Morelli v. Webster

• Decision Date: 07 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 08-1759.,08-1759.
• Parties: Rosanna MORELLI, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Steven WEBSTER, Defendant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

552 F.3d 12

Rosanna MORELLI, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Steven WEBSTER, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 08-1759.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard November 4, 2008.

Decided January 7, 2009.

Zachary L. Heiden, with whom MCLU Foundation, Barbara L. Goodwin, and Murray, Plumb & Murray were on brief, for appellant.

Edward R. Benjamin, Jr., with whom Thompson & Bowie, LLP was on brief, for appellee.

Before BOUDIN, SELYA, and STAHL, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

In this case, a prostitution sting backfired, spawning a series of events that culminated in a civil suit. That suit, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, included claims of unlawful detention and use of excessive force. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant (a police officer). See Morelli v. Webster, 554 F.Supp.2d 46 (D.Me.2008). We affirm as to the unlawful detention claims, but reverse as to the excessive force claims.

I. BACKGROUND

Because this is an appeal from the entry of summary judgment, we take the facts in the light most flattering to the nonmovant (here, the plaintiff). See Cordi-Allen v. Conlon, 494 F.3d 245, 248 (1st Cir.2007). This means that where, as here, there is a wide divergence between the parties' first-hand accounts of the relevant events, we must adopt the nonmovant's version. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774-75, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). Our narrative draws heavily upon the plaintiff's filings under D. Me. R. 7.

Plaintiff-appellant Rosanna Morelli, an exotic dancer, hired out for private parties. Though self-employed, she occasionally accepted engagements through Serena's Heaven on Earth, a purveyor of adult entertainment services in Portland, Maine.

On March 3, 2006, the plaintiff, using the nom de guerre "Vanessa," responded to a call placed to a number advertised by Serena's. She and the caller agreed on a price for an exotic dance to be performed in room 203 of the Best Western hotel in South Portland. Unbeknownst to the plaintiff, the caller was an undercover police officer named McVane, and the call was part of a prostitution sting operation orchestrated by the local constabulary.

The site of the proposed performance — room 203 — had been outfitted with audio and video surveillance equipment. The output was to be transmitted surreptitiously to a so-called "observation room" next door. A local prosecutor and several police officers had congregated in the observation room (among them, defendant-appellee Steven Webster).

McVane met the plaintiff at the door to room 203. Upon entering the room, the plaintiff hugged McVane. At that point, one of the policemen in the observation room (Officer Farris) recognized the plaintiff and exclaimed that she was a known prostitute.

Because McVane was nervous and acting strangely, the plaintiff soon began to suspect that something was amiss. She nonetheless placed her heavy coat on the bed and requested the agreed fee. McVane placed several bills on a counter but the plaintiff did not touch them.

In response to McVane's repeated urgings that she disrobe, the plaintiff informed him that she was only there to dance. When McVane persisted, she sarcastically suggested that he remove his clothes. Finally she started to shed her jeans. At about that time, however, she became convinced that McVane was not a bona fide customer, was probably associated with law enforcement, and was wasting her time. She pulled up her jeans, told McVane that she was leaving, and informed him that she was taking $20 to cover transportation and wasted time. She grabbed a bill in that denomination from the pile of currency on the counter and took her leave.

In the corridor the plaintiff encountered several officers, including Webster. When one of them accused her of having stolen money; she surrendered the $20 bill. She then moved toward the exit, looking straight ahead and proceeding slowly. Her coat was draped over her right arm, and she kept that arm stiff.

Webster stands about a foot taller than the plaintiff — he is 6'2" and in good physical shape — and substantially outweighs her. Although clad in civilian clothing, he prominently displayed a badge on his belt.

Among the cohort of policemen, only Webster attempted to stop the plaintiff from leaving the hotel. He deliberately positioned himself to block her path. As the plaintiff tells it, she tried to walk around him and brushed against him as she passed. Webster reacted angrily, grabbing her wrist, yanking her around, slamming her against the hallway wall, pinning her there by her forearms, and saying "look missy, you're not going anywhere, you need to go back into the room." Webster held the plaintiff against the wall for a full three or four minutes before guiding her back to room 203.

Once there, Webster told the plaintiff that he could not arrest her. Nevertheless, he forced her to remain in the room while he questioned her. Two other officers were present during this interrogation. The plaintiff complained that she was in pain and, after several minutes, Webster told the plaintiff that she could leave as long as she did so "respectfully." The plaintiff found this admonition "condescendingly odd."

The plaintiff returned home. She immediately called the police department to report the incident. Later, she visited the emergency room of a local hospital. She was told that she had sustained contusions and a first-degree shoulder separation. An orthopedic surgeon treated her for some time and, eventually, more sophisticated testing revealed evidence of a rotator cuff tear. She continues to experience pain in her shoulder, arm, and lower back.

Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff sued Webster in Maine's federal district court. She claimed that Webster's actions constituted an unreasonable seizure of her person because they amounted to a detention without adequate justification, see, e.g., United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 70-71 (1st Cir.2004), and because he effected that detention through the use of excessive force, see, e.g., Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422, 428 (1st Cir.2006). The plaintiff's complaint also included supplemental claims under Maine law, which mirrored her federal claims.

Upon the completion of discovery, Webster moved for summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts justified the detention and made pellucid that the force he had applied was not excessive. In the alternative, he argued that he was entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court granted this motion, holding that the undisputed facts established that Webster had adequate justification to seize the plaintiff regardless of whether that seizure amounted to an investigatory stop or a de facto arrest. Morelli, 554 F.Supp.2d at 53. In explaining this holding, the court employed the pooled knowledge doctrine to credit Webster with knowledge possessed by his compatriots and determined that the seizure amounted to a temporary detention, prompted by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 52-53. The court added that even if the seizure amounted to a de facto arrest, it was justified by probable cause. See id. (citing Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A § 353(1)(A)). In all events, the court posited that Webster would be entitled to qualified immunity because "a reasonable official would have believed that criminal activity, prostitution, was afoot, that Maine law permitted him to arrest Plaintiff and that he had probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had committed or was in the process of committing a crime." Id. at 53 n. 9.

With respect to the excessive force claim, the lower court relied entirely on qualified immunity. It concluded that a reasonable officer in Webster's situation could well have believed that the plaintiff had committed theft, was connected to prostitution, posed a threat to those around her, and was actively evading detention. Id. at 56-57. Thus, the force used by Webster was of a degree that a reasonable officer could have believed was appropriate under the circumstances. Id.

Along the way, the district court noted that the resolution of the federal claims would dictate the outcome of the mirrorimage supplemental claims. Id. at 51. The latter claims had been asserted under Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. tit. 5 § 4682, a statute patterned on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Jenness v. Nickerson, 637 A.2d 1152, 1158 (Me.1994). Thus, there was no need for a separate analysis.¹ With this reasoning in mind, the district court entered an adverse judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims. This timely appeal ensued.

II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

Before addressing the assignments of error, we pause to discuss three sets of legal principles, each of which to some extent informs our analysis.

A. Pooled Knowledge.

The pooled knowledge doctrine, sometimes known as the collective knowledge doctrine, is a mechanism that in some circumstances allows a court to "impute" facts known by one police officer to another police officer engaged in a joint mission. See, e.g., United States v. Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 193 (1st Cir.1997). The doctrine derives from a felt sense that officers acting in concert actually do, and are entitled to, assume that fellow officers are acting in a manner consistent with their legal responsibilities. See Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. State Pen., 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); see generally Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.5 (2004). Thus, for example, when an officer who has probable cause "directs an officer who lacks that knowledge to make the arrest, we `impute' to the arresting officer the directing officer's knowledge." Meade, 110 F.3d at 193; see United States v. Cook, 277 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir.2002); Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 236 n. 7 (1st Cir.1990).

In the case at hand, the district court invoked the pooled knowledge doctrine on two different points. First, the court used it to credit Webster with knowledge possessed by a fellow officer, Farris, to the...