Davis v. Washington, No. 05-5224.
| Citation | 547 U.S. 813,165 L. Ed. 2d 224,126 S. Ct. 2266 |
| Decision Date | 19 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-5224. |
| Parties | DAVIS <I>v.</I> WASHINGTON |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
In No. 05-5224, a 911 operator ascertained from Michelle McCottry that she had been assaulted by her former boyfriend, petitioner Davis, who had just fled the scene. McCottry did not testify at Davis's trial for felony violation of a domestic no-contact order, but the court admitted the 911 recording despite Davis's objection, which he based on the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. He was convicted. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, as did the State Supreme Court, which concluded that, inter alia, the portion of the 911 conversation in which McCottry identified Davis as her assailant was not testimonial.
In No. 05-5705, when police responded to a reported domestic disturbance at the home of Amy and Hershel Hammon, Amy told them that nothing was wrong, but gave them permission to enter. Once inside, one officer kept petitioner Hershel in the kitchen while the other interviewed Amy elsewhere and had her complete and sign a battery affidavit. Amy did not appear at Hershel's bench trial for, inter alia, domestic battery, but her affidavit and testimony from the officer who questioned her were admitted over Hershel's objection that he had no opportunity to cross-examine her. Hershel was convicted, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part. The State Supreme Court also affirmed, concluding that, although Amy's affidavit was testimonial and wrongly admitted, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Held:
1. The Confrontation Clause bars "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 53-54. These cases require the Court to determine which police "interrogations" produce statements that fall within this prohibition. Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the present cases to hold that statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Pp. 821-822.
2. McCottry's statements identifying Davis as her assailant were not testimonial. Pp. 823-829.
(a) This case requires the Court to decide whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to testimonial hearsay, and, if so, whether the 911 recording qualifies. Crawford suggested the answer to the first question, noting that "the Confrontation Clause . . . applies to `witnesses' against the accused—in other words, those who `bear testimony.'" 541 U. S., at 51. Only "testimonial statements" cause a declarant to be a witness. The Court is unaware of any early American case invoking the Confrontation Clause or the common-law right to confrontation that did not involve testimony as thus defined. Well into the 20th century, this Court's jurisprudence was carefully applied only in the testimonial context, and its later cases never in practice dispensed with the Confrontation Clause requirements of unavailability and prior cross-examination in cases involving testimonial hearsay. Pp. 823-826.
(b) The question in Davis, therefore, is whether, objectively considered, the interrogation during the 911 call produced testimonial statements. In contrast to Crawford, where the interrogation took place at a police station and was directed solely at establishing a past crime, a 911 call is ordinarily designed primarily to describe current circumstances requiring police assistance. The difference is apparent here. McCottry was speaking of events as they were actually happening, while Crawford's interrogation took place hours after the events occurred. Moreover, McCottry was facing an ongoing emergency. Further, the statements elicited were necessary to enable the police to resolve the present emergency rather than simply to learn what had happened in the past. Finally, the difference in the level of formality is striking. Crawford calmly answered questions at a station house, with an officer-interrogator taping and taking notes, while McCottry's frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that was not tranquil, or even safe. Thus, the circumstances of her interrogation objectively indicate that its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. She was not acting as a witness or testifying. Pp. 826-829.
3. Amy Hammon's statements were testimonial. They were not much different from those in Crawford. It is clear from the circumstances that Amy's interrogation was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct. There was no emergency in progress, she told the police when they arrived that things were fine, and the officer questioning her was seeking to determine not what was happening but what had happened. Objectively viewed, the primary, if not sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime. While the formal features of Crawford's interrogation strengthened her statements' testimonial aspect, such features were not essential to the point. In both cases, the declarants were separated from the defendants, the statements recounted how potentially criminal past events began and progressed, and the interrogation took place some time after the events were over. For the same reasons the comparison to Crawford is compelling, the comparison to Davis is unpersuasive. The statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was alone, unprotected by police, and apparently in immediate danger from Davis. She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past. Pp. 829-832.
4. The Indiana courts may determine on remand whether a claim of forfeiture by wrongdoing—under which one who obtains a witness's absence by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation— is properly raised in Hammon, and, if so, whether it is meritorious. Absent such a finding, the Sixth Amendment operates to exclude Amy Hammon's affidavit. Pp. 832-834.
No. 05-5224, 154 Wash. 2d 291, 111 P. 3d 844, affirmed; No. 05-5705, 829 N. E. 2d 444, reversed and remanded.
Jeffrey L. Fisher, by appointment of the Court, 546 U. S. 1074, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 05-5224. With him on the briefs was Nancy Collins. Richard D. Friedman, by appointment of the Court, 546 U. S. 1088, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 05-5705. With him on the briefs was Kimberly A. Jackson.
James M. Whisman argued the cause for respondent in No. 05-5224. With him on the brief were Norm Maleng, Deborah A. Dwyer, and Lee D. Yates. Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General of Indiana, argued the cause for respondent in No. 05-5705. With him on the brief were Steve Carter, Attorney General, and Nicole M. Schuster and Julie A. Hoffman, Deputy Attorneys General.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 05-5224. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, Irving L. Gornstein, and Joel M. Gershowitz.
Mr. Gornstein argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance in No. 05-5705. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, and Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben.†
These cases require us to determine when statements made to law enforcement personnel during a 911 call or at a crime scene are "testimonial" and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause.
The relevant statements in Davis v. Washington, No. 05-5224, were made to a 911 emergency operator on February 1, 2001. When the operator answered the initial call, the connection terminated before anyone spoke. She reversed the call, and Michelle McCottry answered. In the ensuing conversation, the operator ascertained that McCottry was involved in a domestic disturbance with her former boyfriend Adrian Davis, the petitioner in this case:
App. in No. 05-5224, pp. 8-9.
As the conversation continued, the operator learned that Davis had "just r[un] out the door" after hitting McCottry, and that he was leaving in a car with someone else. Id., at 9-10. McCottry started talking, but the operator cut her off, saying, "Stop talking and answer my questions." Id...
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