Alston v. State
| Decision Date | 01 November 1988 |
| Citation | 554 A.2d 304 |
| Parties | Harold S. ALSTON, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted: |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
John S. Malik (argued), Wilmington, for appellant.
Gary A. Myers (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., and Eugene M. Hall, State Prosecutor, Loren C. Meyers, Deputy Atty. Gen., Dept. of Justice, Wilmington, for appellee.
Before MOORE, WALSH, and HOLLAND, JJ.
The defendant-appellant, Harold S. Alston ("Alston"), was convicted of seven counts of first degree robbery and nine counts of second degree conspiracy after a jury trial in the Superior Court. The robberies were committed at various locations in the city of Wilmington and New Castle County. On appeal Alston contends that the trial judge should have suppressed two statements made by Alston to police. He also argues that the jury's verdict was internally inconsistent and legally flawed. Although we find that certain evidence was improperly admitted against Alston, we conclude that, under a harmless error analysis, all convictions, except one conspiracy charge, are sustainable. Accordingly, with the exception of one charge of conspiracy, all convictions are affirmed.
A series of robberies were committed in New Castle County and the city of Wilmington during the summer of 1985. On the basis of information provided by a confidential informant, the investigating officers believed that Alston was involved. A notebook belonging to a victim of one of the robberies was recovered at one crime scene, a Wilmington hotel. A fingerprint taken from the notebook matched that of Alston's right thumb. Police secured arrest warrants charging Alston with first degree robbery and second degree conspiracy. He was arrested on August 19, 1985, in North Carolina, waived extradition, and was returned to Delaware on August 23, 1985.
In Delaware, Alston was taken directly to a State Police station and there questioned by detectives of the Delaware State Police and the Wilmington Police Department. While in custody Alston was advised of his Miranda rights. He stated that he understood those rights and agreed to give a statement to the detectives. During the course of the interview, Alston was advised that the police were investigating several robberies and that he was under arrest for two robberies at a Wilmington hotel. Alston denied any involvement in the robberies. The interrogating officer then advised Alston about the fingerprint match. In response, Alston asked the officers about his possible sentence for the crimes that were being investigated. Alston was advised that if he gave a statement about all of the robberies that he was involved in, they would recommend to the Attorney General that he be allowed to plead to a single robbery charge.
After being advised of the possible plea arrangement, Alston admitted to participating in two robberies at the hotel, two other robberies, on separate dates, at a supermarket, a fifth robbery near an adult bookstore in New Castle County, a sixth robbery at an automatic teller machine, a seventh robbery at an adult book store in Wilmington, and an eighth robbery at a grocery store in Wilmington. After Alston gave his oral statement, he was taken before a Justice of the Peace for the setting of bond on the two hotel robberies and one conspiracy charge and committed to Gander Hill, a pretrial detention facility.
On August 26, while at Gander Hill, Alston signed a form indicating that he did not desire to talk to law enforcement officials, unless a Public Defender was present. 1 This form, executed according to a standard procedure followed by the Public Defender's Office at Gander Hill, is signed in triplicate. One copy is given to the accused, a second is retained in the public defender's file and a third copy is placed in a file for access by the warden at Gander Hill. According to testimony at the suppression hearing, when police wish to interview a detainee, the warden's office contacts the Public Defender's Office at Gander Hill, to determine if the detainee has executed a form invoking his right to counsel. If the prisoner wishes to speak to the police, notwithstanding his previous execution of the document, the warden's office requests the detainee to sign a separate form to that effect. There is no evidence that the latter form was ever signed by Alston.
On August 28, Alston was indicted on two counts of robbery and one count of conspiracy for the robberies committed at the hotel (Hotel Charges). The following day, Alston was transported by prison guards from Gander Hill to the Wilmington Police Department. The purpose of this appearance was two fold: to be processed on arrest warrants on new charges and to be interviewed again by State and Wilmington police officers.
Before the interview, Alston was advised of his Miranda rights and signed a Wilmington Department of Police form waiving his rights. Prior to questioning, the detectives again told Alston that if he was fully truthful about all of the robberies in which he was involved, the detectives would make a recommendation to the Attorney General's office to allow him to plead guilty to only one charge of first degree robbery. Alston then gave a "question and answer" taped statement in which he confessed to the eight robberies which he had mentioned during the August 23 interview. Alston also confessed to a ninth robbery which occurred on Market Street, but not until one of the detectives reminded him of the robbery. Because Alston delayed confessing to the ninth robbery, interviewing officers refused to recommend to the Attorney General's office the single robbery plea agreement.
On March 5, 1986, Alston was reindicted on nine counts of first degree robbery and nine counts of second degree conspiracy. The indictment included the Hotel Charges set forth in the initial indictment, another conspiracy charge for the hotel robberies, as well as seven new counts of robbery and conspiracy. A suppression hearing was held on September 10, 1986, to determine the admissibility of the two statements Alston had made to the police. At the suppression hearing Alston testified that he would not have confessed to any robberies in either interview, if the detectives had not promised to make a recommendation of leniency on his behalf. His counsel also sought to suppress the second statement on the ground that it had been secured in violation of his right to counsel. Both motions were denied by the trial judge. At trial, Alston was found guilty of seven counts of first degree robbery and nine counts of second degree conspiracy.
The first issue for our consideration is whether Alston's two statements were involuntary, because they were given in exchange for a promise to recommend leniency. Alston claims that his statements to the police were involuntary because the promise to recommend a lenient plea agreement, was the motivating factor behind his confession. Alston relies on the holding in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897), which held that a confession cannot be procured by any direct or implied promises, nor by the exertion of improper influence. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492-1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964).
Voluntariness of a confession is determined from the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the confession. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961); Blankenship v. State, Del.Supr., 447 A.2d 428, 431-432 (1982); State v. Rooks, Del.Supr., 401 A.2d 943, 948-49 (1979). All relevant factors pertaining to the confession must be examined. Alston's argument rests heavily on the fact that the police officers made a promise to him which he claims induced his confession. "Promises or inducements ...do not make a statement involuntary, unless so extravagant, or so impressionable as to overbear the person's will and rational thinking processes." State v. Rooks, 401 A.2d at 948.
Alston was 28 years old at the time of his arrest and had previously been convicted of three felonies. Alston had completed the tenth grade and was able to read and write. At the time his statements were made he was alert and did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The interviews were during the day, and each interview lasted approximately one to one and one-half hours. Although in custody, Alston was not handcuffed during either session. Further, he had been advised of his Miranda rights before each interview and had waived them on both occasions.
We review the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to suppress, after an evidentiary hearing, under an abuse of discretion standard. So viewed, we conclude that the admissibility of both statements as voluntary is amply supported by the evidence. We agree with the trial judge that the officers' promise to make a recommendation to the Attorney General did not rise to a level that overbore Alston's thinking process. Alston was clearly advised that the officer's role was one of recommendation, depending upon the extent of his cooperation. The promise was a factor, but only one of the factors, which motivated the statements. Other factors, in particular, the fingerprint evidence linking him to the hotel charges, undoubtedly influenced the defendant in his decision to cooperate. Under a totality of circumstances test we cannot conclude that his cooperation was solely, or dominantly, the product of a promise of leniency. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the Superior Court on this issue.
We next address a more formidable question: whether Alston's second statement was secured in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel. Alston argues that his execution of a document indicating his desire not to speak to law enforcement authorities unless counsel was present, coupled with his post-indictment status, precluded...
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