Hines v. Anderson, 07-2102.

• Citation: 547 F.3d 915
• Decision Date: 21 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-2102.,07-2102.
• Parties: Howard Lansing HINES; Robert Monge; Emil Johnson; Wardell Hicks; and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. Wendell ANDERSON; Kenneth Schoen; James Cicero; Warren Lawson; Bruce McManus, Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

547 F.3d 915

Howard Lansing HINES; Robert Monge; Emil Johnson; Wardell Hicks; and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Appellants, v. Wendell ANDERSON; Kenneth Schoen; James Cicero; Warren Lawson; Bruce McManus, Appellees.

No. 07-2102.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 14, 2008.

Filed: November 21, 2008.

Mary R. Vasaly, argued, Minneapolis, MN for appellant.

Kelly Susan Kemp, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued, St. Paul, MN (Jennifer A. Service, on the brief), for appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, BEAM, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Howard Hines and other similarly situated inmates (Inmates) at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Oak Park Heights in Stillwater, Minnesota (Oak Park Heights Facility), appeal from the district court's¹ order terminating the Hines Consent Decree (decree) that regulated prison medical care. We affirm.

I

In 1973, inmates at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Stillwater filed a class action suit against Minnesota state actors and prison officials pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the medical care provided at the prison violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Following negotiations, and with neither party making any admissions, the parties agreed to a consent decree that set medical care standards for the prison. The district court issued the decree on May 27, 1977. Hines v. Anderson, 439 F.Supp. 12 (D.Minn.1977). Since March 1999, the decree has applied exclusively to the Oak Park Heights Facility.

In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which outlines appropriate remedies in civil litigation regarding prison conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Section 3626(b) of the PLRA addresses the termination of relief and applies retroactively to prospective relief that was entered before the statute's enactment. § 3626(b)(1)(A)(iii). It also allows for the immediate termination of prospective relief "in the absence of a finding by the court that the relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation." § 3626(b)(2). The district court cannot terminate the prospective relief, however, if it makes such findings. § 3626(b)(3).

On August 22, 2002, the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Corrections (Department) moved to terminate the decree pursuant to § 3626(b). Initially, the district court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to terminate the decree and dismissed the motion without prejudice. We reversed that order and remanded the case on December 15, 2003. See Hines v. Anderson, 83 Fed.Appx. 148 (8th Cir.2003). On November 4, 2004, the magistrate judge² to whom the case was assigned issued a report and recommendation that the district court grant the Department's motion to terminate the decree. After reviewing their objections, the district court granted the Inmates leave to engage in additional discovery for the purpose of presenting evidence of ongoing Eighth Amendment violations at the Oak Park Heights Facility. The order permitted the parties to take five depositions each and serve twenty-five interrogatories. It further allowed the Inmates to file unlimited pro se submissions until September 1, 2005, and to retain a medical expert whose expenses of up to $7,000 would be paid by the defendants.

Following discovery, both parties submitted supplemental memorandums and exhibits with respect to the motion to terminate the decree. The Inmates filed the report prepared by their expert, and individual inmates filed numerous submissions regarding the alleged inadequacies of their medical care. In turn, the Department submitted the medical records pertaining to those individuals. The matter was again submitted to the magistrate judge for review.

The claims in the Inmates' declarations typically described personal experience with deficient medical care as well as general complaints such as staff shortages, delays in receiving medication, and the unfairness of the $3.00 co-pay for medical services. After evaluating the evidence the magistrate judge submitted a forty-six-page report and recommendation detailing the procedural history of and the factual foundation for the parties' respective positions. The report addressed each of the individual inmate's declarations. We highlight a few of the individual submissions below.

Inmate No. 1 complains that he has a painful lump in his left breast.³ He notified health services of the lump in early April 2005 and was not examined until May 27, 2005. Health services ordered laboratory tests that revealed the lump was benign, but Inmate No. 1 was not notified of the cause of the lump or the outcome of the examination. In response to the inmate's grievance, the Department acknowledged that there was no indication that this information was conveyed to him. Although the inmate wanted the lump removed, health services concluded that surgery was not appropriate.

Inmate No. 15 has a history of unstable mental health. On June 9, 2005, he cut his left arm with a staple and inserted an ink pen under the skin. After a nurse discovered this, she bandaged his arm and placed him on observation status. The following day, the inmate was taken to health services for x-rays and an examination by Stephen J. Craane, M.D. The inmate complains that Dr. Craane did not immediately remove the pen and instead left it in place for more than two weeks. In his affidavit, Dr. Craane states that the pen was not in contact with any nerves or blood vessels and that he chose to leave it in place after weighing the risks of bleeding and infection that might result from removing it. Once the area became inflamed, Dr. Craane conducted a surgical procedure to remove the pen.

Inmate No. 16 has a history of kidney failure and receives dialysis three days per week at the prison. He alleges that the nurses are inattentive, that a technician rather than a nurse performs the dialysis, that officials do not wash their hands prior to handling the equipment, that officials allow blood to clot in the dialysis machine, and that prison personnel do not properly clean spilled fluids. The Department has since investigated the inmate's concerns and the Health Services Administrator has met with the dialysis service provider. The Health Services Administrator now provides increased supervision and communication and maintains regular contact with the provider.

At least nine current inmates criticize the lack of care they are receiving for Hepatitis C. In each of these cases, the inmate notes that he is not getting proper treatment for the disease. The Department explained that it follows its "Hepatitis C Treatment Eligibility Criteria and Antiviral Treatment Guidelines." These guidelines require that certain criteria, such as significantly elevated liver function levels, must be met before health services provides treatment to those diagnosed with Hepatitis C. Because the inmates in question did not meet the standards set forth in the Guidelines, the Department did not provide treatment.

The report noted that "the strongest comment offered by the expert is that he had found several examples of substandard care," but went on to find that the expert's submission did not support the Inmates' argument that there were current and ongoing Eighth Amendment violations. Additionally, the report found that the Inmates' declarations did not establish the existence of such violations. Further, the report found that "the record established through individual prisoner complaints does not represent evidence in support of ongoing violation[s] of Eighth Amendment rights to medical care with respect to medications, co-pays, or treatment." Finally, the report found that the decree was "the antithesis of narrowly constructed," that it was "broad and comprehensive, addressing concerns that are certainly related, but largely ancillary to core Eighth Amendment medical treatment issues." The report concluded by recommending that the decree be terminated.

After conducting a de novo review, the district court adopted the report and denied the Inmates' request for further discovery and an evidentiary hearing. It is from this judgment that the Inmates now appeal.

II

The Inmates argue that the district court failed to make findings of fact as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). We review a district court's failure to make findings of fact pursuant to Rule 52(a) for abuse of discretion. Darst-Webbe Tenant Assoc. Bd. v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 339 F.3d 702, 711 (8th Cir.2003). Rule 52(a) states that "[i]n an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately." The rule "generally requires findings of fact and conclusions of law for rulings on injunctions, but not on motions." Cody v. Hillard, 139 F.3d 1197, 1200 (8th Cir.1998). Regardless of whether a motion to terminate a consent decree is more like an injunction than a typical motion, we conclude that the district court made findings sufficient to satisfy Rule 52(a).

III

The Inmates argue that because they have a property interest in the decree, the Due Process Clause and the PLRA required that further expert investigation be conducted and an evidentiary hearing held prior to termination. In Gavin v. Branstad, we concluded that prisoners do not have vested rights in a consent decree. 122 F.3d 1081, 1091 (8th Cir. 1997). Because a consent decree provides prospective relief and can be modified to adapt to changing circumstances, it is not a final judgment. Id. at 1087. A vested right, and by extension due process protections, is dependent upon the existence of a final judgment. Id. at 1090-91. Accordingly, because the decree does not constitute a final judgment, the Inmates have no property right therein...