Oregon v. Guzek

• Decision Date: 22 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-928.,04-928.
• Citation: 163 L. Ed. 2d 1112,126 S. Ct. 1226,546 U.S. 517
• Parties: OREGON <I>v.</I> GUZEK
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

546 U.S. 517

126 S. Ct. 1226

163 L. Ed. 2d 1112

OREGON

v. GUZEK

No. 04-928.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued December 7, 2005.

Decided February 22, 2006.

At the guilt phase of respondent Guzek's capital murder trial, his mother was one of two witnesses who testified that he had been with her on the night the crime was committed. He was convicted and sentenced to death. Twice, the Oregon Supreme Court vacated the sentence and ordered new sentencing proceedings, but each time Guzek was again sentenced to death. Upon vacating his sentence for a third time, the State Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide Guzek a federal constitutional right to introduce live alibi testimony from his mother at the upcoming resentencing proceeding. After this Court granted certiorari, Guzek filed a motion to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted.

Held:

1. Guzek's motion to dismiss certiorari is denied. This Court does not lack jurisdiction on the ground that, irrespective of federal law, state law gives Guzek the right to introduce his mother's live testimony. The Court possesses jurisdiction to review state-court determinations that rest upon federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), and the Oregon Supreme Court based its legal conclusion in relevant part on such law. It pointed out that relevant mitigating evidence under state law refers only to evidence that the Federal Constitution grants a defendant the right to present. And it interpreted the federal admissibility requirement in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (plurality opinion), and Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (per curiam), to include evidence like the proffered alibi testimony. Nor is this Court willing to dismiss the writ on the ground that irrespective of federal law and of the State Supreme Court's federal holding, Oregon's capital-case resentencing statute gives Guzek the right to introduce witnesses who testified at the guilt phase. At most, state law might give him such a right, but "a possible adequate and independent state ground" for a decision does not "bar . . . reaching the federal questions" where, as here, the State Supreme Court's decision "quite clearly rested . . . solely on the Federal Constitution." California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 997, n. 7. Pp. 520-523.

2. The Constitution does not prohibit a State from limiting the innocence-related evidence a capital defendant can introduce at a sentencing proceeding to the evidence introduced at the original trial. This Court's cases have not interpreted the Eighth Amendment as providing such a defendant the right to introduce at sentencing evidence designed to cast "residual doubt" on his guilt of the basic crime of conviction. Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 173, n. 6 (plurality opinion). Lockett v. Ohio, supra, and Green v. Georgia, supra, distinguished. Even if such a right existed, it could not extend so far as to provide Guzek with a right to introduce the evidence at issue. The Eighth Amendment insists upon "`reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case,'" Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328, and that a sentencing jury be able "to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence" about the defendant's "character or record or the circumstances of the offense," id., at 327-328, but it does not deprive the State of its authority to set reasonable limits on the evidence a defendant can submit, and to control the manner in which it is submitted. Three circumstances, taken together, show that the State has the authority to regulate Guzek's evidence through exclusion. First, sentencing traditionally concerns how, not whether, a defendant committed the crime, but alibi evidence concerns only whether, not how, he did so. Second, the parties previously litigated the issue to which the evidence is relevant. Thus, the evidence attacks a previously determined matter in a proceeding at which, in principle, that matter is not at issue. The law typically discourages such collateral attacks. Cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94. Third, the negative impact of a rule restricting Guzek's ability to introduce new alibi evidence is minimized by the fact that Oregon law gives the defendant the right to present to the sentencing jury all the innocence evidence from the original trial (albeit through transcripts). The Oregon courts are free to consider on remand whether Guzek is entitled to introduce his mother's testimony to impeach other witnesses whose earlier testimony the government intends to introduce at resentencing. Pp. 523-527.

336 Ore. 424, 86 P.3d 1106, vacated and remanded.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 528. ALITO, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OREGON

Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General of Oregon, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Peter Shepherd, Deputy Attorney General.

Kannon K. Shanmugam argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae in support of petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Richter, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, and Robert J. Erickson.

Richard L. Wolf, by appointment of the Court, 546 U.S. 974, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was J. Kevin Hunt.^*

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent Randy Lee Guzek was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and ordered a new sentencing proceeding. The question before the Court is whether the State may limit the innocence-related evidence he can introduce at that proceeding to the evidence he introduced at his original trial. We hold that the limitation does not violate the Constitution.

I

Oregon tried Guzek for the offense of capital murder. The evidence showed that Guzek and two associates decided to burglarize the Houser family home, that they entered the house, that an associate killed Rod Houser, and that Guzek then robbed and killed Lois Houser. After the police learned that Guzek held a special grudge against the Housers, they traced him and his associates. The associates confessed. And they testified at trial, painting Guzek as the ringleader.

Guzek's defense rested in part upon an alibi. He presented two alibi witnesses, his grandfather and his mother, who testified that Guzek had been with the one or the other at the time of the crime. The jury disbelieved the alibi, it convicted Guzek, and it sentenced him to death.

Guzek appealed; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the conviction; but the court ordered a new sentencing proceeding. Guzek was again sentenced to death; he again appealed; and the Oregon Supreme Court again ordered resentencing. Guzek was sentenced to death for the third time; he again appealed; and yet again the Oregon Supreme Court found the sentencing procedures faulty. 336 Ore. 424, 86 P. 3d 1106 (2004). Seeking to avoid further errors at the next (the fourth) sentencing proceeding, the Oregon Supreme Court also addressed the admissibility of certain evidence Guzek seeks to introduce at that proceeding, including live testimony from his mother about his alibi.

The Oregon Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide Guzek a federal constitutional right to introduce this evidence at his upcoming sentencing proceeding. At Oregon's request, we agreed to review that determination.

II

Before turning to the merits of Oregon's claim, we consider a motion that Guzek made, asking us to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. The motion rests upon Guzek's claim that, irrespective of federal law, state law gives him the right to introduce his mother's live testimony—the additional alibi evidence here at issue. See Ore. Rev. Stat. § 138.012(2)(b) (2003). For this reason, he says, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal, or, at the least, there is no good practical reason for us to decide the federal issue.

We cannot agree, however, that we lack jurisdiction to hear the case. We possess jurisdiction to review state-court determinations that rest upon federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). And the Oregon Supreme Court here based its legal conclusion in relevant part on federal law. The court pointed out that state law permits the introduction (at a new sentencing hearing) of "`evidence . . . relevant to [the] sentence including . . . mitigating evidence relevant to . . . [w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence.'" App. to Pet. for Cert. 45 (quoting Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 163.150(1)(a), (b) (2003); emphasis added and deleted). But it immediately added that the state law's words "relevant . . . mitigating evidence" refer (in the present context) only to evidence that the Federal Constitution grants a defendant the right to present. App. to Pet. for Cert. 45-52.

The Oregon court went on to discuss this Court's statements to the effect that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments "`require that the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor . . . any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.'" Id., at 54 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion); emphasis deleted); cf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 56 (recognizing that this aspect of Lockett was adopted by a majority of the Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)). And the Oregon court then interpreted this Court's holding in Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), as including, within that federal admissibility requirement, evidence which, like the proffered alibi...