State ex rel. K.C., St. J.&C.B.R.R Co. v. Severance

• Decision Date: 28 February 1874
• Citation: 55 Mo. 378
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel., THE K. C., ST. J. & C. B. R. R CO., Respondent, v. JOHN SEVERANCE, et al., Appellants.

55 Mo. 378

STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel., THE K. C., ST. J. & C. B. R. R CO., Respondent,

v.JOHN SEVERANCE, et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February Term, 1874.

Appeal from Buchanan Common Pleas.

Chandler & Sherman, for Appellants.

I. The Act approved March 10th, 1871, is unconstitutional. (See Art. XI, § 16; Art. I, § 30, Const. of Mo.)

This rule subjecting property to taxation in proportion to its value is imperative. (Life As. Am. vs. B. of As., 49 Mo., 517.)

II. Uniformity, which implies equality, in the burden of taxation, constitutes the very substance designed to be secured by the rule, and a palpable departure from equality in the burden imposed is plainly within the constitutional prohibition. (Life As. vs. B. of As., 49 Mo., 517; Bank vs. Hines, 3 Ohio St., 15; Weeks vs. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 256; Covington vs. Southgate, 15 B. Mon., 498-500; Morford vs. Unger, 8 Iowa, 92.)

III. To the end that taxation, where this rule is in force, may be equal and uniform, there must be some system of apportionment; which apportionment must be applied to all property within the taxing districts with absolute uniformity. A city tax, for example, must be apportioned and levied with absolute uniformity upon the taxable property within its limits, and with reference to a uniform standand. (Cooley on Const. Lim., pp. 495-515; 2 Kent's Com., 231; Weeks vs. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 256; Bank vs. Hines, 3 Ohio St., 15 etseq.) To render taxation uniform in any case two things are essential: 1st. The taxing district should confine itself to objects of taxation within its limits. 2nd. The apportionment of taxes should reach all objects of taxation within the taxing district; in other words, in levying taxes, the valuation of property must be uniform and the rate uniform, so that the burden will fall alike upon all taxable property throughout the territorial limits of the state or municipality within or for which the tax is to be raised. (Cooley on Const. Lim., pp. 499-503; Wells vs. Weston, 22 Mo., 385; Gilman vs. Sheboygan, 2 Black, [U. S.], 510; Wooldridge vs. Detroit, 8 Mich., 301; Knowlton vs. Supervisors, 9 Wis., 410-421; Weeks vs. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 242, 282; Mygatt vs. Washburn, 15 N. Y., 316; Exchange Bank vs. Hines, 3 Ohio St., 1; Merrick vs. Amherst, 12 Allen, 504; People vs. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Attorney General vs. W. L. & F. R. Pl'k R'd Co., 11 Wis. 42; Zanesville vs. Auditor of Muskingum Co., 5 Ohio St., 592.) Considered and judged in the light of the foregoing principles, the said act of March 10th, 1871, as the relator construes its provisions, is null and void.

Though the “Act to provide for a uniform system of assessing and collecting taxes on railroads,” approved March 10th, 1871, should be decided to be constitutional, yet it does not repeal, alter or modify the charter of St. Joseph.

1st. The said act of March 10th, 1871, is a general act, while the city charter and the several amendments thereof are local and special acts. (Sess. Laws 1871, p. 56; Laws and Ordinances of St. Joseph, p. 43, § 3, and p. 7, § 1.) Statutes of a general nature do not repeal, by implication, the charters and special acts enacted for the benefit of particular municipalities unless such appears to have been the intent of the legislature. When the mind of the legislator has been turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it, a subsequent statute, treating the subject in a general manner and not expressly contradicting the previous act, shall not be considered as intended to affect the more particular previous act, unless it is absolutely necessary to give the latter act such a construction in order that its words shall have any meaning at all. (Dill. Mun. Corp., §§ 54, 611, 612; Sedg. Stat. and Const. Law, 123-4; Mayor of Troy vs. Mutual Bank, 20 N. Y., 387, 388; Williams vs. Pritchard, 4 D. & E., 2; Langdon vs. Fire Depart., 17 Wend., 234; Furman vs. Knapp, 19 Johns, 248; R. R. Company vs. Alexandria, 17 Grattan [Va.], 176.)

The legislature did not intend that the said act of March 10th, 1871, should repeal, alter or modify the charter of St. Joseph, because:

1. The city charter provides that the Mayor and Council “shall have power to levy and collect from railroad corporations, upon the value of their property, both real and personal, within the limits of the said city, the same taxes for municipal purposes that are levied and collected upon the real and personal property of the citizens of said city.” (Sess. Acts 1864, p. 430, § 3; Laws & Ordinances of St. Joseph, p. 42, § 3.) 2. The charter also provides a method by which delinquent taxes, assessed against real estate within the city, may be collected. (Sess. Acts 1864, p. 433, § 3 to 17; Laws and Ordinances of St. Joseph, p. 30, § 3 to 17.) 3. The aforesaid act of March 10th, 1871, provides no method by which the municipal authorities may enforce the payment of city taxes upon any assessment made under the provisions of said act, and therefore the city must conform to the mode of procedure prescribed in the charter, or it is powerless to collect its taxes assessed against the real estate of those who fail or refuse to pay them. (Blackwell on Tax Titles, 447; Stetson vs. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Dillingham vs. Swan, 5 Mass., 547; Williamsport vs. Kent, 14 Ind., 306.)

But the method provided by the city charter cannot be applied to any assessment made under the provisions of this act. The assessment apportioned to the city by the “special board” created by said act, includes in one sum the valuation of relator's real and personal property subjected by said act to taxation by the city. The method prescribed by the city charter for collecting delinquent taxes assessed against real estate cannot be applied to the collection of delinquent taxes assessed against personal property. By this method, too, each piece or parcel of real estate is proceeded against for the taxes chargeable against it. And if the method of collecting delinquent taxes assessed against personal property be by distraint, as the relator contends, the municipal authorities cannot know or be informed of the proportion of the aggregate amount apportioned to the city which is properly chargeable against the relator's personalty. The city has no power to enforce against the relators' real estate the taxes chargeable against its personalty. (State to use of Rice vs. Powell, 44 Mo., 436.) Nor can the city enforce against the relator's personal estate the taxes chargeable against its realty, for such a procedure is not authorized, but rather prohibited, by the city charter.

Hence, we argue that the legislature did not intend that said act of March 10th, 1871, should operate to repeal, alter or modify the city charter by imposing upon St. Joseph an impracticable system of assessing property for purposes of taxation.

Though said act of March 10th, 1871, was passed subsequently to the enactment of the city charter, yet the former is a general and affirmative act and does not abrogate the charter, which is a particular and local act, unless negative words are used or unless the acts are irreconcilably inconsistent. Said general act and that portion of the city charter relating to the assessment and collection of city taxes, being in pari materia, must be taken and construed together and made to stand if they can be reconciled. As there may be a general prohibition, with indulgence to particular individuals, so also there may be a general system of procedure with special local exemptions or exceptions. (Sedg. on Stat. and Const. Law, pp. 123-4; Potter's Dwarris, 514, 532-3; State, ex rel. M. & M. R. R. Co. vs. Co. Court, 41 Mo., 459; St. Louis vs. Alexander, 23 Mo., 483; Deters vs. Renick, 37 Mo., 597; Brown vs. County Commissioners, 21 Penn., 37; Mayor of Troy vs. Mutual Bank, 20 N. Y., 387; Hume vs. Gossett, 43 Ill., 297; Daviess vs. Fairburn, 3 How., [U. S.] 636.)Stringfellow, Hall & Oliver, for Respondent.

I. The act of March 10th, 1871, applies to cities and incorporated towns, and provides for the assessment of railroad property within their limits. This is not only the plain meaning of the law, but it is the construction which has been given to it by the officers whose duty it is, to administer it and by all the cities and incorporated towns in Missouri through which railroads pass, except the city of St. Joseph. (State vs. Pearcy, 44 Mo., 160; 16 Iowa, 353; 3 Bush. Ky., 650; 13 Wall., 270; 12 Iowa, 534, 539; Sess. Acts 1871, pp. 56, 57, 58, 59, §§ 1, 4, 8; Sess. Acts 1873, pp. 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, §§ 1, 2, 8, 13, 18.)

II. The fact that said act does not provide a specific mode of collecting taxes against railroad companies by cities and towns makes no difference. Cities and towns can avail themselves in such cases of the provisions of their charter if applicable, and if the provisions of their charter are not applicable they may sue for the taxes. (Carondelet vs. Picot, 38 Mo., 130.)

III. The act of March 10, 1871, is constitutional. Said act requires all property to be taxed according to its actual value in cash. And this is all that our constitution requires. (Sess. Acts of March 10, 1871, p. 56, § 2; Const. Mo., Art. I, § 30.) The Constitution of Missouri does not require the same individual to assess all property. The act of 1871 adopts a just and fair mode of appraising railroads for taxation. (27 Ills., 64; 25 Ind., 178; 16 Iowa, 353; 3 Bush. [Ky.], 650.)

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

The main questions in this case are whether the act approved March 10, 1871, (Sess. Acts 1871, p. 56,) entitled “an act to provide for a uniform system of assessing and collecting taxes on railroads” applies to the city of St. Joseph, and whether it is a valid and constitutional law?

After the board of equalization provided for in said act had made their assessment on the property of the relator, and apportioned the amount on the same within the limits of the city, and duly...