542 U.S. 74 (2004), 03-167, United States v. Benitez

Docket Nº:No. 03-167
Citation:542 U.S. 74, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157, 72 U.S.L.W. 4478
Party Name:UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ BENITEZ
Case Date:June 14, 2004
Court:United States Supreme Court
 
FREE EXCERPT

Page 74

542 U.S. 74 (2004)

124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157, 72 U.S.L.W. 4478

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER

v.

CARLOS DOMINGUEZ BENITEZ

No. 03-167.

United States Supreme Court

June 14, 2004

Argued April 21, 2004

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOE THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[124 S.Ct. 2334] Syllabus [*] After respondent Dominguez Benitez (hereinafter Dominguez) confessed to selling drugs to an informant, he was indicted on drug possession and conspiracy counts. On the conspiracy count, he faced a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. His plea agreement with the Government provided that Dominguez would plead guilty to conspiracy and the Government would dismiss the possession charge; that he would receive a safety-valve reduction of two levels, which would allow the court to authorize a sentence below the otherwise mandatory 10-year minimum; that the agreement did not bind the sentencing court; and that he could not withdraw his plea if the court rejected the Government's stipulations or recommendations. He pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge, but, in the plea colloquy, the court failed to mention (though the written plea agreement did say) that Dominguez could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the Government's recommendations. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11(c)(3)(B). The Probation Office subsequently found that Dominguez had three [124 S.Ct. 2335] prior convictions, making him ineligible for the safety valve, so the District Court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum. On appeal, Dominguez argued, for the first time, that the District Court's failure to warn him, as Rule 11(c)(3)(B) instructs, that he could not withdraw his plea if the court did not accept the Government's recommendations required reversal. The Ninth Circuit agreed, citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508, in applying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52's plain-error standard.

Held: To obtain relief for an unpreserved Rule 11 failing, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty. Pp. 2338-2342.

(a) When a defendant is dilatory in raising Rule 11 error, reversal is unwarranted unless the error is plain. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 63, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90. Except for certain structural errors undermining the criminal proceeding's fairness as a whole, relief for error is tied to prejudicial effect, and the standard phrased as "error that affects substantial rights," as used in Rule 52, means error with a prejudicial effect on a judicial proceeding's outcome. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557. Kotteakos held that to affect "substantial rights," an error must have "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

Page 75

the ... verdict." Id., at 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239. Where the burden of demonstrating prejudice (or materiality) is on the defendant seeking relief, this Court has invoked a similar standard, which requires "a reasonable probability that, but for [the error claimed], the result of the proceeding would have been different" is required. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). For defendants such as Dominguez, the burden of establishing entitlement to plain-error relief should not be too easy: First, the standard should enforce the policies underpinning Rule 52(b) generally, to encourage timely objections and reduce wasteful reversals by demanding strenuous exertion to get relief for unpreserved error, see Vonn, supra, at 73, 122 S.Ct. 1043; and second, it should respect the particular importance of the finality of guilty pleas, which usually rest on a defendant's profession of guilt in open court, and are indispensable in the modern criminal justice system's operation, see United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 784, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634. Pp. 2338-2340.

(b) The Ninth Circuit's test in this case fell short. Its first element (whether the error was "minor or technical") requires no examination of the omitted warning's effect on a defendant's decision, a failing repeated to a significant extent by the test's second element (whether the defendant understood the rights at issue when he pleaded guilty). That court's standard does not allow consideration of evidence tending to show that a misunderstanding was inconsequential to a defendant's decision, or evidence indicating the relative significance of other facts that may have borne on his choice regardless of any Rule 11 error. Nor does it consider the overall strength of the Government's case. When, as here, the record shows both a controlled drug sale to an informant and a confession, one can fairly ask what a defendant seeking to withdraw his plea thought he could gain by going to trial. The point is not to second-guess the defendant's actual decision, but to enquire whether the omitted warning would have made the difference required by the standard of reasonable probability; it is hard to see here how the warning could have affected Dominguez's assessment of his [124 S.Ct. 2336] strategic position. Also, the plea agreement, read to Dominguez in his native spanish, specifically warned that he could not withdraw his plea if the court refused to accept the Government's recommendations; this fact, uncontested by Dominguez, tends to show that the Rule 11 error made no difference to the outcome here. Pp. 2340-2342.

310 F.3d 1221, reversed and remanded.

SOUTER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 2342.

COUNSEL

Myra D. Mossman, Counsel of Record, Santa Barbara, CA, Counsel for Respondent.

Theodore B. Olson, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Dan Himmelfarb, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for United States.

OPINION

SOUTER, Justice.

Page 76

Respondent claims the right to withdraw his plea of guilty as a consequence of the District Court's failure to give one of the warnings required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Because the claim of Rule 11 error was not preserved by timely objection, the plain-error standard of Rule 52(b) applies, with its requirement to prove effect on substantial rights. The question is what showing must thus be made to obtain relief for an unpreserved Rule 11 failing, and we hold that a defendant is obliged to show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.

I

In early May 1999, a confidential informant working with law enforcement arranged through respondent Carlos Dominguez Benitez (hereinafter Dominguez) to buy several pounds of methamphetamine. First, the informant got a sample from Dominguez, and a week later Dominguez went to a restaurant in Anaheim, California, to consummate the sale in the company of two confederates, one of whom brought a shopping bag with over a kilogram of the drugs. The meeting ended when the informant gave a signal and officers arrested the dealers. Dominguez confessed to selling the methamphetamine and gave information about his supplier and confederates.

Page 77

A federal grand jury indicted Dominguez on two counts: conspiracy to possess more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, and possession of 1,391 grams of a methamphetamine mixture, both with intent to distribute. On the conspiracy count, Dominguez faced a statutory, mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years, with a maximum of life. 84 Stat. 1260, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. The District Court appointed counsel, who began talking with the Government about a plea agreement.

In September 1999, the District Court received the first of several letters from Dominguez, [1] in which he asked for a new [124 S.Ct. 2337] lawyer and expressed discomfort with the plea agreement his counsel was encouraging him to sign. On counsel's motion, the court held a status conference, at which Dominguez spoke to the judge. Again he said he was dissatisfied with his representation, and wanted a "better deal." The court asked whether he was "talking about a disposition ... other than...

To continue reading

FREE SIGN UP