Morrissey v. National Maritime Union of America
| Decision Date | 24 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | D,Nos. 615-617,s. 615-617 |
| Citation | 544 F.2d 19 |
| Parties | 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3211, 79 Lab.Cas. P 11,556 James MORRISSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v. NATIONAL MARITIME UNION OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant-Appellee, and Joseph Curran et al., Defendants-Appellants. ocket 75-7457, 75-7459 and 75-7467. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Arthur E. McInerney, New York City (Duer & Taylor, and John S. Chapman, Jr., New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant-appellee.
Charles Sovel, New York City (Abraham E. Freedman, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant-appellee NMU.
Harold E. Kohn, Philadelphia, Pa. (Feder, Kaszovitz & Weber, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant Joseph Curran.
Harold Epstein, New York City (Bloom & Epstein, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant Shannon J. Wall.
Kenneth J. Finger, White Plains, N. Y., for defendant-appellant Charles Snow.
Before FRIENDLY, MANSFIELD and MULLIGAN, Circuit Judges.
We have here a set of appeals by defendants and a limited cross-appeal by plaintiff in an action brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiff Morrissey, a member of defendant National Maritime Union of America (NMU or the Union), obtained a modest award of compensatory damages and a large award of punitive damages against the Union and three individual defendants. The complaint stated two claims. One charged violations of § 101(a)(2) and (5) of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) and (5). The other was a pendent claim for malicious prosecution. The individual defendants were Joseph Curran, president of the Union; Shannon J. Wall, its secretary-treasurer; and Charles Snow, its chief security officer; claims against three other defendants were dismissed during trial with plaintiff's concurrence. The case was tried before Judge Ward and a jury.
The nature of the case and the proceedings in the trial court are well described in Judge Ward's post-trial opinion, 397 F.Supp. 659, 663-64 (1975):
On July 1, 1971, Morrissey who had for years opposed the established Union leadership, was in the Union Hall in New York City, distributing pamphlets contesting Curran's policies as he had on several occasions during the preceding month. Curran was President of the Union, but on that day was in Boca Raton, Florida. The Master-at-Arms, James Nimmo, upon instructions from Snow, the Chief of Security, several times requested Morrissey to cease distributing pamphlets inside the Hall, pointing out to him a notice posted on the bulletin board in the Hall and advising him that his conduct was illegal. The notice, which was undated but was signed by Wall, then the Union's Secretary-Treasurer, read:
It is the established policy of the National Maritime Union that only official union publications may be distributed inside the Hiring Halls or other union offices. No solicitation is permitted inside any union buildings. Any persons attempting to solicit sales or distribute unauthorized literature inside NMU buildings will be asked to discontinue such practice and, in the event they fail to comply with such request, will be required to leave the premises.
When Morrissey persisted in distributing his pamphlets and refused to leave the building, the police were called, as Snow had directed. After a brief meeting with Snow in his office, the police took Morrissey to the Sixth Precinct Station House, where, upon a complaint which Nimmo signed, he was charged with disorderly conduct and criminal trespass. Morrissey was allowed to leave within a short time but was summoned for arraignment July 13, 1971. At the arraignment the charge of disorderly conduct was dropped and the case set for trial on July 20, 1971. The trial judge, after a preliminary hearing at which no testimony was taken, summarily dismissed the charge of criminal trespass, finding no chargeable offense upon any set of facts which the State offered to prove. Counsel for the Union was present at that time.
Morrissey, in this civil action brought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 412, claimed that the actions of the Union officials in prohibiting and preventing him from distributing the pamphlets in the Union Hall deprived him of his right under 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) to meet and assemble freely with other Union members and to express his views, arguments and opinions; that their causing his arrest constituted improper disciplinary action in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5); and that the arrest and subsequent attempts to prosecute him constituted the common law tort of malicious prosecution. He sued for both compensatory and punitive damages.
The Court, using a special verdict form, submitted the question of liability and compensatory and punitive damages on the Landrum-Griffin Act claims and the malicious prosecution claim separately to the jury.
The jury returned a verdict as follows:
Landrum-Griffin Act: Compensatory damages: $500
Punitive Damages against the Union: $50,000
against Curran: $100,000
against Wall: $60,000
against Snow: $10,000
Malicious Prosecution: Compensatory damages: $3,000
Punitive Damages against the Union: $50,000
against Curran: $25,000
against Wall: $15,000
against Snow: $20,000
The judge refused to disturb this except by eliminating the award of punitive damages against the Union, 397 F.Supp. at 666-67, and also refused to grant a new trial.
We are confronted with a barrage of assaults by the defendants, some relating only to the Landrum-Griffin (LG) claim, some relating only to the malicious prosecution claim, and some relating to both. Plaintiff cross appeals from the judge's elimination of the punitive damage award against the Union. Since we have concluded that one of the defendants' points requires reversal of the judgment on the LG count for a new trial, we find it convenient to deal in the first instance with those challenges which go only to that claim and to discuss all other points in connection with the malicious prosecution claim.
Two sections of the Landrum-Griffin Act are here relevant. Section 101(a)(2) reads as follows:
Freedom of speech and assembly. Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided, That nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
Section 101(a)(5) reads:
Safeguards against improper disciplinary action. No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
Having charged the language of § 101(a)(2) in full, the judge continued:
The law gives a union the right to make reasonable rules.
I charge you as a matter of law that on July 1, 1971, the notice against distributing unauthorized literature in the union hall which had been posted earlier was not at that time, that is, on July 1, 1971, duly promulgated by the union.
If you find that on July 1, 1971 plaintiff's activities created an immediate danger of seriously interfering with the union's function, you may find that prohibiting those activities was reasonable.
The defendants objected that this charge denied them their rights under the "proviso" to § 101(a)(2). As we understand the argument, there are really two claims: that the judge was wrong in ruling that the notice was not "duly promulgated"; and that in so doing he effectively required the defendants to show the reasonableness of their actions on July 1, 1971 rather than to show only the reasonableness of the overall policy.
We think this charge was correct. In his post-trial opinion, after reciting Wall's testimony that he had signed the notice and caused it to be posted at Snow's request because passing out literature tended to stimulate arguments, and Snow's deposition testimony that arguments sometimes became fights, Judge Ward said, 397 F.Supp. at 664-65:
Whether this would be a reasonable basis for adopting a standing rule might have been a question for the jury. However the Union Constitution, in evidence, clearly states that all policies of the Union and all changes in official Union policy, must be formally approved by the members of the Union. And the transcript of the proceeding before Judge Ringel in New York Criminal Court on July 20, 1971, also in evidence in this action, at which the charge of criminal trespass was dismissed, contains statements made by attorneys for the Union, that the notice in question was never so ratified. The notice itself purports to reflect a national policy. There is no evidence whatever in the record that the "policy" referred to in the notice was ever adopted by the Union membership. Accordingly, the Court instructed the jury, on this issue alone, that the notice itself was not duly promulgated by the Union.
We agree with this. We add only that even if there were error in construing the Union's constitution, as defendants contend, we...
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