Scott v. Harris

Decision Date30 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. 05–1631.,05–1631.
Citation75 BNA USLW 4297,550 U.S. 372,127 S.Ct. 1769,167 L.Ed.2d 686
PartiesTimothy SCOTT, Petitioner, v. Victor HARRIS.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Syllabus*

Deputy Timothy Scott, petitioner here, terminated a high-speed pursuit of respondent's car by applying his push bumper to the rear of the vehicle, causing it to leave the road and crash. Respondent was rendered a quadriplegic. He filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, inter alia, the use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The District Court denied Scott's summary judgment motion, which was based on qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on interlocutory appeal, concluding, inter alia, that Scott's actions could constitute “deadly force” under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1; that the use of such force in this context would violate respondent's constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a seizure; and that a reasonable jury could so find.

Held: Because the car chase respondent initiated posed a substantial and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others, Scott's attempt to terminate the chase by forcing respondent off the road was reasonable, and Scott is entitled to summary judgment. Pp. 1773 – 1779.

(a) Qualified immunity requires resolution of a “threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272. Pp. 1773 – 1774.

(b) The record in this case includes a videotape capturing the events in question. Where, as here, the record blatantly contradicts the plaintiff's version of events so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a summary judgment motion. Pp. 1774 – 1776.

(c) Viewing the facts in the light depicted by the videotape, it is clear that Deputy Scott did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 1776 – 1779.

(1) Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute “deadly force.” The Court there simply applied the Fourth Amendment's “reasonableness” test to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation. That case has scant applicability to this one, which has vastly different facts. Whether or not Scott's actions constituted “deadly force,” what matters is whether those actions were reasonable. Pp. 1776 – 1778.

(2) In determining a seizure's reasonableness, the Court balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests allegedly justifying the intrusion. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110. In weighing the high likelihood of serious injury or death to respondent that Scott's actions posed against the actual and imminent threat that respondent posed to the lives of others, the Court takes account of the number of lives at risk and the relative culpability of the parties involved. Respondent intentionally placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in reckless, high-speed flight; those who might have been harmed had Scott not forced respondent off the road were entirely innocent. The Court concludes that it was reasonable for Scott to take the action he did. It rejects respondent's argument that safety could have been ensured if the police simply ceased their pursuit. The Court rules that a police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Pp. 1777 – 1779.

433 F.3d 807, reversed.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., post, p. 1779, and BREYER, J., post, p. 1780, filed concurring opinions. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 1781.

Philip W. Savrin, Atlanta, GA, for petitioner.

Gregory G. Garre, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner.

Craig T. Jones, Atlanta, GA, for respondent.

Orin S. Kerr, Washington, D.C., Philip W. Savrin, Counsel of Record, Sun S. Choy, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Counsel for Petitioner.

Craig T. Jones, Counsel of Record, Edmond & Jones, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia, Andrew C. Clarke, Borod & Kramer, Memphis, Tennessee, Counsel for Respondent.

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider whether a law enforcement official can, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing motorist from continuing his public-endangering flight by ramming the motorist's car from behind. Put another way: Can an officer take actions that place a fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist's flight from endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?

I

In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent's vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55–mile–per–hour speed limit. The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over. Instead, respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour. The deputy radioed his dispatch to report that he was pursuing a fleeing vehicle, and broadcast its license plate number. Petitioner, Deputy Timothy Scott, heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along with other officers. In the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by the various police vehicles. Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott's police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane highway.

Following respondent's shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott's police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle. Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a “Precision Intervention Technique (‘PIT’) maneuver, which causes the fleeing vehicle to spin to a stop.” Brief for Petitioner 4. Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to [g]o ahead and take him out.’ Harris v. Coweta Cty., 433 F.3d 807, 811 (C.A.11 2005). Instead, Scott applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent's vehicle.1 As a result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed. Respondent was badly injured and was rendered a quadriplegic.

Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his federal constitutional rights, viz. use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. In response, Scott filed a motion for summary judgment based on an assertion of qualified immunity. The District Court denied the motion, finding that “there are material issues of fact on which the issue of qualified immunity turns which present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.” Harris v. Coweta Cty., No. 3:01–CV–148–WBH, 2003 WL 25419527 (N.D.Ga. Sept. 23, 2003), App. to Pet. for Cert. 41a–42a. On interlocutory appeal,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to allow respondent's Fourth Amendment claim against Scott to proceed to trial. 3 Taking respondent's view of the facts as given, the Court of Appeals concluded that Scott's actions could constitute “deadly force” under Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985), and that the use of such force in this context “would violate [respondent's] constitutional right to be free from excessive force during a seizure. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Scott violated [respondent's] Fourth Amendment rights.” 433 F.3d, at 816. The Court of Appeals further concluded that “the law as it existed [at the time of the incident], was sufficiently clear to give reasonable law enforcement officers ‘fair notice’ that ramming a vehicle under these circumstances was unlawful.” Id., at 817. The Court of Appeals thus concluded that Scott was not entitled to qualified immunity. We granted certiorari, 549 U.S. 991, 127 S.Ct. 468, 166 L.Ed.2d 333 (2006), and now reverse.

II

In resolving questions of qualified immunity, courts are required to resolve a “threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If, and only if, the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, “the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established ... in light of the specific context of the case.” Ibid. Although this ordering contradicts [o]ur policy of avoiding unnecessary adjudication of constitutional issues,” United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 478, 115 S.Ct. 1003, 130 L.Ed.2d 964 (1995) (citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346–347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)), we have said that such a departure from practice is “necessary to set forth principles which will become the basis for a [future] holding that a right is clearly established,” Saucier, supra, at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.4 We therefore turn to the threshold inquiry: whether Deputy Scott's actions violated the Fourth Amendment.

III
A

The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19111 cases
  • Lively v. Theriot, CIVIL NO. 6:13-2756
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. United States District Courts. 5th Circuit. Western District of Louisiana
    • June 29, 2015
    ...test applies to all uses of force, including actions which fall within the definition of "deadly force". Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382-383, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Reasonableness is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20......
  • Anderson v. Dunbar Armored, Inc., Civil Action File No. 1:08-CV-3639-BBM.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. United States District Courts. 11th Circuit. Northern District of Georgia
    • August 18, 2009
    ...the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a `genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). "When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so t......
  • Julian v. Rigney, Case No. 4:13-cv-00054
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Western District of Virginia)
    • March 24, 2014
    ...rather, the Court must look to the quantum of proof applicable to the claim to determine whether a genuine dispute exists. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 254. A fact is material where it might affect the outcome of the case in light of the controlli......
  • Fabricius v. Tulare Cnty.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Eastern District of California
    • June 19, 2017
    ...under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This claim is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). This assessment involves determining whether the force was objectively reasonable "in lig......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 firm's commentaries
58 books & journal articles
  • Arrests
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 1 - 2015 Contents
    • August 17, 2015
    ...does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). §1:40 PretextArrests A pretextual seizure, in the most general sense, is one that is effectuated for an ......
  • QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: TIME TO CHANGE THE MESSAGE.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 93 No. 5, May 2018
    • May 1, 2018
    ...Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 82 (2018) (listing thirty cases since Harlow). Professor Baude's list does not include Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), a case in which the Court disposed of qualified immunity on the first prong of the analysis, holding that "[a] police officer's atte......
  • Arrests
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Texas Criminal Lawyer's Handbook. Volume 1 - 2021 Contents
    • August 16, 2021
    ...does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). §1:40 PretextArrests A pretextual seizure, in the most general sense, is one that is effectuated for an ......
  • Deposing & examining the plaintiff
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Deposing & Examining Employment Witnesses
    • March 31, 2022
    ...it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment. ” Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Flores v. Am. Airlines Inc. , 2020 WL 6585535, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 10, 2020) (emphasis added). In evaluating motions for summary jud......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT