Strong v. Int'l Bldg., Loan & Inv. Union

Decision Date18 December 1899
Citation55 N.E. 675,183 Ill. 97
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
PartiesSTRONG v. INTERNATIONAL BUILDING, LOAN & INVESTMENT UNION et al.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Intervening petition by William J. Strong in a suit against the International Building, Loan & Investment Union and others. Order dismissing the petition was affirmed by the appellate court (82 Ill. App. 426), and said Strong appeals. Affirmed.

On November 23, 1897, a bill was filed by one Emrick alleging insolvency of the appellee building and loan association, and seeking its dissolution. Thereunder a receiver was appointed, and subsequently, and on March 3, 1898, the people, upon the relation of the state auditor, filed a similar bill. These cases were consolidated, the former receiver removed, and the present receivers were appointed, and have since been liquidating the union. In this consolidated suit, appellant on May 19, 1898, filed his intervening petition, averring that between January 1, 1897, and August 14, 1898, he had, under the employment of the union, rendered to it legal services which were reasonably worth $5,000, and of which he asked payment. This was resisted by these receivers, and after a hearing the superior court dismissed appellant's petition for want of equity. Upon appeal to the appellate court the order of the superior court was affirmed; hence the present appeal.

The statement of facts accompanying the opinion of the appellate court is as follows: ‘A bill was filed by one Emrick, alleging insolvency of appellee, a building and loan association, and a receiver for it was appointed. In that suit appellant filed a petition which alleged, in effect, that the appellee was indebted to him for professional services, and praying that his claim be allowed, and that the receiver be ordered to pay the same. Appellee answered the petition, denying that appellant was entitled to any amount in that behalf. Upon hearing, the petition was dismissed for want of equity. Appellant is a practicing attorney at law, and there is evidence to show that he rendered professional services to appellee as follows: In 1896 suits were begun both in the circuit and superior courts of Cook county for the appointment of receivers of appellee on the ground of its then insolvency. Receivers were appointed by each court, and a conflict ensued as to the priority of jurisdiction acquired. Upon January 1, 1897, the president of the association called a meeting of the directors, which was held upon that day in appellant's office. It was at this meeting that appellant was first employed by the directors of the association to take charge of its litigation then pending. Services were rendered by appellant in the various proceedings which followed, up to August 14, 1897, at which latter date his services ceased. At that time the association had been freed from the litigation, its various receivers had been discharged, and it was again a going concern. Whether this result was accomplished through efforts of appellant is a controverted question. The amount claimed by appellant for services is $5,000, and there is evidence tending to show that the amount would be a proper compensation for the services claimed to have been rendered. The employment of appellant was for the purpose of accomplishing the discharge of all receivers, and the restoration of the association to the management of its own officers. During the period of this employment,-the exact time is not shown by the abstract,-appellant accepted retainer and employment by one of the contesting sets of receivers, viz. the receivers appointed by the superior court, and thereafter, and during the period of his employment by the association, proceeded to render professional services as well to these receivers in the same litigation. For his services to the receivers he was paid $1,295. After the association had been freed from the litigation, and the receivers had been discharged, and a new board of directors elected, the validity of whose election is not questioned, a resolution was adopted by the board of directors at a meeting held on August 7, 1897, by which it was resolved ‘that we do hereby approve of all that our attorney, William J. Strong, has done in behalf of the union in the litigation that has been pending in the circuit and superior courts in the case of McGonigle et al. against this union,’ etc. On November 17, 1897, another resolution was presented at a meeting of this board of directors, to the effect that ‘Strong had no authority to represent the union,’ and ‘that all previous resolutions of this board regarding Strong's claim be rescinded.’ This resolution was defeated by a vote of seven to two. Again, on November 27, 1897, a resolution was adopted by this board of directors, which, in effect, recites that the sum of $1,295 had been paid to appellant under a misapprehension, and instructing the attorney of the association to commence proceedings against appellant to recover the amount so paid. There was evidence tending to show that appellant agreed with the association that, unless he should succeed in getting the assets of the association restored to it,-i. e. unless he procured the dicharge of the receivers within sixty days from February 4, 1897,-he would charge nothing for his services to the association. This is denied by appellant, who testified that he had agreed only to charge nothing to the members of the board of directors individually in the contingency named. The receivers were not discharged, nor were the assets of the association returned to its management, until after the expiration of the sixty days indicated.'Henry S. Robbins, for appellant.

Pam, Donnelly & Glennon, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

In deciding this case, the appellate court delivered the following opinion: We do not deem it necessary to go into any discussion of the evidence, either as to the regularity of the election of the various boards of directors prior to the last, or as to the...

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43 cases
  • State ex rel. Robertson Inv. Co. v. Patterson, former County Treasurer
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    ......944; Boyd v. Court, . 274 P. 7; Strong v. Union, (Ill.) 55 N.E. 675. The. trial court was ......
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    ...represent conflicting interests or undertake to discharge inconsistent duties.”); Strong v. International Building Loan & Invest. Union, 183 Ill. 97, 102, 55 N.E. 675 (1899) ( per curiam ) (“ ‘[a]lawyer can, under no conceivable circumstances, recover for services rendered in the same suit ......
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    ...... is designated in the testimony as the ‘strong box,’ of that office. No record of any kind ...Strong v. International Investment Union, 183 Ill. 97, 55 N. E. 675,47 L. R. A. 792. He ......
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