Hassan v. Lubbock Independent School Dist.

Decision Date27 June 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-10345,94-10345
Citation55 F.3d 1075
Parties100 Ed. Law Rep. 862 Issam HASSAN, as next friend of Ameen Hassan, a minor child, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUBBOCK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants, Lubbock Independent School District, Joe Williams, Vincent Thomas, and Ricky Atkins, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Ann Mannings, Brian P. Quinn, McWhorter, Cobb & Johnson, Lubbock, TX, for LISD, et al.

Richard Koenig, B.J. Hemmeline, Crim. Dist. Attys., Lubbock, TX, for Atkins.

Dennis Ray Reeves, Reeves & Harriger, Lubbock, TX, for appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Chief Judge:

Issam Hassan, on behalf of his son Ameen Hassan, sued the Lubbock Independent School District; the principal of Whiteside Elementary School, Joe Williams; a teacher at Whiteside Elementary, Vincent Thomas; and a juvenile probation officer at the Lubbock County Youth Center, Ricky Atkins; asserting fourth and fourteenth amendment claims. LISD, Williams, Thomas, and Atkins appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment based on their claim of qualified immunity. We dismiss the appeal of the LISD for lack of appellate jurisdiction and reverse the denial of summary judgment for the remaining defendants and render judgment in their favor.

Background

On February 27, 1992, approximately 103 sixth graders from James A. Whiteside Elementary School in Lubbock, Texas, visited the Lubbock County Youth Center, a facility housing both the Lubbock County Probation Office and a detention center for minors between the ages of 10 and 17 who are either in custody awaiting adjudication on criminal offenses or being detained thereafter. Williams and Thomas accompanied the children.

At the outset of the tour, Center employees explained to the children that the Center expected all visitors to comply with Center rules concerning deportment and respect, and that they should listen carefully and not talk inside the facility. Center personnel then divided the schoolchildren into groups, one of which consisted of 15 boys, Williams, Thomas, and a Center employee, Ricky Atkins. As this group made its way through the facility Ameen Hassan was cautioned repeatedly for being inattentive and disrespectful. When he persisted, Williams and Thomas asked Atkins to place him in a holding room so that the other students could continue the tour without distraction. 1

Atkins took Hassan to a room used to hold juveniles brought to the facility pending retrieval by their parents or admission into the Center. The room, located at the front of the facility outside the detention area, contained a bed and a toilet, but was otherwise bare. Its metal door had a glass partition. Hassan was locked in this room for approximately 50 minutes, monitored continuously by Center employees and Thomas who returned to the area to check on him.

When the other students finished their tour, school officials led them by the room in which Hassan was waiting and allegedly told them to look at Hassan. Thomas then escorted Hassan to the bus where he joined the other students for the return trip to Whiteside Elementary. Once back at the school, Thomas had Hassan tell the class about his behavior and the resulting punishment, informing them what, if anything, he had learned from the experience.

The next day Williams met with Hassan's parents to explain the incident. He apologized for placing Hassan in a situation of which they did not approve, but insisted that the trip had been a positive experience for Hassan. Manifesting disagreement, Hassan's parents removed him from Whiteside Elementary and enrolled him in another school.

The instant action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 followed, claiming that LISD, Williams, Thomas, and Atkins violated Ameen Hassan's fourth amendment right against unreasonable seizures, fourteenth amendment due process rights, and eighth amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. 2 The complaint also claims that Thomas violated Hassan's first amendment right to free association by ordering Hassan to leave the school grounds when he went there to play with his friends after transferring schools. The district court dismissed the eighth and first amendment claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); Hassan did not appeal those dismissals.

The LISD, Williams, Thomas, and Atkins moved for summary judgment on the fourth and fourteenth amendment claims on two grounds: (1) the LISD could not be held liable because its employees did not act pursuant to an official policy or custom, and (2) the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motions for summary judgment and the defendants timely appealed.

Analysis

At the outset, we note that we have jurisdiction over the appeal by Williams, Thomas, and Atkins of the district court's denial of qualified immunity under Mitchell v. Forsyth, 3 which held that such denials, to the extent that they turn on a question of law, were final judgments for the purposes of appellate jurisdiction. The LISD appeals the district court's denial of its defense of absolute immunity to Hassan's apparent state law false imprisonment claim. 4 Hassan, however, maintains in brief that all of his claims arise under federal law. Because of this clarification, the LISD no longer advances its claim of absolute immunity. LISD offers no other jurisdictional basis for its appeal. We therefore dismiss same for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

We review a district court's denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. "Summary judgment is proper when no issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In determining whether summary judgment was proper, all fact questions are viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Questions of law are reviewed ... de novo." 5

In examining the claims of qualified immunity on summary judgment, we first inquire whether Hassan has alleged "the violation of a clearly established constitutional right." 6 For a right to be clearly established, there does not have to be a prior case directly on point, but the unlawfulness of the precipitating acts must be apparent in light of the existing law. 7 We then inquire whether the defendants' conduct was objectively reasonable " 'in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time' of the incident in issue." 8 Thus, even if we find a violation of Hassan's constitutional rights, the individual defendants are immune from liability if reasonable public officials could differ on the lawfulness of their actions. 9 The court need not reach this second inquiry, however, if Hassan fails to tender the requisite summary judgment evidence that the individual defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right. 10

In his first claim, Hassan alleges that the acts of Williams, Thomas, and Atkins violated his fourth amendment right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. This constitutional right extends to seizures by or at the direction of school officials, but whether such a seizure is unreasonable depends on all relevant contextual circumstances. 11 The Supreme Court has recognized the unique backdrop that schools present for the operation of the fourth amendment, specifically noting that "the preservation of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult." 12 Thus, while school officials are subject to the limitations of the fourth amendment, the reasonableness of seizures must be determined in light of all of the circumstances, with particular attention being paid to whether the seizure was justified at its inception and reasonable in scope. 13

At the time of the instant seizure, Hassan was touring a juvenile detention center as part of a school-sponsored educational field trip. The two school officials supervising the trip, Williams and Thomas, were charged with the care and control of all of the students. The detention center contained both older and younger youths awaiting adjudication for criminal offenses, or residing at the center following adjudication for criminal offenses; these surroundings understandably heightened the need for a disciplined attitude by the visiting students to ensure their safety and to maintain order among the residents of the facility. In this setting Hassan misbehaved. 14 We are fully cognizant that teachers routinely find it necessary to punish such behavior. Williams and Thomas, aware of their responsibilities, responded to Hassan's behavior by separating and isolating him until the other students had finished their tour. We entertain no doubt that these actions properly furthered the mandated maintenance of discipline within the touring group, thus making it possible for the other students to continue their valuable educational experience. 15 We conclude that Hassan's seizure was reasonably justified at its inception.

The placement of Hassan in the holding room at the detention center was also reasonably related in scope to the relevant circumstances, thus justifying the action. The presence of other potentially dangerous juveniles militated against Hassan being left alone in an easily accessible area. The room into which Hassan was placed both protected him and allowed for his easy supervision. Further, this restriction of his freedom of movement lasted no longer than absolutely necessary. 16 He was released from the room as soon as the other students completed their visit. Under these circumstances, we find no violation of any of Hassan's clearly established constitutional rights by either Williams or Thomas.

Nor do we perceive...

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