Johnson v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 02 December 1976
• Docket Number: No. 74-2011,74-2011
• Citation: 547 F.2d 688,178 U.S. App. D.C. 391
• Parties: Peter L. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 688

547 F.2d 688

178 U.S.App.D.C. 391

Peter L. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America.

No. 74-2011.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued Oct. 24, 1975.

Decided Dec. 2, 1976.

Patrick J. Moran, Washington, D. C., with whom David B. Lamb, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Michael A. Pace, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry and Eric B. Marcy, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before HASTIE, ^* Senior Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, BAZELON, Chief Judge, and ROBINSON, Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal challenges a judgment of the District Court dismissing appellant's action against the United States for damages assertedly recoverable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. ¹ Appellant's complaint, in two counts, charged false arrest, false imprisonment and medical malpractice. In pertinent part the first count alleged that

(appellant) was a patient at the Veterans Administration Hospital, Washington, D. C. and while in that capacity (appellant) was wrongfully, maliciously and wantonly arrested and imprisoned against his will as a direct result of the actions of the defendants (sic ) ² by its agents and/or employees in that the Veterans Administration Hospital by Stephen D. Quint, M.D. did wrongfully, falsely, maliciously and wantonly execute an application for emergency hospitalization and thereby commit (appellant) to St. Elizabeth's Hospital.

As a result of the defendant's wrongful, wanton and malicious execution of said application for emergency hospitalization and commitment to St. Elizabeth's Hospital, (appellant) was wrongfully arrested and imprisoned against his will and without just cause or excuse, . . . . ³

The second count relevantly avers that

defendant by its agents and/or employees, Steven D. Quint, M.D., did wrongfully, carelessly, wantonly and negligently commit (appellant) to St. Elizabeth's Hospital by way of an application for emergency hospitalization which was executed by defendant, its agents and/or employees without complying with the reasonable medical standards of care required under the circumstances then existing. ⁴

The complaint demanded both compensatory and punitive damages. ⁵

The United States moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court granted the motion. We affirm.

I

Congress has, "(s)ubject to the provisions of" the Federal Tort Claims Act, ⁶ endowed the federal district courts with

exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. ⁷

The Act specifies that "(t)he United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," ⁸ but excepts various types of claims, ⁹ including "(a)ny claim arising out of assault (or) false imprisonment" unless committed by federal investigative or law enforcement officers. ¹⁰ It is by these provisions that the legal sufficiency of appellant's complaint is ultimately to be tested.

The first count of the complaint alleges that appellant was " wrongfully, maliciously and wantonly arrested and imprisoned against his will" by the action of Dr. Quint, said to have been an agent of the United States, in "wrongfully, falsely, maliciously and wantonly execut(ing) an application for emergency hospitalization and thereby commit(ting) (appellant) to St. Elizabeth's Hospital." ¹¹ Clearly, this count seeks damages from the United States solely on account of an arrest and a false imprisonment allegedly inflicted by one clearly not an investigative or law enforcement officer. ¹² Just as clearly a cause of action therefor does not lie. Even were we to assume that a private physician guilty of the conduct charged in this count would become liable, ¹³ the insuperable difficulty which appellant faces is that the United States can be sued only within the limits of its consent. ¹⁴

While the Federal Tort Claims Act "waived sovereign immunity from suit for certain specified torts of federal employees," ¹⁵ it did so only so far as the Act provides, ¹⁶ and plainly the waiver of sovereign immunity does not extend to claims for arrest or false imprisonment. ¹⁷ It follows, then, that the District Court's dismissal of the first count was proper.

II

The second count of the complaint differs, however, from the first, at least in form. It alleges that Dr. Quint "wrongfully, carelessly, wantonly and negligently commit(ted) (appellant) to St. Elizabeth's Hospital by way of an application for emergency hospitalization which was executed by (Dr. Quint) without complying with the reasonable medical standards of care required under the circumstances then existing." ¹⁸ Appellant contends that the cause of action asserted in this count is malpractice, which assuredly the Act does not bar. ¹⁹ The United States, on the other hand, argues that appellant's second claim, though captioned "malpractice," is in substance identical to the first, and thus falls within the statutory exclusion.

As we have stated in the past, "the label which a plaintiff applies to a pleading does not determine the nature of the cause of action which he states." ²⁰ And surely a litigant cannot circumvent the Act by the simple expedient of drafting in terms of negligence a complaint that in reality is a claim as to which the United States remains immunized. ²¹ We are mindful, too, that both of appellant's counts allege that Dr. Quint caused him to be confined in Saint Elizabeths Hospital, and thus impart a superficial cast of sameness. On the other hand, false imprisonment historically has been viewed as an intentional tort; ²² notwithstanding liability for negligence causing a confinement when actual damage ensues, ²³ only an act intended to impose confinement or known by the actor to be substantially certain of doing so generates the common law tort of false imprisonment. ²⁴ It does not appear that the conduct alleged in the second count meets these specifications. ²⁵

We need not, however, inquire whether the Act, which plainly allows negligence claims ²⁶ but just as plainly bars false imprisonment claims, ²⁷ sets the line of demarcation between the two where the common law draws it. For we are satisfied that appellant's second count, viewed simply as the statement of a cause of action for negligence within the general compass of the Act, does not yield a claim upon which relief can be granted. A malpractice action does not lie unless the physician violates a duty of care owed the patient ²⁸ nor, even, then unless the physician's breach of duty proximately causes the injury complained of by the patient. ²⁹ By our assessment, the allegations of the second count of appellant's complaint, even if fully proven at a trial, would establish neither of these essential ingredients.

III

A physician "who has reason to believe that (his patient) is mentally ill and, because of the illness, is likely to injure himself or others if he is not immediately detained" is statutorily empowered, without a warrant, "(to) take the (patient) into custody, transport him to a public or private hospital, and make application for his admission thereto for purposes of emergency observation and diagnosis." ³⁰ The only additional requirement which the statute imposes upon the physician is that "(t)he application shall reveal the circumstances under which the person was taken into custody and the reasons therefor." ³¹ But notwithstanding the belief and reasons underlying the physician's application, the hospital is authorized to admit and detain a nonconsenting patient only "if the application is accompanied by a certificate of a psychiatrist on duty at the hospital stating that he has examined the person and is of the opinion that he has symptoms of a mental illness and, as a result thereof, is likely to injure himself or others unless he is immediately hospitalized." ³² The statute thus contemplates that the psychiatrist's certificate rather than the physician's application, will determine whether the patient will be confined for emergency observation and diagnosis.

The second count of appellant's complaint charges that he was " commit(ted)" to Saint Elizabeths Hospital upon an application executed by Dr. Quint "without complying with the reasonable medical standards of care required under the circumstances then existing." ³³ But, as the statute explicates, the examination requirement preconditioning admission to and detention in the hospital is imposed upon the "psychiatrist on duty at the hospital" ³⁴ and not upon the initiating physician. ³⁵ Beyond that, the statute clothes the initiating physician with a privilege immunizing his role as the agency by which such examinations become possible. ³⁶ He may "take the person (suspected of mental illness) into custody, transport him to a public or private hospital, and make application for his admission thereto for purposes of emergency observation and diagnosis" if three stipulations are met: (a) prior to assumption of custody, he believes the patient to be mentally ill and likely to injure himself or others if not immediately detained; (b) the belief is reasonable; and (c) he discloses in the application for hospitalization the circumstances under which the patient was taken into custody and the reasons therefor. ³⁷ The second count of appellant's complaint in no way...