Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 05 January 1983
• Docket Number: No. C-1-82-1407.,C-1-82-1407.
• Citation: 553 F. Supp. 1011
• Parties: The CINCINNATI BENGALS, INC., Plaintiff, v. Jack THOMPSON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

553 F. Supp. 1011

The CINCINNATI BENGALS, INC., Plaintiff, v. Jack THOMPSON, Defendant.

No. C-1-82-1407.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, W.D.

January 5, 1983.

Robert Stachler, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff.

Mark A. VanderLaan, Cincinnati, Ohio, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

SPIEGEL, District Judge:

This matter came on for hearing on defendant's motion to transfer or to stay (doc. 8) and plaintiff's memorandum in opposition (doc. 14); and plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration and stay discovery pending arbitration (doc. 11), defendant's memorandum in opposition (doc. 13), and plaintiff's reply memorandum (doc. 18). At the hearing, both the motion to transfer and the motion to stay discovery were denied. The motion to compel arbitration was taken under advisement.

We hereby grant plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration. Our decision is based upon our conclusion that although not a union member, Thompson is a member of the bargaining unit represented by the National Football Association Players' Association (NFLPA). He is thus bound by the terms of the NFL Player Contract and the Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated by the NFLPA and the National Football League Management Council (Management Council). Reading the Contract and the Agreement together, we find that there was a valid agreement to arbitrate. We also find that the subject matter of this lawsuit — whether a Club is obligated by the terms of the NFL Contract to pay compensation during a strike to a player who is not a member of the NFLPA — is covered by the agreement to arbitrate.

I. Factual Background

Defendant Jack Thompson is employed as a professional football player by plaintiff Cincinnati Bengals (Bengals). His employment is pursuant to two NFL Player Contracts covering the 1982-83 and 1983-84 seasons (doc. 9, ex. A, B) which expressly refer to the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Management Council and the NFLPA. The NFLPA is the recognized exclusive bargaining representative for the collective bargaining unit of which defendant Thompson is a member. The Management Council and the NFLPA executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement on March 1, 1977 for the period from February 1, 1977 through July 1, 1982 (1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement); on December 11, 1982 the same parties executed a Collective Bargaining Agreement for the period from July 16, 1982 through August 31, 1987 (1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement). The terms and conditions of defendant's employment contract with the Bengals (NFL Player Contract) are in part governed by the Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated between the Management Council and the NFLPA.

On September 21, 1982 the NFLPA initiated a strike which lasted eight weeks. On October 27, 1982 defendant Thompson notified the Bengals by letter that he considered the Club in breach of the employment contract as it had not issued him his weekly paycheck during the strike (doc. 15, ex. E). He asserted that because he was not a member of the NFLPA and was not participating in the strike, and had so notified the Bengals, the Club was not excused from paying him in accordance with his NFL Player Contract. Defendant also stated that he considered that the breach released him from all obligations under the 1982-83 and 1983-84 player contracts.

On November 19, 1982 plaintiff Bengals brought this action in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court pursuant to Paragraph Three of the Player Contract. The Bengals sought a temporary restraining order to prevent defendant from playing football with the Michigan Panthers or any other organization. The temporary restraining order was issued that afternoon. The same day Jack Thompson brought an action against the Bengals in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington (Jack Thompson v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., No. C-82-1387), seeking a declaration that the Bengals had breached his NFL Player Contract (doc. 13, ex. 1).

On December 2, 1982 defendant Thompson removed the case in Hamilton County Common Pleas Court to this Court. Defendant then filed a motion to transfer this action to the Western District of Washington or, in the alternative, to stay these proceedings until the case in Washington was resolved on the grounds that the two cases involved the same factual and legal issues and that the Bengals could have brought this action in Washington rather than in Ohio (doc. 8).

On December 10, 1982 by letter to the NFLPA the Bengals filed a non-injury grievance pursuant to Article VII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (doc. 11, ex. C). Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint in this action (doc. 9), asserting that both parties have an obligation under the NFL Player Contract to submit to arbitration all grievances concerning contract interpretation. The Bengals also filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay all discovery pending arbitration (doc. 11).

At the hearing, the Court found with respect to the motion to transfer that the balance was not strongly in favor of the defendant as the contract was formed in Ohio, was to be governed by Ohio law, and was to be largely performed in Ohio. Accordingly, the motion to transfer was denied. Nicol v. Koscinski, 188 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.1951); Priess v. Fisherfolk, 535 F.Supp. 1271 (S.D.Ohio 1982).

With respect to plaintiff's motion to stay discovery pending arbitration, the Court found neither party would be prejudiced should discovery be permitted. This finding was based on the representations of counsel that defendant Thompson had agreed not to play football with any other organization without reasonable notice to the Bengals. Therefore, and believing that the information to be developed by discovery may be relevant to the tribunal which decides this issue, whether arbitrator or court, the Court denied the motion to stay discovery.

II. Motion to Compel Arbitration

With respect to plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration, the Court after investigation has determined that both case law and policy considerations mandate a finding that the motion is well-taken and should be granted. In reaching this conclusion, we considered not only the memorandum supporting the motion (doc. 11), including the affidavit of Michael E. Brown and attached exhibits (doc. 15), defendant's opposing memorandum (doc. 13), and plaintiff's reply (doc. 18), but also the post-hearing documents filed by both parties. Defendant filed a December 21, 1982 telex from the NFLPA to the Bengals stating that the NFLPA took the position that there was no grievance procedure in effect from the expiration of the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement until the signing of the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement on December 11, 1982 (doc. 19). Plaintiff filed a supplemental affidavit by Michael E. Brown (doc. 20) to which are attached a November 19, 1982 telex from the NFLPA to the Management Council presenting a non-injury grievance on behalf of players on the injured reserved list (App. A) and a December 3, 1982 letter from the NFLPA to the Management Council presenting another non-injury grievance which arose during the strike (App. B). It is apparent from these post-hearing filings that the NFLPA's position with respect to the existence of arbitration procedure during the strike is inconsistent; it is, however, the responsibility of the Court, not the NFLPA, to determine whether there was a valid arbitration agreement in effect during the strike.

As a preliminary matter, the Court points out that even though he is not a member of the NFLPA, defendant is nevertheless bound by the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated between the NFLPA and Management Council because he is a member of the bargaining unit represented by the NFLPA. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 334-35, 64 S.Ct. 576, 578-79, 88 L.Ed. 762 (1944). Moreover, defendant is bound by the terms of his NFL Player Contract which incorporates the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

A. The Agreement to Arbitrate

Whether a dispute is arbitrable is a question for the Court to determine upon examination of the contract. Siam Feather & Forest Products Co. v. Midwest Feather Co., 503 F.Supp. 239, 241 (S.D.Ohio 1980) and cases cited therein. But, as defendant points out, the Court must first determine that there is a valid agreement to arbitrate.

Defendant contends that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate, pointing out that paragraph twenty of the Player Contract requires arbitration according to procedures established by "any collective bargaining agreement in existence at the time the event giving rise to such dispute occurs" (doc. 15, ex. A-1, emphasis added). The dispute arose during the strike and the resultant non-payment to Thompson. At that time the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement had terminated. Plaintiff responds, however, that because the 1982 Collective Bargaining Agreement is retroactive to July 16, 1982, there was an agreement "in existence." Counsel for plaintiff also noted that even though the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement terminated on July 1, 1982, the players continued to play football until September 21, 1982 and that grievances arising during that time would have been processed according to the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement. Counsel for defendant agreed that such a grievance would be covered, but argued that the injury would have occurred prior to the strike whereas defendant's non-injury grievance occurred during the strike.

Under all the circumstances, we conclude that there is a valid arbitration agreement. The dispute, although it arose after the 1977 Collective Bargaining Agreement had terminated, clearly arose under defendant's player contract which specifically incorporates "any collective bargaining agreement in existence during the term of this contract." Counsel for defendant conceded that there would be a valid arbitration agreement...