McKnight v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 December 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-1479.,07-1479.
• Citation: 550 F.3d 519
• Parties: Leroy McKNIGHT, Nicholas Klayo, Robert Griffin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

550 F.3d 519

Leroy McKNIGHT, Nicholas Klayo, Robert Griffin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-1479.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: May 2, 2008.

Decided and Filed: December 4, 2008.

ARGUED: Dennis D. James, Reosti, James & Sirlin, P.C., Pleasant Ridge, Michigan, for Appellants. David Matthew Davis, Hardy, Lewis & Page, P.C., Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Dennis D. James, Ronald J. Reosti, Reosti, James & Sirlin, P.C., Pleasant Ridge, Michigan, for Appellants. David Matthew Davis, Hardy, Lewis & Page, P.C., Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before GUY, SUHRHEINRICH, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs-appellants Leroy McKnight, Nicholas Klayo, and Robert Griffin ("plaintiffs") are former employees of General Motors Corporation ("GM") who accepted the early retirement option provided in GM's pension plans. Each plaintiff also applied for, and received, Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits ("SSDIB") following retirement. Pursuant to provisions of the GM pension plans, plaintiffs' retirement benefits were reduced by the amount received from the government in SSDIB benefits. The primary issue on appeal presents, in part, a question over which the circuits are split: whether disabled former employees have standing under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), to bring suit against their former employers for discrimination with respect to the payment of post-employment fringe benefits. Plaintiffs contend that such employees do have standing under the ADA, and, moreover, GM's pension plans do not provide equal access to disabled and non-disabled employees. The district court disagreed with plaintiff's contentions and granted summary judgment in favor of GM.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the plaintiffs do not have standing under Title I of the ADA to pursue their claims. Furthermore, we note that, even if plaintiffs had standing, their claims would fail on the merits. We therefore affirm the district court.

I.

A. The Pension Plans

Plaintiffs challenge provisions in two pension plans offered by GM: the General Motors Hourly-Rate Employees Pension ("GM Pension Plan") and the General Motors Retirement Program for Salaried Employees ("GM Retirement Program") (collectively, "the pension plans"). The pension plans have similar provisions providing for the payment of basic and supplemental benefits to individuals choosing to retire early after thirty years of service. Both pension plans also provide for a reduction in supplemental benefits if a beneficiary becomes eligible for SSDIB prior to reaching the age of 62 and one month.

Pursuant to Article II, Section 6 of the GM Pension Plan, an employee who retires after thirty years of service will receive a monthly early retirement supplement, in addition to the basic pension payment, until age 62 and one month. Section 6 provides:

(a) An employee who retires under Section 2 ... and who retires within five years of the last day worked for the Corporation will receive, in addition to the pension, certain supplements as set forth below:

(1) If the employee retires under Section 2 or Section 3 of this Article II with 30 or more years of credited service at the date of retirement, such employee shall be entitled to a monthly early retirement supplement until age 62 and one month in an amount which when added to the monthly pension under this Plan will equal the amount of total monthly benefit provided in the table set forth below, subject to subsequent provisions of this Section 6: [table omitted].

The plan further provides for a reduction in supplemental benefits if, prior to the age of 62 and one month, the employee becomes eligible for SSDIB:

(b) The early retirement supplement under provision (a)(1) of this Section 6 for an employee who retires at the employee's option shall be calculated assuming that the basic pension commences immediately after retirement, and such early retirement supplement and the interim supplement under provisions of (a)(2) of this Section 6 shall be reduced for any month prior to age 62 and one month, for which the employee becomes or could have become eligible for a Federal Social Security benefit, by an amount equal to the amount of the temporary benefit to which the employee would have been entitled if retired under Section 2(b) of this Article II.

Similarly, the GM Retirement Program also provides for basic and supplemental benefit payments and contains a nearly identical passage allowing for the reduction of supplemental benefits in light of SSDIB eligibility:

(b) The early retirement supplement under subsection (a)(1) of this Section 7 for an employee who retires voluntarily shall be calculated assuming that the basic benefit commences immediately after retirement, and such early retirement supplement under subsection (a)(2) of this Section 7 shall be reduced for any month prior to age 62 and one month for which the employee becomes or could have become eligible for a Federal Social Security benefit, by an amount equal to the amount of the temporary benefit to which the employee would have been entitled if retired under Section 4 of this Article I.

In both pension plans, the "temporary benefit"—the amount by which the supplemental benefit is reduced—is apparently about equal to the amount the beneficiary receives from the government in the form of SSDIB.¹ The district court explained the significance of this plan structure: "Both the Pension Plan and the Retirement Program were designed to achieve what is referred to as `benefit integration' with Social Security benefits. Benefit integration permits a higher level of income to all retired/disabled employees by allowing benefits under such plans to take credit for other income streams that a participant may be entitled to receive."

B. The Plaintiffs

Leroy McKnight worked for GM as an hourly employee until January 31, 2000. On February 1, 2000, McKnight retired under the GM Pension Plan after completing more than thirty years of service. In November 2000, McKnight began receiving SSDIB benefits, and, accordingly, GM reduced McKnight's supplemental pension payments. GM also claims that, as a result of McKnight's SSDIB eligibility, it overpaid McKnight $10,489.50.

Robert Griffin worked for GM as a salaried employee for twenty-six years and, subsequently, transferred to American Axle and Manufacturing, Inc. After more than thirty total years of service, Griffin retired on December 1, 1998, and he now receives a retirement benefit from the GM Retirement Program for his twenty-six years of GM credited service. Griffin was awarded SSDIB effective April 1, 1999, and his retroactive award resulted in an overpayment by GM of $30,446.40 in supplemental benefits.

Also a former salaried GM employee, Nicholas Klayo retired on January 1, 1999, under the GM Retirement Program, after thirty years of credited service. Klayo was awarded SSDIB effective December 1, 2001, and his retroactive award resulted in an overpayment by GM of $35,166.96 in supplemental benefits.

Plaintiff Carol Dudek does not appeal the decision of the district court.

B. Procedural History

On October 17, 2005, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in federal district court, alleging that GM's enforcement of the GM Pension Plan and the GM Retirement Program violated the ADA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), and Michigan's Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act. On August 29, 2006, GM filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted GM's motion on March 20, 2007. The district court concluded that plaintiffs did not have standing under Title I of the ADA, and, even if they did have standing, plaintiffs had no viable ADA claim, as they had equal access to GM's pension plans. The court further found that GM's pension plans did not violate ERISA. Finally, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims. On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's decision only with respect to their claim under Title I of the ADA.

II.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Nance v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 527 F.3d 539, 546 (6th Cir.2008). Summary judgment will be affirmed if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party," summary judgment for the moving party is inappropriate. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In reviewing the district court's decision, we draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

III.

Pursuant to Title I of the ADA, an employer is prohibited from discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability" with respect to "job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Act defines a "qualified individual" as someone "with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). "The plain language of the Act thus allows only those who are `qualified individuals' to bring suit." Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir.2000). Accordingly, we must first resolve the threshold issue of whether plaintiffs—former GM employees who have been adjudged...