Dean v. St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Co

Citation55 N.W. 628,53 Minn. 504
PartiesMichael C. Dean v. St. Paul & Duluth Railroad Co
Decision Date16 June 1893
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Submitted on briefs April 14, 1893.

Appeal by defendant, St. Paul and Duluth Railroad Company, from a judgment of the District Court of Pine County, F. M. Crosby J., entered December 3, 1892, against it for $ 27.98.

One C E. Peterson was at work for defendant as brakeman during March, 1892, for which it owed him $ 50.53. He owed the plaintiff, Michael C. Dean, five dollars for board, and gave him an order upon the Railroad Company for that amount. The Company returned the order to plaintiff, saying it declined to collect claims against its employes. On April 15, 1892 Dean commenced this action against the Railroad Company before William Ginder, a Justice of the Peace of Pine County to recover the five dollars, and on May 12, 1892, he obtained judgment. Defendant appealed to the District Court on questions of law alone. There the judgment of the Justice was affirmed, the Judge saying: "I think it must be held in this state, and that it ought to be held everywhere, that an assignee of a part of an entire demand may maintain an action upon it. See Canty v. Latterner, 31 Minn. 239; Risley v. Phenix Bank, 83 N.Y. 318." Defendant appealed to this court.

Judgment reversed.

J. D. Armstrong and Lusk, Bunn & Hadley, for appellant.

We ask the court's attention to a case involving a trivial sum, but an important principle, and a serious nuisance to those who employ very numerous servants. The law applicable was stated in the leading case of Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277. The rule in this case has been generally followed and approved. It was indorsed by this court in Lewis v. Trader's Bank, 30 Minn. 134, and in Canty v. Latterner, 31 Minn. 239. The case of Risley v. Phenix Bank, 83 N.Y. 318, cited by the learned District Judge, in no way goes to support this action. It is not questioned that partial orders and assignments may bind the debtor when the custom of trade shows the debtor's consent, as in case of checks or orders on a bank. It is not disputed that, under the Code, the real party in interest must sue. But this proves only that assignor and assignee, in case of partial assignments, must join in the suit. The assignee can no more sue alone for his interest in the debt than the original creditor could have brought two actions, each for a part of the debt. The same rule that no one shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause forbids either proceeding.

While it is true, as suggested by respondent, that his complaint does not state a cause of action, still a failure to make the objection is not prejudicial, as questions of law may be raised at any time during the trial. The question of law here is, that plaintiff's evidence did not make a case.

It is not necessary that the return show a request to the justice for a transcript of the evidence, provided it affirmatively appears that all the evidence is in fact returned. Hinds v. American Express Co., 24 Minn. 95; Smith v. Force, 31 Minn. 119.

The certificate of the justice shows the return of certain papers numbered 1 to 8, the evidence and exhibits being numbered 4, 5 and 6. The justice certifies that said papers, together with the foregoing transcript, contain, "a full, correct and complete statement of all the proceedings and the evidence had before me in said cause." Proceedings before a justice are liberally construed, and the certificate is sufficient. Payson v. Everett, 12 Minn. 216, (Gil. 137;) Smith v. Force, 31 Minn. 119; Plymat v. Brush, 46 Minn. 23.

Robert C. Saunders, for respondent.

The question of law raised should have been raised by objection to the complaint that it contains no cause of action. 1878 G. S. ch. 65, § 33.

The return of the justice does not purport to contain a true transcript of all the evidence given at the trial, nor does it affirmatively show that the transcript of the evidence is returned upon the request of either party to the suit. The transcript of the evidence is not properly made a part of the return, and the appeal should be dismissed. 1878 G. S. ch. 65, § 116; Hinds v. American Express Co., 24 Minn. 95.

1878 G. S. ch. 66, § 26, authorizes the assignment of things or parts of things in action arising out of contract. Partial assignments of a thing in action arising out of contract are not excepted in the body of this section, nor enumerated in the proviso. The Act is remedial and enlarging, and should be liberally construed. Aside from the statutory validity of partial assignments and the statutory direction that the assignee sue in his own name, the tendency of the best considered modern cases is to uphold such assignments. 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 833, 834; 2 Morse, Banks & B. §§ 494, 500.

Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277, has frequently been questioned, and is cited by Morse as favoring the contention that a draft operates as an assignment. No intervening rights complicate this case. The simple question is, can the assignee of a specified sum, payable out of a designated fund, enforce payment from the debtor...

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