552 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1977), 75-2017, Pollock v. General Finance Corp.
|Citation:||552 F.2d 1142|
|Party Name:||John C. POLLOCK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. GENERAL FINANCE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.|
|Case Date:||May 27, 1977|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit|
Lewis N. Jones, J. Norwood Jones, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., Kenneth J. Berke, Stahl & Berke, New Orleans, La., Milton W. Schober, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellant.
John D. Hawke, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Glenn E. Loney, Atty., Washington, D. C., for Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, amicus curiae.
Thomas R. Blum, New Orleans, La., for Industrial Finance & Thrift Corp., amicus curiae.
G. W. Florence, Jr., Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
Before GODBOLD and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. [*]
In our earlier opinion herein, 535 F.2d 295 (5 Cir. 1976), we affirmed a judgment imposing the minimum statutory penalty of $100.00, together with attorneys' fees, on appellant General Finance Corporation, for three violations of the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regulation Z thereunder, occurring in connection with a loan transaction consummated September 12, 1973. Appellant and amici, including the Federal Reserve Board, now raise a number of issues relating to our decision which deserve an answer but do not, in our opinion, require either reargument or reversal of the judgment below.
Addressing our conclusion that it is a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1639(a) for a creditor to fail to make a labeled disclosure of the amount of loan proceeds of which the debtor will have actual use, appellant argues, with the help of the Federal Reserve Board, that the Board does not require such disclosure. We held previously that, although Regulation Z § 226.8(d)(1) as promulgated might appear to support appellant's position, it must be read in the light of § 1639(a), 1 which does include this requirement. The Board contends that it possesses, and has exercised, power to eliminate this particular disclosure requirement, either by virtue of its authority under § 1604 of the Act or in order to resolve a contradiction in the statutory language.
The Board finds a contradiction in § 1639(a) in the fact that subsection (3) thereof requires the disclosure of the sum of the amounts described in (1) and (2). It argues that some of the "charges" required to be disclosed by (2), such as insurance premiums, as here, "could be construed" to
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