Mattis v. Schnarr
| Decision Date | 01 December 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75-1849,75-1849 |
| Citation | 547 F.2d 1007 |
| Parties | Robert Dean MATTIS, M.D., Appellant, v. Richard R. SCHNARR and Robert Marek, Appellees, v. John C. DANFORTH, Attorney General, State of Missouri, Intervenor-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Eugene H. Buder, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant; Richard D. Baron, American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri, St. Louis, Mo., Joel M. Gora, American Civil Liberties Union, New York City, and Benjamin Roth, American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri, St. Louis, Mo., on brief.
Robert L. Presson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., on brief.
Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, and LAY, HEANEY, BRIGHT, ROSS, STEPHENSON
*
This appeal concerns the constitutionality of Missouri statutes 1 which permit law enforcement officers to use deadly force to effect the arrest of a person who has committed a felony if the person has been notified that he or she is under arrest and if the force used is restricted to that reasonably necessary to effect the arrest. 2 We hold the statutes unconstitutional as applied to arrests in which an officer uses deadly force against a fleeing felon who has not used deadly force in the commission of the felony and whom the officer does not reasonably believe will use deadly force against the officer or others if not immediately apprehended.
The challenge to the constitutionality of the Missouri statutes arose out of the killing of Michael Mattis by Robert Marek, a police officer.
Michael Mattis, age eighteen, and Thomas Rolf, age seventeen, were discovered in the office of a golf driving range at approximately 1:20 A.M. by police officer, Richard Schnarr. Shortly thereafter, the two boys left the office by climbing out through the back window. Schnarr shouted at the boys to halt. They ran in different directions. Schnarr then shouted, "Halt or I'll shoot" two times. When the boys failed to stop, he fired one shot into the air and one shot at Rolf. Meanwhile, Officer Robert Marek, who had arrived on the scene, ran to intercept the boys. He collided with Mattis as he came around the corner of the building. Both fell to the pavement. Marek grabbed Mattis by the leg. Mattis broke away. Marek ran after him. Marek was losing ground. He shouted, "Stop or I'll shoot." Mattis did not stop. Marek, believing it was necessary to take further action to prevent Mattis's escape, fired one shot in the direction of Mattis and killed him. Both officers believed that the use of their guns was reasonably necessary to effect an arrest and was authorized by valid Missouri statutes.
Robert Dean Mattis, the father of Michael, brought an action against the officers and the City of Olivette under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, V.A.M.S. § 537.080, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(4), 2201 and 2202, and the Constitution of the United States, Amendments XIV, VIII and IX. It is alleged in the complaint that the officers, acting under color of law, deprived Michael Mattis of his life without due process of law, deprived him of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, and inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment on him in violation of the Fourteenth, Eighth and Ninth Amendments of the Constitution. The court was asked to declare V.A.M.S. §§ 559.040 and 544.190 unconstitutional and to award damages of $100.00.
The officers asserted in their answer that the statutes had been construed by the Missouri courts to authorize police officers to use deadly force to prevent the escape of a person fleeing from a lawful arrest after committing a felony. They further asserted that any acts performed by them were done in good faith and in reliance on the laws of Missouri which they had probable cause to believe were constitutional. 3 The trial court dismissed the case holding that Robert Mattis did not have standing to bring the action and that defenses of good faith and probable cause were available to the officers. Mattis v. Kissling, et al., Civil No. 72-Civ. (3) (E.D.Mo., filed January 16, 1973).
Robert Mattis appealed to this Court. We held that he had standing, that the defenses of good faith and probable cause were available to the officers insofar as the action for damages was concerned, but were unavailable insofar as declaratory relief was concerned. We remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to determine the constitutionality of the statutes in question. We directed that the Attorney General of the State of Missouri be given an opportunity to intervene pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24. Mattis v. Schnarr, 502 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1974).
After remand, Robert Mattis filed a second amended complaint. It substantially tracked the earlier complaints. 4 The State of Missouri filed an answer admitting that Michael Mattis was shot and killed by Officer Marek while Mattis was attempting to escape from an arrest sought to be made on suspicion of burglary, a felony under Missouri law. The answer also asserted that V.A.M.S. §§ 559.040 and 544.190, as construed by the Supreme Court of Missouri to authorize the use of deadly force by police officers if reasonably necessary to prevent a felon but not a misdemeanant 5 from escaping, are constitutional.
The District Court entered a judgment upholding the constitutionality of the statutes. In discussing the due process claim, it stated:
Constitutional rights are not absolute; where conflict arises between assertions of rights, there must be a balancing of the public interest and the individual's rights. * * *
Here the claims of parental rights must be weighed against the interest of the state in apprehending criminals and in aiding police officers in the fulfillment of this duty. The dangers faced by the police are not to be minimized. * * * To restrict the means available to the police to effectuate an arrest is to reduce the effectiveness of the officers in the pursuit of their duties. * * *
The competing interests here involve two different areas of concern; plaintiff asserts a right to raise a family and to have his parental rights continue until terminated by due process of law while the state asserts an interest in aiding police officers in apprehending criminal suspects. While neither assertion of right is to be taken lightly, it is this Court's opinion that plaintiff's claims of parental rights must yield to the state's overriding interest as determined by the legislature.
Mattis v. Schnarr, 404 F.Supp. 643, 646-647 (E.D.Mo.1975).
With respect to the equal protection claim, it stated that the statutory classification was reasonable and as free from arbitrariness as any other suggested classification.
The court, in discussing the cruel and unusual punishment claim, stated that the issue was whether the use of deadly force against fleeing felons by police officers "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934). It pointed out that thirty-four states authorized the use of the force sought to be condemned here and declared that this fact gave credence to the proposition that the limits of civilized standards had not been exceeded.
The court concluded by noting:
To abolish the use of deadly force altogether is to deprive the state and its citizens of their rights to security, safety and a feeling of protection. To pick and choose those crimes warranting the application of these statutes is the duty of the legislature. It involves a determination of the effect and seriousness of crimes on society and such a determination lies exclusively within the province of the legislative branch. It is not the role of a federal judge to legislate for the people of a state.
The court dismissed the action. See Mattis v. Schnarr, supra at 651.
This appeal followed.
We emphasize initially that no claim is made that the statutes are unconstitutional insofar as they permit police officers to use deadly force where reasonably necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon who has used or has threatened to use deadly force in the commission of the felony for which he or she is being apprehended or insofar as they permit such force to be used to apprehend a fleeing felon whom the officers reasonably believe will use deadly force against the arresting officers or others if he or she is not immediately apprehended. The claim is the narrower one that the statutes are unconstitutional as applied to fleeing felons suspected of a nonviolent felony whom the officers do not reasonably believe will use deadly force against the officers or others. 6
We also emphasize that we are not concerned in this case with whether the force used was that reasonably necessary to effect the immediate arrest of the fleeing Michael Mattis. It was necessary if Michael was to be apprehended at that time. The question is, rather, whether deadly force could constitutionally be used to effect the arrest of this fleeing eighteen-year-old burglar who threatened no one's life during the commission of the burglary and posed no threat to the apprehending officers or others.
With the issue thus defined, we turn to a brief discussion of common and statutory law, scholarly opinion and present police practice with respect to the use of deadly force.
At common law, deadly force could be used by a law enforcement officer if necessary to effect the arrest of a felony suspect but not of a suspected misdemeanant. 7 While the rule has been severely criticized by legal scholars, most jurisdictions governed by common law have continued to adhere to the distinction. 8 As early as 1887, however, Judge Brown, of the Eastern District of Michigan, later appointed to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Davis v. Balson
...93 S.Ct. 927, 34 L.Ed.2d 696 (1973); Cunningham v. Ellington, 323 F.Supp. 1072 (W.D.Tenn.1971) (three-judge court). Cf. Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), rev'g, 404 F.Supp. 643 (E.D. Mo.1975), vacated sub nom., Ashcraft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 ......
-
Guyton v. Phillips
...with federal constitutional standards.3 Jones v. Marshall, supra; Clark v. Ziedonis, supra; Landrum v. Moats, supra; Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 In this case ......
-
Carter v. City of Chattanooga, Tenn.
...the scope of such an unsettled rule as an arresting officer's privilege for the use of deadly force. Id. at 142. In Mattis v. Schnarr 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir.1976), the court performed a due process analysis of a Missouri statute quite similar to the Tennessee statute, and found it unconstit......
-
Zachary Lee Church v. Anderson
...912 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); Pruitt v. City of Montgomery, 771 F.2d 1475, 1479 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1985) (same); Mattis v. Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007, 1009 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom., Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 97 S.Ct. 1739, 52 L.Ed.2d 219 (1977) (same). Thus, ......