548 U.S. 140 (2006), 05-352, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez
|Docket Nº:||No. 05-352.|
|Citation:||548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. Cuauhtemoc GONZALEZ-LOPEZ.|
|Case Date:||June 26, 2006|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued April 18, 2006.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
[126 S.Ct. 2558] Syllabus [*]
Respondent hired attorney Low to represent him on a federal drug charge. The District Court denied Low's application for admission pro hac vice on the ground that he had violated a professional conduct rule and then, with one exception, prevented respondent from meeting or consulting with Low throughout the trial. The jury found respondent guilty. Reversing, the Eighth Circuit held that the District Court erred in interpreting the disciplinary rule, that the court's refusal to admit Low therefore violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his choosing, and that this violation was not subject to harmless-error review.
A trial court's erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant's choice of counsel entitles him to reversal of his conviction. Pp. 144-152.
(a) In light of the Government's concession of erroneous deprivation, the trial court's error violated respondent's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. The Court rejects the Government's contention that the violation is not "complete" unless the defendant can show that substitute counsel was ineffective within the [126 S.Ct. 2559] meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674--i.e., that his performance was deficient and the defendant was prejudiced by it--or the defendant can demonstrate that substitute counsel's performance, while not deficient, was not as good as what his counsel of choice would have provided, creating a "reasonable probability that . . . the result . . . would have been different," id., at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To support these propositions, the Government emphasizes that the right to counsel is accorded to ensure that the accused receive a fair trial, Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291, and asserts that a trial is not unfair unless a defendant has been prejudiced. The right to counsel of choice, however, commands not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided--to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be best. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177. That right was violated here; no additional showing of prejudice is required to make the violation "complete." Pp. 144-148.
(b) The Sixth Amendment violation is not subject to harmless-error analysis. Erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, "with
consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as 'structural error.' " Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 282, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182. It "def[ies] analysis by 'harmless error' standards" because it "affec[ts] the framework within which the trial proceeds" and is not "simply an error in the trial process itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302. Different attorneys will pursue different strategies with regard to myriad trial matters, and the choice of attorney will affect whether and on what terms the defendant cooperates with the prosecution, plea bargains, or decides to go to trial. It is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings. This inquiry is not comparable to that required to show that a counsel's deficient performance prejudiced a defendant. Pp. 148-151.
(c) Nothing in the Court's opinion casts any doubt or places any qualification upon its previous holdings limiting the right to counsel of choice and recognizing trial courts' authority to establish criteria for admitting lawyers to argue before them. However broad a trial court's discretion may be, this Court accepts the Government's concession that the District Court erred. Pp. 151-152.
399 F.3d 924, affirmed and remanded.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Clement, Assistant Attorney General Fisher, Lisa S. Blatt, and Daniel S. Goodman.
Jeffrey L. Fisher argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were J. Richard McEachern, Pamela S. Karlan, Joseph H. Low IV, Thomas C. Goldstein, Amy Howe, and Kevin K. Russell [*]
Scalia, J., Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Altto, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 152.
[126 S.Ct. 2560] SCALIA, Justice.
We must decide whether a trial court's erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant's choice of counsel entitles him to a reversal of his conviction.
Respondent Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez was charged in the Eastern District of Missouri with conspiracy to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. His family hired attorney John Fahle to represent him. After the arraignment, respondent called a California attorney, Joseph Low, to discuss whether Low would represent him, either in addition to or instead of Fahle. Low flew from California to meet with respondent, who hired him.
Some time later, Low and Fahle represented respondent at an evidentiary hearing before a Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge accepted Low's provisional entry of appearance and permitted Low to participate in the hearing on the condition that he immediately file a motion for admission pro hac vice. During the hearing, however, the Magistrate Judge revoked the provisional acceptance on the ground that, by passing notes to Fahle, Low had violated a court rule restricting the cross-examination of a witness to one counsel.
The following week, respondent informed Fahle that he wanted Low to be his only attorney. Low then filed an application for admission pro hac vice. The District Court denied his application without comment. A month later, Low filed a second application, which the District Court again denied without explanation. Low's appeal, in the form of an application for a writ of mandamus, was dismissed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Fahle filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and for a show-cause hearing to consider sanctions against Low. Fahle asserted that, by contacting respondent while respondent was represented by Fahle, Low violated Mo. Rule
of Professional Conduct 4-4.2 (2003), which prohibits a lawyer "[i]n representing a client" from "communicat[ing] about the subject of the representation with a party . . . represented by another lawyer" without that lawyer's consent. Low filed a motion to strike Fahle's motion. The District Court granted Fahle's motion to withdraw and granted a continuance so that respondent could find new representation. Respondent retained a local attorney, Karl Dickhaus, for the trial. The District Court then denied Low's motion to strike and, for the first time, explained that it had denied Low's motions for admission pro hac vice primarily because, in a separate case before it, Low had violated Rule 44.2 by communicating with a represented party.
The case proceeded to trial, and Dickhaus represented respondent. Low again moved for admission and was again denied. The court also denied Dickhaus's request to have Low at counsel table with him and ordered Low to sit in the audience and to have no contact with Dickhaus during the proceedings. To enforce the court's order, a United States Marshal sat between Low and Dickhaus at trial. Respondent was unable to meet with Low throughout the trial, except for once on the last night. The jury found respondent guilty.
After trial, the District Court granted Fahle's motion for sanctions against Low. It read Rule 44.2 to forbid Low's contact with respondent without Fahle's permission. [126 S.Ct. 2561] It also reiterated that it had denied Low's motions for admission on the ground that Low had violated the same Rule in a separate matter.
Respondent appealed, and the Eighth Circuit vacated the conviction. 399 F.3d 924 (2005). The court first held that the District Court erred in interpreting Rule 44.2 to prohibit Low's conduct both in this case and in the separate matter on which the District Court based its denials of his admission motions. The District Court's denials of these motions were therefore erroneous and violated respondent's
Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his choosing. See id., at 928932. The court then concluded that this Sixth Amendment violation was not subject to harmless-error review. See id., at 932935. We granted certiorari. 546 U.S. 1085, 126 S.Ct. 979, 163 L.Ed.2d 722 (2006).
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." We have previously held that an element of this right is the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) ("It is hardly necessary to say that, the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice"). The Government here agrees, as it has previously, that "the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be represented by an otherwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire, or who is willing to represent the defendant even though he is without funds." Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-625, 109 S.Ct....
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