King v. Champion

Citation55 F.3d 522
Decision Date18 May 1995
Docket NumberNo. 93-5192,93-5192
PartiesDoyle Kent KING, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Ron CHAMPION; Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit)

Susan M. Otto, Federal Public Defender, Western Dist. of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, OK, for petitioner-appellant.

Susan B. Loving, Atty. Gen., Diane L. Slayton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, OK, for respondents-appellees.

Before BRORBY, LOGAN, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

LOGAN, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner Doyle Kent King appeals the district court's order of August 9, 1993, denying him habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254 on his claim that state court delay in adjudicating his direct criminal appeal violated his federal due process rights. 1 We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and affirm. 2

Petitioner was convicted in Oklahoma state court of assault and battery with intent to commit a felony, for which he received a twenty-five-year sentence, and of escape from a penal institution, for which he also received a twenty-five-year sentence. Petitioner appealed these convictions to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in July 1985. By October 1986, petitioner's appeal was fully briefed and ready for resolution by the court. When petitioner filed his habeas petition in federal court in April 1992, however, the Oklahoma court had yet to issue a decision in his case. Petitioner claimed that this delay in adjudicating his appeal violated his right to due process.

For purposes of investigation and resolution, petitioner's habeas case was grouped together with numerous other habeas cases alleging delay in Oklahoma's criminal appellate processes, pursuant to this court's remand order in Harris v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062, 1071, 1073 (10th Cir.1991) (Harris I ). These habeas cases, referred to as the Harris cases, were presided over by a three-judge panel of the district court, made up of one judge from each of the federal districts in Oklahoma, which ruled on the issues of law and fact that were common to all. See Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1552 (10th Cir.1994) (Harris II ) (discussing formation and purpose of three-judge panel).

In June 1993, Judge Brett, one of the members of the three-judge panel, held an evidentiary hearing concerning the individual circumstances of petitioner's case. By that time, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had affirmed petitioner's convictions in a summary opinion issued on April 23, 1992. Therefore, to obtain habeas relief based on the delay in adjudicating his direct criminal appeal, petitioner had to show "actual prejudice to the appeal itself, arising from the delay," Harris II, 15 F.3d at 1566.

Judge Brett determined that petitioner's evidence was not sufficient to demonstrate prejudice to the appeal itself and, therefore, denied petitioner habeas relief on his claim of appellate delay. Before reaching the merits of this ruling, we must first consider petitioner's arguments that Judge Brett erred in not recusing himself and that petitioner should otherwise receive a new evidentiary hearing because Judge Brett improperly limited the evidence he could present at the hearing.

On appeal, petitioner notes that in Harris II, 15 F.3d at 1571, we held that Judge Brett should have recused himself from the Harris cases, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455. We so held because Judge Brett's uncle was a member of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals during the time period at issue in many of the Harris cases and his uncle also was named as a party to the civil rights claim that was added to the Harris cases. We further determined, however, that Judge Brett's failure to recuse himself from the Harris cases did not require vacation of the three-judge panel's decisions with respect to the common issues of law and fact in those cases. Harris II, 15 F.3d at 1572. Instead, we ruled that the proper remedy for Judge Brett's violations of Sec. 455 was for Judge Brett "to recuse himself from all further proceedings relating to these matters on remand, including any individual hearings that may be necessary." Id.

Judge Brett did not have the benefit of our ruling in Harris II when he conducted the evidentiary hearing here or when he ruled on the merits of petitioner's individual claim for appellate delay. Although we conclude, for the same reasons discussed in Harris II, that Judge Brett should have recused himself from petitioner's habeas action pursuant to Sec. 455, his failure to do so does not require us to vacate his opinion and remand the action for a new hearing and decision. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 862, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2203-04, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988) (noting that Sec. 455 "neither prescribes nor prohibits any particular remedy for a violation" of its provisions, rather, it leaves the task of formulating an appropriate remedy to the courts).

First, as petitioner acknowledges on appeal, further delay by the federal courts will only exacerbate any injury petitioner has already suffered as a result of delays by the state court. See also Harris II, 15 F.3d at 1572. Second, petitioner's appellate delay claim was decided almost entirely on the basis of undisputed facts. Although petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing, resolution of this case did not require Judge Brett to make any credibility determinations. See id. Thus, there is no need for a new factfinder to hear the testimonial evidence.

As an alternative remedy to remanding the case for a new hearing before a new judge, petitioner suggests that we review Judge Brett's findings of fact de novo, rather than for clear error. Under the particular circumstances of this case we hold there is no need for a remand. Petitioner is not entitled to relief under any standard of review we might apply, for the reasons stated hereafter.

Next, we consider petitioner's argument that he is also entitled to a new hearing because the district court improperly limited the evidence he was permitted to elicit at the June 29 hearing. At a scheduling conference preceding the evidentiary hearing, petitioner's counsel indicated that he wanted to call a judge from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to testify at the hearing about what took the court so long to issue an opinion in petitioner's case. Counsel noted that the Oklahoma court had previously presented evidence that the judges' inability to agree on the wording of an opinion had led to the delay, and contended that this explanation conflicted with the Oklahoma court's eventual issuance of a summary opinion in petitioner's case.

Therefore, counsel said, he wanted a judge from the Oklahoma court to "explain how this summary opinion resolves the issue of them not having been able to agree upon language to affirm this fellow's conviction when there's no language in the summary opinion explaining the basis for their affirmance." I R.Supp. 10. Judge Brett, however, noted that this court had previously approved the Oklahoma court's use of summary opinions, 3 and said he would not permit counsel to call an Oklahoma judge to testify as to the state court's thought processes in reaching a decision in petitioner's case.

On appeal, petitioner argues that "[b]y effectively denying [him] a meaningful opportunity to explore fully this aspect of delay, the district court improperly truncated the fact finding purpose of the evidentiary hearing." Appellant's Br. at 13. Therefore, petitioner contends, he should be granted a new hearing.

As an initial matter, we fail to see any conflict between the Oklahoma court's statement that the delay in adjudicating petitioner's appeal was caused by the individual judges' inability to agree on the wording of an opinion and the fact that after the Oklahoma court adopted the use of a summary opinion format in all cases not issued for publication, see Harris II, 15 F.3d at 1551, it then issued a summary opinion in petitioner's case. The use of a summary opinion in petitioner's case obviated the need for agreement as to the wording of a lengthier opinion. See id. ("By reducing the amount of legal analysis and discussion set forth in its unpublished opinions, the court eliminated lengthy conferences concerning the precise wording of the opinion, as well as the need for separate opinions when judges concurred in the outcome but not in the analysis.").

Moreover, we conclude that, under the circumstances, any reasonable judge would have denied counsel's request to call a judge from the Oklahoma court to testify about that court's decisional process. First, the reason for the delay given by the state clearly established both that the delay was exclusively the fault of the state and that the delay was not constitutionally justified. Further inquiry into the reason for the delay would, therefore, have been of little or no additional benefit to petitioner. Second, just as courts generally will not inquire into juries' deliberations, see United States v. Abbott Washroom Sys., Inc., 49 F.3d 619, 621 (10th Cir.1995), so, too, a federal court would be reluctant to inquire into the deliberative process of a state appellate court whose opinion was before it on collateral attack.

Finally, any error in not permitting petitioner to inquire further into the reason for the Oklahoma court's delay was harmless, because the reason for the delay was just one of several factors to be considered in determining whether petitioner established a due process violation. Harris II, 15 F.3d at 1546-47. To prevail on his due process claim, petitioner also had to demonstrate that the delay resulted in prejudice to the appeal itself. Id. at 1566. Because, as we conclude below, petitioner failed to make the requisite showing of prejudice, his claim would have failed, regardless of the reason for the delay in adjudicating his appeal.

Having determined that petitioner is not entitled to another evidentiary hearing, we turn to the merits of petitioner...

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7 cases
  • Jackson v. Shanks
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 5 Mayo 1998
    ...Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1359 (10th Cir.1997). We are not empowered to correct errors of state law. See King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522, 527 (10th Cir.1995). I. Procedural Default of Issues (4), (5), (6), and Before examining the merits of Mr. Jackson's claims, we must examine wheth......
  • Burleson v. Saffle
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 24 Enero 2002
    ...that "there is nothing inherently objectionable in the Oklahoma court's use of summary opinions in unpublished cases," King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522, 526 (10th Cir. 1995), and that we will normally defer to a state court's result even when it is unaccompanied by supporting reasoning, Aycox ......
  • Tyler v. Nelson, 97-3323
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 5 Enero 1999
    ...of state law." Id. (citation omitted). We lack authority to correct errors of state law made by state courts. See id.; King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522, 527 (10th Cir.1995). We presume that the state court's factual findings are correct, and we review the district court's factual findings for ......
  • Cheatham v. Nelson
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • 3 Febrero 2000
    ...v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 378, 142 L.Ed.2d 312 (1998) and King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522, 527 (10th Cir.1995)). "When the admission of evidence in a state trial is challenged on federal habeas, the question is whether the error, if any,......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Trials
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • 1 Agosto 2022
    ...in prior case, because judge did not personally participate in prior case). 1865. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(i); see, e.g. , King v. Champion, 55 F.3d 522, 523-24 (10th Cir. 1995) (recusal required because judge would otherwise review rulings of state appellate court on which judge’s uncle was j......

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