Crosby v. SOCIAL SEC. ADMIN. OF UNITED STATES

• Decision Date: 16 November 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 81-675-T.
• Citation: 550 F. Supp. 1278
• Parties: Carol A. CROSBY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF the UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

550 F. Supp. 1278

Carol A. CROSBY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OF the UNITED STATES, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 81-675-T.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

November 16, 1982.

Robert B. Morton, Charles R. Capace, Paul R. Collier, III, Harvard Legal Aid Bureau, Cambridge, Mass., for plaintiffs.

John W. Laymon, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boston, Mass., for defendants.

OPINION

TAURO, District Judge.

Plaintiffs challenge as unlawful and unconstitutional defendants' delay in processing and deciding claims for disability benefits under Title II (Social Security Disability Insurance) and Title XVI (Supplemental Security Income) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., 1381 et seq. (the "Act"). Plaintiffs are a class of Massachusetts residents who have applied for disability benefits pursuant to the Act.¹ Named as defendants are the Social Security Administration (the "SSA"), the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), and the Secretary of HHS (the "Secretary").

Plaintiffs rely on three theories in support of their claim for declaratory and injunctive relief:² (1) that defendants' delays in hearing and deciding disability applications violate the Act, specifically 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b) and 1383(c); (2) that the delays violate the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 555(b) and 706(1); and (3) that the delays violate their due process and equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.³ Plaintiffs assert jurisdiction is conferred on this court by 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1361 and 1331, and 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-704 and 706.

At issue here are the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, as well as defendants' motion to vacate an interim order issued by this court.⁴

I. Factual Background

Applicants for disability benefits under the Act receive an initial eligibility determination. Those aggrieved by that determination may request reconsideration, and receive a de novo review. Should the disability application still be denied after reconsideration, the claimant may ask for a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b) and 1383(c)(1). The delays involved in the ALJ hearing stage underlie this litigation.

The complaints of plaintiffs here echo those of disability applicants in other jurisdictions. In one case, Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir.1978), the Secretary had agreed to promulgate regulations setting a 165 day time limit from hearing request to hearing decision.⁵ The proposed regulations promised to moot the issues in Blankenship and, thereby, obviate the necessity for cases such as this.

Subsequently, the Secretary and the SSA backed away from their agreement to promulgate remedial regulations. Indeed, the Secretary has asked the Blankenship court to release him from his agreement to promulgate regulations.⁶ Similarly, the defendants here seek to have this court lift its interim order calling for a 165 day time limit between hearing request and decision. Defendants' current position is that no time limit should be imposed. Rather, the defendants now suggest that they should be permitted to set their own "goals", and should be left alone to do the best that they, in their sole judgment, believe they can do to eliminate or reduce the complained of time delays.

Meanwhile, the plaintiff class continues to suffer serious delays in receiving hearings and decisions on their claims. According to defendants' computer printouts, the average processing time from hearing request to decision in Massachusetts, as of March 1981, was 199 days. Notwithstanding the court's June 8, 1981 interim order, delays between hearing requests and decisions exceeded 165 days in more than half the cases processed from December 1981 to June 1982.⁷

The significance of these delays is underscored by the fact that, in 1981, sixty percent of those who challenged initial determinations of ineligibility for benefits were actually found entitled to those benefits after a hearing before an ALJ. Even that figure, however, understates the total percentage of the plaintiff class who are eventually found entitled to benefits after later review by the Appeals Council and the federal court.

Abandoning the position originally adopted by the Secretary in Blankenship, the defendants now argue that, due to rising levels of hearing requests, the 165 day time limit is no longer realistic. Indeed, defendants' statistics do show a rising level of case filings. But, they also show that defendants have not hired additional ALJs to handle this increased caseload. As of December 1, 1979, there were 19 ALJs assigned to conduct disability hearings for Massachusetts. As of May 31, 1982, the number of ALJs was 20. For the period June 7, 1981 to November 30, 1981, the figure had dropped to 18.

II. Justiciability

The threshold issue to be resolved here is defendants' claim that plaintiffs' complaint is non-justiciable. This argument rests on two related grounds. First, relying on Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.1978), defendants argue that Congress has charged HHS with administration of the Act, and that judicial intervention is, therefore, inappropriate. Second, they assert that Congress has exercised continuing oversight with regard to the Act, and has failed to impose any time limits on hearings or hearing decisions. From this, defendants would draw the conclusion that judicially imposed time limits are inappropriate. These arguments have been rejected by the First Circuit and several other courts.

In Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.1978), the First Circuit addressed both ends of defendants' present argument. The court of appeals recognized congressional concern regarding, and oversight of, the SSA and its administration of the Act. Nevertheless, the Caswell court held, this "does not mean that a judicial role is precluded where the statutory mandate is not being followed .... it is clear that no violence to the principle of the separation of powers arises from judicial efforts to enforce a congressional mandate." Id. at 16. Similarly, Caswell rejected the suggestion that the judiciary must defer to the Secretary's and the SSA's method of handling hearings and administrative procedure. While pointing out that the Secretary has substantial discretion, the court stated, "equally clear is the Secretary's statutory duty to provide a hearing at a meaningful and reasonable time.... Where the delays exceed the bounds of reasonableness, the Secretary may be judicially required to act with greater dispatch so as to meet his statutory obligation." Id. at 15.

Most recently, the Second Circuit, relying on Caswell, also dismissed the defendants' justiciability arguments. Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19, 22-3 (2d Cir.1982). As Day points out, the Secretary's argument cuts both ways. It is true that Congress, in its exercise of oversight, has not imposed explicit time limits on hearings and hearing decisions. At the same time, however, the federal courts have for several years been imposing time limits, and Congress has not amended the Act so as to preclude time limits or to remove the statutory basis for these limits. This court, then, is unpersuaded by the defendants' justiciability arguments, and turns now to the merits of the case.

III. Merits

Under § 205(b) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b), an applicant under Title II who is denied disability benefits may request a hearing, and the Secretary must give such an applicant "reasonable notice and opportunity for a hearing ...." Section 1383(c)(1) of 42 U.S.C. contains identical language with respect to applicants for disability benefits under Title XVI. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that "within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter presented to it ...," 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and mandates that a reviewing court "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed ...." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). The First Circuit has held that these statutory provisions impose on the Secretary "a statutory duty to hold hearings within a time that is reasonable under the circumstances ...." Caswell v. Califano, supra at 15. See also Day v. Schweiker, supra; Barnett v. Califano, 580 F.2d 28 (2d Cir.1978); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977); Blankenship v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir.1978). Cf. Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345 (7th Cir.1978).⁸

Defendants do not dispute that they must meet this statutory standard. Rather, they contend that so long as they are exercising what they consider to be their best efforts in reducing delays, then whatever delays do exist are per se reasonable. The defendants argue that rising caseloads and a shortage of ALJs make it impossible for them to hold hearings and issue decisions any more expeditiously, and so their current performance must be deemed reasonable. While more than sympathetic with the plight of our hardworking ALJs, this court cannot accept the rationale of defendants' legal argument.

In order for the statutory obligation that hearings be held and decisions rendered within a reasonable time to have any effect, the standard for review must be more stringent than that of a mere best efforts self appraisal by defendants. In almost every previous case attacking the delays suffered by disability claimants in receiving hearings and decisions, the Secretary and the SSA have argued that increasing caseloads and staffing shortages make it impossible for them to do any better. And these cases, while recognizing the difficulties faced by the defendants, have held that the court must decide for itself whether, as Caswell put it, "the plaintiffs have been afforded a `reasonable ... opportunity for a hearing.'" Caswell v. Califano, supra at 16 citations omitted.⁹

On this record, the court finds that defendants have not met their statutory obligation to...