Gonzalez v. Crosby

Citation125 S. Ct. 2641,162 L. Ed. 2d 480,545 U.S. 524
Decision Date23 June 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-6432.,04-6432.
PartiesGONZALEZ <I>v.</I> CROSBY, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition was dismissed as time barred when the District Court concluded that the federal limitations period was not tolled while petitioner's motion for postconviction relief was pending in state court. After petitioner abandoned his attempt to seek review of the District Court's decision, this Court decided that a state postconviction relief petition can toll the federal statute of limitations even if, like petitioner's, the petition is ultimately dismissed as procedurally barred. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4. Petitioner filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion for relief from the judgment, which the District Court denied. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that the Rule 60(b) motion was in substance a second or successive habeas petition, which under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b), cannot be filed without precertification by the court of appeals.

Held:

1. Because petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion challenged only the District Court's previous ruling on AEDPA's statute of limitations, it is not the equivalent of a successive habeas petition and can be ruled upon by the District Court without precertification by the Eleventh Circuit. Pp. 528-536.

(a) Rule 60(b) applies in § 2254 habeas proceedings only "to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with" applicable federal statutes and rules. § 2254 Rule 11. Because § 2244(b) applies only where a court acts pursuant to a prisoner's "habeas corpus application," the question here is whether a Rule 60(b) motion is such an application. The text of § 2244(b) shows that, for these purposes, a habeas application is a filing containing one or more "claims." Other federal habeas statutes and this Court's decisions also make clear that a "claim" is an asserted federal basis for relief from a state-court conviction. If a Rule 60(b) motion contains one or more "claims," the motion is, if not in substance a "habeas corpus application," at least similar enough that failing to subject it to AEDPA's restrictions on successive habeas petitions would be "inconsistent with" the statute. A Rule 60(b) motion can be said to bring a "claim" if it seeks to add a new ground for relief from the state conviction or attacks the federal court's previous resolution of a claim on the merits, though not if it merely attacks a defect in the federal habeas proceedings' integrity. Pp. 528-532.

(b) When no "claim" is presented, there is no basis for contending that a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated like a habeas petition. If neither the motion itself nor the federal judgment from which it seeks relief substantively addresses federal grounds for setting aside the movant's state conviction, allowing the motion to proceed on its own terms creates no inconsistency with the habeas statute or rules. Petitioner's motion, which alleges that the federal courts misapplied § 2244(d)'s statute of limitations, fits this description. Nothing in Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U. S. 538, suggests that entertaining a filing confined to a nonmerits aspect of the first federal habeas proceeding is "inconsistent with" AEDPA. Pp. 533-536.

2. Under the proper Rule 60(b) standards, the District Court was correct to deny relief. The change in the law worked by Artuz is not an "extraordinary circumstance" justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6), and it is made all the less extraordinary by the lack of diligence that petitioner showed in seeking direct appellate review of the statute-of-limitations issue. Pp. 536-538.

366 F. 3d 1253, affirmed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 538. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined, post, p. 539.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

Paul M. Rashkind argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Richard C. Klugh.

Christopher M. Kise, Solicitor General of Florida, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Carolyn Snurkowski, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, and Cassandra Dolgin, Assistant Attorney General.

Patricia A. Millett argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With her on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Wray, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.*

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

After the federal courts denied petitioner habeas corpus relief from his state conviction, he filed a motion for relief from that judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The question presented is whether, in a habeas case, such motions are subject to the additional restrictions that apply to "second or successive" habeas corpus petitions under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at 28 U. S. C. § 2244(b).

I

Petitioner Aurelio Gonzalez pleaded guilty in Florida Circuit Court to one count of robbery with a firearm. He filed no appeal and began serving his 99-year sentence in 1982. Some 12 years later, petitioner began to seek relief from his conviction. He filed two motions for state postconviction relief, which the Florida courts denied. Thereafter, in June 1997, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida alleging that his guilty plea had not been entered knowingly and voluntarily.

Upon the State's motion, the District Court dismissed petitioner's habeas petition as barred by AEDPA's statute of limitations, 28 U. S. C. § 2244(d). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, petitioner's filing deadline, absent tolling, was April 23, 1997, one year after AEDPA's statute of limitations took effect. Wilcox v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 158 F. 3d 1209, 1211 (CA11 1998) (per curiam). Adopting a Magistrate Judge's recommendation, the District Court concluded that the limitations period was not tolled during the 163-day period while petitioner's second motion for state postconviction relief was pending. Section 2244(d)(2) tolls the statute of limitations during the pendency of "properly filed" applications only, and the District Court thought petitioner's motion was not "properly filed" because it was both untimely and successive. Without tolling, petitioner's federal habeas petition was two months late, so the District Court dismissed it as time barred. A judge of the Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of appealability (COA) on April 6, 2000, and petitioner did not file for rehearing or review of that decision.

On November 7, 2000, we held in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4, that an application for state postconviction relief can be "properly filed" even if the state courts dismiss it as procedurally barred. See id., at 8-9. Almost nine months later, petitioner filed in the District Court a pro se "Motion to Amend or Alter Judgment," contending that the District Court's time-bar ruling was incorrect under Artuz's construction of § 2244(d), and invoking Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), which permits a court to relieve a party from the effect of a final judgment.1 The District Court denied the motion, and petitioner appealed.

A judge of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit granted petitioner a COA, but a panel quashed the certificate as improvidently granted. 317 F. 3d 1308, 1310, 1314 (2003). The full court vacated that order and reheard the case en banc. It granted petitioner a COA but held, by a vote of 7 to 4, that the District Court was correct to deny his Rule 60(b) motion. The en banc majority determined that petitioner's motion—indeed, any postjudgment motion under Rule 60(b) save one alleging fraud on the court under Rule 60(b)(3)—was in substance a second or successive habeas corpus petition. 366 F. 3d 1253, 1278, 1281-1282 (2004). A state prisoner may not file such a petition without precertification by the court of appeals that the petition meets certain stringent criteria. § 2244(b). Because petitioner's motion did not satisfy these requirements, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed its denial. Id., at 1282.

We granted certiorari. 543 U. S. 1086 (2005).

II

Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence.2 Rule 60(b)(6), the particular provision under which petitioner brought his motion, permits reopening when the movant shows "any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" other than the more specific circumstances set out in Rules 60(b)(1)-(5). See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U. S. 847, 863, n. 11 (1988); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 613 (1949) (opinion of Black, J.). The mere recitation of these provisions shows why we give little weight to respondent's appeal to the virtues of finality. That policy consideration, standing alone, is unpersuasive in the interpretation of a provision whose whole purpose is to make an exception to finality. The issue here is whether the text of Rule 60(b) itself, or of some other provision of law, limits its application in a manner relevant to the case before us.

AEDPA did not expressly circumscribe the operation of Rule 60(b). (By contrast, AEDPA directly amended other provisions of the Federal Rules. See, e. g., AEDPA, § 103, 110 Stat. 1218 (amending Fed. Rule App. Proc. 22).) The new habeas restrictions introduced by AEDPA are made indirectly relevant, however, by the fact that ...

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