Williams v. The State Of Ga.
| Decision Date | 31 July 1875 |
| Citation | 55 Ga. 391 |
| Parties | Elijah Williams, plaintiff in error. v. The State of Georgia,defendant in error. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Criminal law. Grand jurors. Indictment. Accomplice. Larceny. Before Judge Kiddoo. Miller Superior Court. April Term, 1875.
Reported in the opinion.
I. A. Bush, by Jackson & Clarke; Henry C. Sheffield, for plaintiff in error.
James T. Flewellen, solicitor general, by A. Hood, for the state.
1. The bill of indictment was found by grand jurors, some of whom, after being drawn to serve at that term of court, had been dropped from the general list of persons qualified and liable to serve as jurors on a revision of the list by the proper officers. This was made a ground of motion to quash the bill. It was properly overruled for the reason that the revised list was made for the purpose of designating the names from which future juries were to be drawn, and had no relation whatever to the jurieswhich had already been drawn to do duty at the next term of the court—the term at which the*indictment was found. Any other construction would subject both the grand jury and the petit juries to a process of disintegration every time a revision of the general list takes place.
2. Another ground of motion to quash was, that the indictment, upon its face, by an entry at the close of it, purported to have been found at October term, 1877. This, also, was properly overruled. This entry was not an essential part of the indictment, and giving the year 1877 instead of the year 1874, was evidently a clerical error. The true date appeared on the minutes of the court, and was reproduced on the back of the indictment.
3. The trial proceeded, and the defendant was convicted. He was charged with stealing thirty pounds of seed cotton, of the value of $1 00. It appeared in evidence that the cotton was on the owner's plantation, in the possession of his tenant or agent. The agent, during the day, reported to the owner, that the defendant wanted to buy or get some cotton, and the owner replied: "Let him have it, and I will be there at the getting." That night, the owner, with a party of friends armed with guns, concealed themselves near the cotton house. As testified by the owner, he was told, at the conversation in the day, by his agent, that the defendant would be there that night to get the cotton. He also testified that, on taking his position at night, he called out his agent and asked where the defendant was. Being told that he was in the woods about a quarter of a mile off, he directed the agent to go and tell him to come and get the cotton. The agent went, and after a short absence returned in company with defendant. Leaving defendant at the cotton house, within a few steps of where the owner and his party lay concealed, the agent went to his dwelling house, brought out a basket of cotton, delivered it to defendant, who moved off with it, and just then, the owner cried, "halt!" and his party discharged their guns in the air; the defendant dropped the basket, ran off in the darkness, and made his escape. The court charged the jury, in substance, that if the defendant and his associate in thetransaction (the owner\'s agent,) united in a common intent to *steal the cotton, combining and confederating for that purpose, in executing the common intent, and one of them did the actual taking and carrying, they were both guilty. Also, that if the agent had no intent to steal, but the defendant believed he had, and so combined and confederated with him to steal, and the agent handed him the cotton, and he took it and removed it any distance whatever, he was guilty. There is noevidence in the record upon which to charge the defendant with any taking and carrying away done by his supposed accomplice. The evidence is clear that that person was in mental and moral concert with the owner, not with the accused. It is incredible that he was engaged in stealing during this transaction. There was no guilty taking or carrying done by him, and it was error for the court to make any charge based on that hypothesis. The defendant is responsible alone for such taking and carrying away as...
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