17.) Typically, a sworn officer — like Plaintiff — who works a twelve hour shift, works 156 hours per deployment period. (Id. at 199:7-8.) This twelve hour shift is actually scheduled for twelve hours and forty-five minutes and includes a forty-five minute unpaid break (hereafter "Code-7"). (Id.) The evidence demonstrated that a patrol officer is required to follow certain procedures in order to receive their Code-7. First, the patrol officer must request their Code-7, usually over the radio. (1/16/2008 [Vol.II] at 183:2-21.) If an officer is denied permission, then the officer must request a Code-7 a second time, later in their shift. (Id.) If a Code-7 is still not received, then an officer is required by written policy to submit an overtime sheet for the extra forty-five minutes worked. (Id.)

Each time an officer works overtime, the LAPD policy requires that he or she submit an overtime request form. (1/24/2008 [Vol.II] at 151:24-153:7.) These forms are often referred to as "greenies." (Id.) Each greenie must be approved by a supervisor prior to being submitted to the payroll department. (1/15/2008 [Vol.I] at 66:12-67:2.) The greenie is the only mechanism the officer has for submitting overtime to payroll. (1/24/2008 [Vol.II] at 151:24-153:7; 154:24-155:5.) Evidence at trial demonstrated that LAPD policy requires that all overtime slips be approved, and all employees compensated for any overtime submitted, regardless of the amount of overtime or whether prior approval was granted. (1/23/2008 [Vol.II] at 23:4-5.)

Each patrol unit (consisting of two patrol officers) is required to complete a Daily Field Activity Report (hereafter "DFAR".) (1/25/2008 [Vol.I] at 19:14-20.) The DFAR lists each of the officer's activities for that shift. (Id.) The DFAR is either submitted to a supervisor at the end of the shift, or placed in an in-box. (1/16/2008 [Vol.II] 152:10-153:6.) Although a DFAR is not a payroll document, LAPD policy requires that the Code-7, or lack thereof, be listed on the DFAR. (1/16/2008 [Vol.I] 41:23-42:5) Plaintiff admits that he never submitted any requests for overtime which were not paid, nor did he expressly inform anyone he was working uncompensated overtime. (1/16/2008 [Vol.I] at 19:6-20:7.) Plaintiff also admits that no supervisor ever expressly told him not to submit overtime requests for hours worked. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Statute of Limitations

An employee is limited to two years of damages for any FLSA violations, unless such violations are willful, then damages can be increased to a three-year time period. 29 U.S.C § 255(a). An employer's behavior is considered willful where the employer either knew, or showed reckless disregard, as to whether its conduct was prohibited by the FLSA. See McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 129, 108 S.Ct. 1677, 100 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988). Actions are not willful even if the employer acts unreasonably, so long as the employer does not act recklessly. See id.

B. Fair Labor Standards Act Recovery

To establish a claim for unreported (and therefore uncompensated) overtime under 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he worked overtime hours without compensation; (2) the amount and extent of the work as a matter of just and reasonable inference; and (3) that employer "suffered" or "permitted" him to work uncompensated overtime. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g); Lindow v. United States, 738 F.2d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir.1984); Pforr v. Food Lion. Inc., 851 F.2d 106, 108 (4th Cir.1987).

As defined in 29 U.S.C. § 203(g), "[T]he words `suffer' and `permit' [means for the employee to work] `with the knowledge of the employer.'" Fox v. Summit King Mines, 143 F.2d 926, 931 (9th Cir.1944). An employer who is armed with such knowledge cannot stand idly by and allow an employee to perform overtime work without proper compensation, even if the employee does not make a claim for the overtime compensation. See Forrester v. Roth's I.G.A. Foodliner. Inc., 646 F.2d 413, 414 (9th Cir.1981).

C. Donning and Doffing

Under the FLSA, employers must pay employees for all "hours worked." See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1999); Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894, 902-903 (9th Cir.2003). "Work," the Supreme Court has long noted, is "physical or mental exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer." See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123. 321 U.S. 590, 598, 64 S.Ct. 698, 88 L.Ed. 949 (1944).

Whether activity is "work" is simply a threshold matter, and does not mean, without more, that the activity is necessarily compensable. Alvarez, 339 F.3d at 902-903. The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 relieves an employer of responsibility for compensating employees for "activities which are preliminary or postliminary to [the] principal activity or activities" of a given job. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (1999).

Not all "preliminary or postliminary" activities can go uncompensated, however. "Activities performed either before or after the regular work shift," the Supreme Court has stated, are compensable "if those activities are an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities." Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256, 76 S.Ct. 330, 100...

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    ...claims and issues, the Court finds in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof. IT IS SO ORDERED 1. See 542 F.Supp.2d 1082 (2008). 2. All other Defendants have been 3. All transcript and exhibit citations herein refer to the evidence and testimony in the civil trial ......
  • Clark v. Del. Valley Sch.
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    ...don and doff was a "strong indicia" that such practice was a "de facto" requirement. Id. at 1206 ; see also Maciel v. City of Los Angeles , 542 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that "for all practical purposes" police equipment had to be donned and doffed at the station). Finally,......

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