State v. Hanson

• Decision Date: 19 January 1996
• Docket Number: C5-95-564,Nos. C1-95-531,s. C1-95-531
• Citation: 543 N.W.2d 84
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Randy Charles HANSON, Petitioner, Appellant (C1-95-531), and Joseph Michael Burns, Petitioner, Appellant (5-95-564).
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 84

543 N.W.2d 84

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Randy Charles HANSON, Petitioner, Appellant (C1-95-531) and Joseph Michael Burns, Petitioner, Appellant (5-95-564).

Nos. C1-95-531, C5-95-564.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 19, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

Civil driver's license revocation for driving under the influence does not bar subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct under double jeopardy principles because the civil driver's license revocation can fairly be characterized as remedial, and does not constitute "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.

Donald H. Nichols, John A. Fabian, Paul J. Lukas, Minneapolis, for appellant Hanson.

Samuel A. McCloud, Kelly Vince Griffitts, Shakopee, for appellant Burns.

Elliott B. Knetsch, Andrea M. Poehler, Eagan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Nancy Bode, Office of the Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Thomas D. Hayes, Thomas C. McNinch, Sherbourne County Attorney's Office, Elk River, for respondent,

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

KEITH, Chief Justice.

This consolidated appeal raises the issue of whether Minnesota's statutory scheme of civil driver's license revocation followed by criminal prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances is unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. In these two cases, appellants had their driver's licenses revoked for 90 days under Minnesota's implied consent statute, Minn.Stat. § 169.123 (1994) ("implied consent statute"), and subsequently faced criminal charges for violating Minnesota's DUI statute, Minn.Stat. § 169.121 (1994) ("DUI statute"). Because civil license revocation pursuant to the implied consent statute can fairly be characterized as remedial, we hold that Minnesota's statutory scheme of civil license revocation followed by criminal prosecution is constitutional under double jeopardy principles.

The facts are generally undisputed. Appellant Randy Charles Hanson ("Hanson") was driving in Sherburne County when he was pulled over for erratic driving. Hanson was arrested for driving under the influence after failing a breath test, and he then took a urine test, which disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.17. Based on this test result, he was charged with driving under the influence, driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, and driving within two hours of having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subds. 1(d) and (e). Hanson's driver's license was revoked for 90 days pursuant to the implied consent statute. Hanson then moved to dismiss the subsequent criminal charges on the grounds that pursuing the criminal charges after revoking his driver's license constituted double jeopardy. The district court denied the motion, but certified the double jeopardy question to the court of appeals.

Appellant Joseph Michael Burns ("Burns") was arrested for driving under the influence in Lakeville. Burns submitted to a breath test, which disclosed an alcohol concentration of 0.15. Based on this test result, he was charged with driving under the influence, driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, and driving within two hours of having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subds. 1(d) and (e). Burns' driver's license was revoked for 90 days pursuant to the implied consent statute. Burns first challenged the implied consent license revocation pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 5c, but the district court sustained the revocation. Burns then moved to dismiss the criminal charges on the grounds that pursuing the criminal charges after revoking his driver's license constituted double jeopardy. The district court granted his motion and certified the double jeopardy question to the court of appeals.

The court of appeals consolidated the two appeals and held that:

A 90-day implied consent driver's license revocation for a driver who has failed the chemical test is rationally related to the remedial purpose of protecting public safety by removing intoxicated drivers from the highways and is not so "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the threat posed to public safety that it is "punishment" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 599 (Minn.App.1995).

On appeal to this court, appellants argue that civil driver's license revocation is "punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and therefore bars any subsequent criminal charges for the same conduct. The state counters that license revocation is remedial, not "punishment," and is rationally related to the legitimate governmental purpose of removing drunk drivers from Minnesota's streets and highways.

I.

The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution protect a criminal defendant from three distinct abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989); State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726-27 (Minn.1985). At issue here is whether civil driver's license revocation followed by criminal punishment for driving under the influence constitutes multiple punishments for the same offense.

The constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy will bar either appellant's criminal prosecution only if: (1) punishment is for the same offense; (2) license revocation and criminal prosecution occur in separate proceedings; and (3) license revocation constitutes punishment. Halper, 490 U.S. at 441, 109 S.Ct. at 1898. Because the civil driver's license revocation and criminal prosecution seek redress for the commission of the same offense (drunk driving) and occur in separate proceedings, the sole issue is whether the driver's license revocation constitutes "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.

The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether a driver's license revocation triggers double jeopardy protection and thus bars subsequent criminal prosecution for the same conduct. This court decided over 30 years ago that a driver's license revocation followed by criminal punishment does not violate any constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Anderson v. Commissioner of Hwys., 267 Minn. 308, 316-17, 126 N.W.2d 778, 783-84 (1964). Appellants, however, seek reconsideration of our holding in Anderson in light of the Supreme Court's recasting of double jeopardy jurisprudence in Halper. Numerous state courts have considered this issue over the past year, with the overwhelming majority rejecting such claims. ¹

Prior to 1989, courts turned to the test established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Ward to determine whether a statute or a noncriminal proceeding violated double jeopardy protections. 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). The Ward test focused heavily on which label, civil or criminal, Congress had attached to a particular sanction. Id. at 249, 100 S.Ct. at 2641.

In 1989 the Supreme Court in Halper rejected the formalistic Ward approach, concluding that in determining whether proceedings were criminal or civil, "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance." Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901. Because Halper was envisioned as "a rule for the rare case," and has fundamentally changed double jeopardy jurisprudence, a consideration of its facts merits discussion here. In Halper, a unanimous Court held that the multiple-punishments prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the federal government from imposing $130,000 in civil penalties against a defendant who already had been criminally prosecuted for the same conduct, namely the submission of $585 in false Medicare claims.

Halper, a manager of a medical services company, submitted 65 false claims for reimbursement under the federal Medicare program, defrauding the government of $585. Id. at 437, 109 S.Ct. at 1895-96. The government brought charges under the criminal false-claims statute, convicting him of all 65 counts. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment and fined $5,000. Id.

The government then brought suit under the civil false-claims act, which provided at that time for a penalty of $2,000 for each false claim. Id. at 438, 109 S.Ct. at 1896 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982 ed., Supp. V)). Because Halper violated the act 65 times, he was potentially subject to a fine of $130,000 for defrauding the government of $585. The district court concluded that this fine, roughly 220 times greater than the government's actual loss, was "punishment" barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause due to Harper's previous conviction. Id. at 439-40, 109 S.Ct. at 1897.

The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which affirmed. In determining whether a civil penalty may constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes, the Court observed that:

a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.

Id. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. The Court thus held that

under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution.

Id. at 448-49, 109 S.Ct. at 1902.

While Halper replaced Ward, the exact nature of the new "test" to be used in double jeopardy cases is subject to some debate. The two "tests" quoted above are strikingly dissimilar. The first is a "solely remedial" test. Applied literally, it would appear to...