Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials
Decision Date | 28 December 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 75-2434,75-2434 |
Citation | 546 F.2d 1077 |
Parties | William Oscar HAMPTON v. HOLMESBURG PRISON OFFICIALS. Appeal of Richard BURK et al. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Sheldon L. Albert, Stephen Arinson, Raymond Kitty, James M. Penny, Jr., Ralph J. Teti, Sols. for the City, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.
Robert J. Donaghy, Ms. Denise Goren, Student Attys., Jack J. Levine, Supervising Atty., Civil Rights for Inmates, Temple Law School, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.
Before VAN DUSEN, HUNTER and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
The distinction between conduct necessary to support recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that establishing liability under state tort law is at issue in this appeal. The district court awarded damages to a prisoner against a warden and guards because of their failure to provide medical care. Our examination of the record demonstrates that the plaintiff failed to prove the intentional conduct characterizing a constitutional infringement. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the district court.
Several inmates assaulted plaintiff, a federal pretrial detainee at Holmesburg Prison in Philadelphia in 1974. He brought this action in the district court, grounding his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a pendent state law cause of action on allegations that the warden and guard defendants failed to protect him from attack and thereafter denied him medical care for six days. After a non-jury trial, the district judge found that the officials had exercised reasonable care in protecting plaintiff from the other inmates and, consequently, found no constitutional violation on the assault count. However, the court determined that plaintiff had been denied medical care and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $1,000.00.
In the assault, which occurred on October 10, 1974, the plaintiff suffered injuries to his jaw, head, face and right hand. Although guards arrived on the scene within minutes after the incident, Hampton did not ask for any medical attention until two days later, when he spoke to defendants Mayo and Penbrock, the officers then on duty.
Plaintiff testified that he put out sick call slips on October 13 but did not see any medical personnel in the next five days. He said that the doctor determined which inmates he would see. On the 18th of October, Hampton saw the prison nurse and showed her his injuries. She told him the doctor would be in the following day, but it was not until October 20 that Dr. Westby examined plaintiff and prescribed aspirin. On October 24, plaintiff complained to the doctor that aspirin was not effective. Four days later, he was taken to Philadelphia General Hospital for out-patient treatment.
According to the warden's testimony, a prisoner going on routine sick call was to notify his block officer at 8:30 in the morning. However, a doctor was not available every day and occasionally there could be as much as a three-day interval between visits by the physician. In emergency situations, however, prisoners were taken to specified hospitals in the area.
The district judge found:
The court did not address plaintiff's pendent state law claims.
The plaintiff bases his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon his assertion that the denial of medical treatment amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. It is questionable whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is applicable to a pretrial detainee, the most accepted view being that the amendment's proscription applies only after conviction. See the discussion in Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033, 94 S.Ct. 462, 38 L.Ed.2d 32 (1973); Anderson v. Nosser, 456 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848, 93 S.Ct. 53, 34 L.Ed.2d 89 (1972); cf. Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d Cir. 1972). But this does not mean there is no constitutional protection for a pretrial detainee. It would be anomalous to afford a pretrial detainee less constitutional protection than one who has been convicted. United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Glick, supra; Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 Yale L.J. 941 (1970). The source of that protection is properly found in the Due Process or, in some instances, the Equal Protection Clause, 1 See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576, 95 L.Ed. 774 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945); Tyrrell v. Speaker, supra; Rhem v. Malcolm, supra; Johnson v. Glick, supra; Anderson v. Nosser, supra, with decisions interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause serving as useful analogies. Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976). However, we do not think it appropriate to discuss the precise source of the right because, while it may have significance in other contexts, it is not controlling here. The facts mandate a finding that there has been no constitutional deprivation, whatever the derivation.
In Estelle v. Gamble, --- U.S. ----, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), the Supreme Court distinguished medical malpractice cases cognizable under state tort law and those rising to the level of a constitutional abridgement. After discussing the government's obligation to furnish medical service to prisoners, the Court articulated the standard for determining whether a constitutional violation had occurred:
--- U.S. at ----, 97 S.Ct. at 291 (footnotes omitted)
The Court's newly announced standard is in agreement with the line of cases in this circuit, see Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1973); Nettles v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1971); Kontos v. Prasse, 444 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1971); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970); Fear v. Commonwealth, 413 F.2d 88 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 935, 90 S.Ct. 278, 24 L.Ed.2d 234 (1969). Indeed, as the Court noted in its opinion, all the courts of appeals are in essential agreement with this standard.
To establish a constitutional violation, the indifference must be deliberate and the actions intentional. Moreover, not every injury or illness invokes the constitutional protection only those that are "serious" have that effect. Neglect, carelessness or malpractice is more properly the subject of a tort action in the state courts. 2
A careful review of the record in the case before us reveals no evidence satisfying the constitutional standard. The district court found that "(f)rom October 12th to October 18th medical treatment was denied," and that Although "(t)here was no medical evidence to establish the extent or severity of the plaintiff's injuries," he testified that he sustained obvious injuries. 3
Plaintiff testified that the first request was made on October 12 when he told guard Mayo that he needed to see a doctor. Mayo replied that the doctor was not at the prison and that he did not know when the physician would be in. On the following day, plaintiff put in a ...
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Sundance v. Municipal Court
...be punished at all, they are entitled at a minimum to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (See Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials (3d Cir.1976) 546 F.2d 1077, 1079-1080.) Therefore, some courts have held explicitly that "a detainee is entitled to protection from cruel and unusual......
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Skevofilax v. Quigley, Civ. A. No. 79-2783.
...medical needs. Eighth Amendment standards are applied to pre-trial detainees in this Circuit, Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1079-1080 (3d Cir.1976); that is, the Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) standard of "deliberate indifference......
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...be anomalous to afford a pretrial detainee less constitutional protection than one who has been convicted.' Hampton v Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F2d 1077, 1779-1080 (CA3, 1976)." ...
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...Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir.1977). There must be proof that the conduct alleged was deliberate and intentional. Hampton v. Holmesburg, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir.1976). With regard to the deliberate indifference prong, "`It is only such deliberate indifference' that can violate the Ei......