Zinger v. Blanchette, 76-1249

Decision Date20 January 1977
Docket NumberNo. 76-1249,76-1249
Parties14 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 497, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,467, 1 Employee Benefits Ca 1548 William F. ZINGER, Appellant, v. Robert W. BLANCHETTE et al., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Alexander Brodsky, Harry E. Brodsky, Brodsky, Brodsky & Brodsky, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Hermon M. Wells, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.

Before ADAMS, KALODNER * and WEIS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WEIS, Circuit Judge.

Acknowledging the inexorable march of time but unwilling to leave his employment before the customary age of 65, the plaintiff contests his involuntary retirement one year earlier. He contends that an agreement by his employer preceding the formation of the Penn Central Railroad and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act both proscribe his premature retirement. Consequently, he seeks to augment his pension to what it would have been had he remained in service until he reached 65. Though he argues vigorously, we conclude that he cannot prevail on either of his contentions and, therefore, we must affirm the district court's judgment for the defendants.

Only months before his sixty-fifth birthday and despite his protests, the Penn Central Transportation Company retired plaintiff Zinger, making him eligible for pension benefits from several sources, including the Railroad Retirement Fund. However, these payments total $834.12 less per year than he would have received had he continued to work for Penn Central until age 65.

Zinger began working for the Pennsylvania Railroad Company in 1943, and continued without interruption in the service of its successor, the Penn Central. He served as an attorney in the legal department of the company on a salary basis, and appeared for the railroad in proceedings in the courts as well as before the Interstate Commerce Commission. His efforts were directed chiefly toward claims for freight loss and damage, and did not extend to matters of company policy or the discretion to institute litigation.

Zinger had been a contributing member of the Plan for Supplemental Pensions first put into effect by the Pennsylvania Railroad in 1938 and later amended by the Penn Central in 1974. 1 The Plan provided for payment of pension benefits in addition to those afforded by the Railroad Retirement Act. In 1962, the Pennsylvania Railroad also adopted an "Interim Pension Policy" to pay benefits to those employees retiring before 65, when payments began under the Railroad Retirement Act.

In the preliminary negotiations for the Pennsylvania and New York Central merger, management agreed with the unions to provide extensive job protection for their members. In the course of ICC hearings, concerned in part with the fate of employees who would be affected by the merger, the companies stated that they would extend those benefits to non-union ("non-agreement") personnel as well. The Commission approved the protective agreement as "fair and equitable" to both union and "non-agreement" employees but required the latter group to accept the terms and conditions of the agreement in writing. 2

On April 5, 1965, the chairman of the board of the Pennsylvania Railroad sent a letter addressed to "PRR Supervisors, Managers, and Officers" explaining some effects of the merger. Mr. Zinger was one of the persons who received this communication. In the body of the letter, the chairman wrote:

"You will note from Section I, (of the attachment) which applies to you, that non-agreement supervisors, managers, and officers will be offered continued employment until they retire, . . . ."

The attached document, captioned "Personnel Policy for Merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads Applying to Supervisors, Managers, Officers and other Employees Not Subject to Agreement with Unions," 3 listed two classifications of personnel not subject to the union agreement: "I. Supervisors, Managers, and Officers" and "II. Other Employees Not Subject to Agreements with Unions." Paragraph E under the first category read:

"The company may elect to retire any such person between ages 60 and 65 and he, as well as any such person over 60 years of age who is unwilling to relocate or accept a position in a new field of endeavor, will be provided interim pension allowances . . . ."

On February 19, 1968, soon after consummation of the Penn Central merger, the senior vice president sent a letter to "Management Employees Provided For by The Personnel Policy for Merger of the Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroads." This letter, sent to Mr. Zinger among others, stated in part: "(I)t is a pleasure to reaffirm the Personnel Policy for Merger which applies to you." The policy was reprinted on the reverse side and read in part: "(T) hese policies will apply to managers and officers not subject to the provisions of the ICC Order." Included was a provision for early retirement at the company's election set out in the same verbiage as in the letter of April 5, 1965.

On March 1, 1974, the general counsel for Penn Central told plaintiff that he would be retired very shortly. After Zinger protested and commenced this litigation, his retirement was postponed to October 1, 1974, seven months before his 65th birthday.

In the district court, plaintiff asked for injunctive relief and damages, asserting that as a "non-agreement employee" he could not be involuntarily retired. In addition, he alleged that the early retirement plan violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. The district court rejected both contentions, and entered judgment for the defendants.

I.

Plaintiff's position, as we understand it, is that, as a salaried employee of the railroad, he was entitled to the benefits of the protective agreement approved by the ICC as a condition of the merger. He argues that since the ICC is required to protect the interests of all affected railroad employees in the event of a merger, see 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f), and "employee" is not defined in the statute, the word should be given its ordinary meaning one that would include a person in his position. In response, the defendants argue that managers and professional personnel are simply not "employees" within the meaning of § 5(2)(f) and there was no intention to include them in the protective agreement.

Before reaching the question of whether plaintiff was covered by the protective agreement, however, we think it important to determine whether its provisions have the effect Mr. Zinger urges. We conclude that they do not.

The plaintiff cites language in the union protective agreement of May 20, 1964 providing that, upon merger, employees of the Pennsylvania Railroad shall be continued in service "and none of the present employees . . . shall be deprived of employment or placed in a worse position with respect to compensation, rules, working conditions, fringe benefits or rights and privileges pertaining thereto at any time during such employment." Mr. Zinger apparently contends that the company's action in retiring him before age 65 was a deprivation of employment. However, the agreement states, "(a)n employee shall not be regarded as deprived of employment or placed in a worse position . . . in case of his . . . retirement . . . ."

The plaintiff also points to a factual stipulation that "(e)mployees subject to the Union Contract dated May 20, 1964, have not involuntarily been retired early by the Penn Central Transportation Company." That fact, however, does not of itself establish a contractual undertaking under the terms of the protective agreement. All that the record shows is that the ICC order and the offer of the railroads were limited to the terms of the May 20, 1964 writing. There was no understanding that unspecified provisions of other union collective bargaining agreements or practices would be incorporated and applied to non-union employees.

After a careful review of the evidence, we find nothing to show that the protective agreement, even if it covers plaintiff, prohibits the early retirement on a pension otherwise permitted by company policy.

Since he has failed to prove any breach of the protective agreement, we need not decide whether the plaintiff would be considered an "employee" within the terms of the statute or the ICC order. We doubt that he would on the record here because of the lack of evidence to establish the meaning which the railroads and the ICC placed upon the word in their negotiations. Our research and that of counsel has not uncovered any authoritative court decision or ruling of the ICC in which a person in Mr. Zinger's capacity has been considered an "employee" under § 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Accordingly, we would expect discussion and a specific designation in the proceeding and order if such an unusual result were desired. 4 What evidence there is in this case tends to show an intention to exclude, but since the record is not as complete as it might be, we think it better practice not to issue a definitive ruling. Accordingly, since the record does not demonstrate a breach of the protective agreement, the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proof on that issue, and the district court's finding in favor of the defendants was not erroneous.

II.

Disposition of the protective agreement issue, however, does not end the case. As an alternative, Zinger contends that the Penn Central program authorizing involuntary retirement between the ages of 60 and 65 violates the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. He asserts that the early retirement provision, although bona fide, is a "subterfuge" and, hence, not within the exception described in 29 U.S.C. § 623(f):

"It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization

"(2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee...

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