Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America

• Decision Date: 11 February 1977
• Docket Number: No. 1890,No. 1957,Nos. 75-2392,1957,1890,s. 75-2392
• Citation: 551 F.2d 695
• Parties: 94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2609, 81 Lab.Cas. P 13,010 SOUTHERN OHIO COAL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants, Local Union, etc., Defendant-Appellant. SOUTHERN OHIO COAL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants-Appellees (three cases). SOUTHERN OHIO COAL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants, Local Unionet al., Defendants-Appellants. SOUTHERN OHIO COAL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants, Local Unionet al., Defendants-Appellees. to 75-2396 and 76-2031.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 695

551 F.2d 695

94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2609, 81 Lab.Cas. P 13,010

SOUTHERN OHIO COAL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants, Local Union No. 1957, etc., Defendant-Appellant.

SOUTHERN OHIO COAL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants-Appellees

(three cases).

SOUTHERN OHIO COAL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants, Local Union No. 1890 et al., Defendants-Appellants.

SOUTHERN OHIO COAL COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA et al., Defendants, Local Union No. 1890 et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 75-2392 to 75-2396 and 76-2031.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 18, 1976.

Decided Feb. 11, 1977.

John W. Kenesey, Clayman & Jaffy, Columbus, Ohio, for appellants in Nos. 75-2392 and 75-2396, and appellees in Nos. 75-2393 to 75-2395, and 76-2031.

Willard P. Owens, Washington, D. C., for U. M. W.

Alvin J. McKenna, Alexander, Ebinger, Holschuh, Fischer & McAlister, D. Michael Miller, Columbus, Ohio, for appellees in Nos. 75-2392 and 75-2396, and appellants in Nos. 75-2393 to 75-2395, and 76-2031.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Circuit Judge, and WEICK and CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judges.

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge.

This case arose from a series of work stoppages at three coal mines owned by the Ohio Power Company and operated by the Southern Ohio Coal Company ¹ Meigs No. 1, Meigs No. 2 and Raccoon No. 3. The miners employed at these mines are members of Locals 1890, 1886 and 1957 of the United Mine Workers of America. The Southern Ohio Coal Company and the United Mine Workers are signatories of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974. On April 14, 1975, the Company filed an amended complaint in the Southern District of Ohio seeking injunctive relief and damages for breach of the mandatory arbitration provision in the collective bargaining agreement. ² Jurisdiction was based on § 301(a) of the National Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(1970). Named as defendants were Locals 1890, 1886 and 1957, District No. 6 and the United Mine Workers of America. The amended complaint alleged that the members of the unions were engaged in a continuing practice of striking over arbitrable grievances in violation of the no-strike pledge implied from the mandatory arbitration clause. The complaint also alleged that the strikes had been condoned and encouraged by District No. 6 and the United Mine Workers of America.

The District Court denied the initial motions for preliminary injunctions because the particular work stoppage had ceased, but the Court warned defendants that future work stoppages during the pendency of the action could result in injunctive relief for the employer. On May 28th, the employees at Raccoon No. 3, who are members of Local No. 1957, failed to report for work. The work stoppage was occasioned by the assignment of a supervisor to whom the miners objected. On June 2d, the members of Local No. 1957 again failed to report for work. This time the strike was set off by a computer error that shortchanged a number of miners' pay checks. On June 19th, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction against Local 1957 but refused to extend the order to the district and international unions. The Court found that the May 28th and June 2d work stoppages resulted from disputes over arbitrable grievances and thus violated the union's no-strike obligation. The Court also found that these work stoppages were only the latest of a series of strikes over arbitrable disputes where the miners failed to file grievances but simply closed the mine for a short period. The Court noted that the Company was ready and willing to arbitrate the grievances. Finally, the Court concluded that the injunction was warranted by ordinary principles of equity because the Company was suffering irreparable injury from the repetitious work stoppages and would suffer more from the denial of the injunction than would the union from its granting. The District Court ordered Local 1957:

To refrain from engaging in any further work stoppage at Raccoon No. 3;

To refrain from committing, doing, uttering, writing, or communicating, any word, act, or deed, written, spoken or performed which is intended, designed or calculated to induce, persuade, order, cause or bring about the failure or refusal of any member of the defendant to report for work or to work at Raccoon No. 3;

To utilize the grievance and arbitration procedures of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974, with respect to arbitrable grievances; and

To take all action which may be necessary to assure compliance with the terms of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1974.

On August 19, 1975, mine workers at all three mines failed to report for their shifts. As a result the Company sought preliminary injunctions against Locals 1886 and 1890, District No. 6 and the UMW International. ³ The Court found that these work stoppages were primarily attributable to the Company's distribution of a document entitled "Guidelines for Dealing with Mine Health and Safety Committee" to its supervisory personnel. The Court also indicated that the presence of stranger pickets at the mine sites and the shooting of a member of Local 1886 contributed to the August 18th work stoppage. As before, the Court noted that no grievances had been filed over the incidents and found that the work stoppages were over arbitrable issues and thus in violation of the implied no-strike agreement. The Court stated that the Company had "amply demonstrated a pattern of activity by the local union which does, in fact, reflect disregard of the contractual provisions of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement and which further shows a probability that the local unions will continue such work stoppages whenever they again become dissatisfied over some conditions of work at the mine." Concluding that the equities supported issuance of preliminary injunctions against Locals 1886 and 1890, the District Court entered orders identical to the decree imposed on Local 1957. Once again, however, the Court refused to enjoin the district and international unions.

In late July of 1976, the mines were again closed. This time the shut down was caused by the miners' refusal to cross stranger picketlines set up at the mine sites by unidentified pickets. The Company viewed the miners' refusal to cross the picketlines as a violation of the outstanding injunctions, and motioned the Court for orders to show cause why the local unions should not be held in contempt. The District Court denied the motions feeling itself bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976), which had been decided in the interim since the injunctions were issued. The District Court reasoned that the miners' refusal to cross was protected activity and not subject to injunction. The Court concluded the order denying the motions with the statement that "Buffalo Forge casts a shadow upon the breadth of the injunctions issued June 19th and September 9, 1975, and at a minimum requires under the present circumstances the denial of Plaintiffs' motions for orders to show cause." The Company appeals from the Court's refusal to enjoin the district and international unions and from the denial of the motions for orders to show cause. The local unions challenge the issuance of the preliminary injunctions and contend, inter alia, that the orders are vague and overbroad.

A logical starting point for review of injunctions restraining work stoppages growing out of a labor dispute is the Supreme Court's decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 1583, 26 L.Ed.2d 199 (1970). In Boys Markets the Supreme Court overruled its previous decision in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8 L.Ed.2d 440 (1962), and held that, despite the prohibitory language of § 4(a) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, ⁴ federal courts in the exercise of § 301 jurisdiction had the power to issue injunctions to restrain strikes over arbitrable disputes in violation of express or implied no-strike agreements. The Boys Markets Court adopted the standards suggested in the Sinclair dissenting opinion for the exercise of a court's equitable powers to enjoin a strike:

"A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the contract does have the effect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equity whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will the union from its issuance." 370 U.S., at 228, 82 S.Ct. 1328. (Emphasis in original.)

398 U.S. at 254, 90 S.Ct. at 1594, quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 228, 82 S.Ct. 1328. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

The unions claim that the preliminary injunctions were invalidly issued because the District Court failed to follow the Boys Markets formula. Specifically, they argue that the work stoppages were caused by non-arbitrable disputes and that the...