Usery v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 May 1977
• Docket Number: No. 76-1373,76-1373
• Citation: 554 F.2d 498
• Parties: W. J. USERY, Jr., Secretary of Labor, Petitioner, Appellant, v. WHITIN MACHINE WORKS, INC., Respondent, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 498

554 F.2d 498

1 ITRD 1604

W. J. USERY, Jr., Secretary of Labor, Petitioner, Appellant, v. WHITIN MACHINE WORKS, INC., Respondent, Appellee.

No. 76-1373.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Argued Nov. 5, 1976.

Decided May 11, 1977.

Neil H. Koslowe, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Appellate Section, Washington, D. C., with whom Rex E. Lee, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., James N. Gabriel, U. S. Atty., Boston, Mass., William J. Kilberg, Sol. of Labor, Alvin Bramow, Acting Associate Sol. Gen., Legal Services, John R. Garson, Counsel for International Affairs, Anna Holmberg, Atty., Dept. of Labor, and Ronald R. Glancz, Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Appellate Section, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for petitioner, appellant.

Gunter von Conrad, Washington, D. C., with whom James H. Lundquist, H. Henning Vent and Barnes, Richardson & Colburn, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for respondent, appellee.

Before COFFIN, Chief Judge, CAMPBELL, Circuit Judge, and GIGNOUX, ^* District Judge.

COFFIN, Chief Judge.

This appeal presents the somewhat bizarre case of an employer attempting to terminate a procedure which could result in substantial benefits to many of its present and former employees by standing piously on a Congressional directive for expedition. This suit began when the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint under § 249 of the Trade Act of 1974 to enforce a subpoena that ordered Whitin Machine Works (Whitin) to furnish certain materials the Secretary needed to determine whether Whitin's employees were eligible for worker adjustment assistance under § 222 of that Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2272. Whitin interposed the defense that the subpoena exceeded the Secretary's jurisdiction because it was untimely and overbroad. The district court accepted these contentions and dismissed the complaint. We reverse.

The Trade Act of 1974 is a comprehensive program to foster economic growth and full employment in the United States and to strengthen economic relations with foreign countries by reducing restrictions on foreign trade and imports. Because the Congress recognized that increased importation of foreign goods could cause serious economic dislocations in certain segments of American society and because it wished to ameliorate the consequences of such dislocations, it established a series of remedial programs to assist affected groups in adjusting to the effects of increased imports. See id. §§ 2271-2322 (adjustment assistance for workers), §§ 2341-54 (adjustment assistance for firms), §§ 2371-74 (adjustment assistance for communities).

The worker adjustment assistance program, which is the central concern of this case, authorizes the Secretary to grant a number of benefits to workers who, by reason of increased imports, have been "partially or totally separated" from their employment. Such workers may receive compensation calculated largely on the basis of their previous weekly wages, id. §§ 2291-94, employment services, id. § 2295, training, id. § 2296, job search allowance, id. § 2297, and relocation allowances, id. § 2298. No worker may receive such benefits unless the Secretary has previously issued a certification that the workers in the affected firm are eligible to apply. To be certified, the workers file a petition with the Secretary, who will issue the certification if he determines that a significant number of the workers in the firm are being threatened with total or partial separation, that the sales or production of the firm has decreased absolutely, and that increased importation contributed to the decreased sales and jobs. The date of the workers' petition determines the period for which workers may receive benefits. Id. § 2273(b)(1).

On November 7, 1975, a petition for worker adjustment assistance was filed on behalf of Whitin's employees. The petition alleged that Whitin, a manufacturer of textile and printing machinery, had laid off some 800 employees during the previous year, and suggested that increased imports might be the cause of such layoffs. The Secretary, as required by § 221 of the Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2271, published a notice that he had received the petition in the Federal Register and initiated an investigation to determine whether the group eligibility requirements had been satisfied. In the course of the investigation, the Secretary determined that he required certain sales, production, and employment data from Whitin, and he issued a formal request to Whitin. The Secretary's formal request provided categorically that no truly confidential business records would be disclosed to any third party. This statement was consistent with the Secretary's regulations, which provide that information which is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), will not be made available to the public. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 90.32, 90.33. In this connection, we note that the Secretary has a procedure whereby a company like Whitin may obtain an administrative determination of the exempt character of any information which has been requested before it unconditionally discloses the materials to the Secretary. See 29 C.F.R. § 90.33. On December 19, Whitin's counsel wrote the Secretary that Whitin, a net exporter, did not believe that increased imports had affected its production or sales. Subsequent discussions occurred, and Whitin at one point offered to let the officials see, but not transmit, the information that had been requested. This was not acceptable to the Secretary. On January 9, 1976, Whitin, in a letter, provided some information, but it reiterated its conclusion that imports had not affected its business and that inquiry into specific company records, which allegedly contained sensitive information, was not warranted. At no time did Whitin avail itself of the procedure in which it could have received a determination by the Secretary of the exempt status of the information which had been requested. Four days later the Secretary issued a subpoena, ¹ and Whitin refused to comply. An enforcement action was brought in federal district court, and, after a hearing and submission of memoranda, the district court dismissed the complaint.

The district court believed the dismissal was mandated by § 2273(a) which provides that the Secretary shall determine eligibility for adjustment assistance "(a)s soon as possible after the date on which a petition is filed under section 2271 of this title, but in any event not later than 60 days after that date". It held that the directive to make a determination within 60 days is a limitation on the Secretary's jurisdiction and that, by failing to make an eligibility determination before January 13, 1976, the Secretary lost his power to take any steps in furtherance of the investigation. As a second ground for dismissing the complaint, the district court held that the Secretary had exceeded his subpoena power by ordering that certain data be complied and analyzed.

The first question before us is whether the Act was properly construed as ousting the Secretary of jurisdiction to make an eligibility determination after 60 days had passed following the filing of the petition. We observe that the statute does not specifically address this question. Although Congress clearly desired the expeditious treatment of such petitions, there is nothing in the statute which in any way suggests that the time limitation was designed to be jurisdictional. The Act neither purports to restrain the Secretary from acting after 60 days have passed nor specifies that any adverse consequences follow from the Secretary's failure to comply. In the absence of any such clear indications of Congressional intent that the limitations are to be strictly enforced, courts have uniformly held that the time requirements in statutes such as the one in the case at bar are not jurisdictional. See Fort Worth Corp. v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 469 F.2d 47, 58 (5th Cir. 1972); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cardillo, 69 App.D.C. 199, 99 F.2d 432 (1938); cf. United States v. Morris, 252 F.2d 643, 648-49 (5th Cir. 1960). ²

The contrary result of the district court is not only inconsistent with established principles; it produces a result which we find impossible to square with the remedial objectives of the Act. The consequence of the district court's approach would be that worker adjustment assistance would be absolutely denied certain workers who had taken the statutorily required steps to establish their eligibility. Even if we assume that the workers will be free to file a second petition to establish their eligibility under the district court's approach, the result would be that benefits would be denied those additional workers whose last total or partial separation occurred after November 7, 1974 but before the date one year prior to the filing of the second petition. See § 2273(b)(1). We cannot believe that Congress could have intended to deny any worker his federal benefits solely because of administrative footdragging.

The overriding objective of the adjustment assistance programs is to ameliorate the consequences of the economic readjustments occasioned by increased imports. That Congress could have intended that the attainment of this paramount goal was to be subordinated to the protection of whatever interests might be served by prompt eligibility determinations strikes us as implausible. Moreover, we doubt that the time limitations were required to protect any interests other than those of the Act's beneficiaries. ³ The only conceivable purpose of the 60 day decision requirement was to further the Act's remedial goals by ensuring that there would be no long delays in the distribution of benefits; Congress apparently was interested not only in granting benefits but also in ensuring that, to the maximum extent feasible, the benefits were received during the periods in which they were most needed. It would be ironic indeed to convert this...