George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp.

Decision Date06 May 1977
Docket NumberNo. 363,READY-MIXED,D,363
Citation554 F.2d 551
Parties1977-1 Trade Cases 61,429 GEORGE C. FREYCONCRETE, INC., George C. Frey Batching Plant, Inc., and Herbert Frey and Lois Muck, as co-executors of the Estate of George C. Frey, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellants, v. PINE HILL CONCRETE MIX CORP., Regent Sand & Gravel Corp., Ludwig F. Kahle, Joseph Pfohl, Paul M. Pfohl, and Fidelis H. Pfohl, individually and as the controlling and surviving directors, officers, shareholders, liquidators and receivers of the assets of Pfohl Brothers, Inc., a dissolved corporation, and Pfohl Brothers, Inc., Defendants-Appellees. ocket 75-7698.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Arnold Weiss, Buffalo, N. Y. (Raichle, Banning, Weiss & Halpern, Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellants.

Victor T. Fuzak, Buffalo, N. Y. (Hodgson, Russ, Andrews, Woods & Goodyear, Buffalo, N. Y., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before LUMBARD and OAKES, Circuit Judges, and BRYAN, District Judge. *

OAKES, Circuit Judge:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, John T. Curtin, Chief Judge, which granted one or the other or both 1 of appellees' motions for dismissal and summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12, 56. We find the court's decision unjustified on either of these grounds and therefore reverse.

On both sides of this suit are corporations engaged, inter alia, in the production and sale of ready-mixed concrete and gravel in the Buffalo, New York, area. On June 17, 1970, appellants brought suit charging appellees with monopolization, various restraints of trade, and conspiracy in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., 12 et seq., as well as various state antitrust and contract law violations. Appellees were granted permission to complete their discovery before appellants began their own. On May 7, 1971 appellees were chastised by the district court for their desultory discovery process and ordered to adhere to a strict schedule. A long series of mutually agreed upon delays followed, however, and on October 16, 1974, the court, disturbed with the dilatoriness of both sides, referred the suit to a magistrate for close supervision and a quick termination of the discovery process. On October 22, 1974, the magistrate established a schedule calling for appellees to end their protracted discovery by November 29 and for appellants to begin their discovery immediately thereafter. On November 27, appellants filed their first request for documents pursuant to this schedule. Appellees filed substantial objections to this request on December 17, and, before the court could act on these objections, appellees moved on January 10, 1975, for dismissal of the action and summary judgment. A decision on these motions was delayed at appellants' instance while they examined some documents not covered by appellees' objections and, with the aid of evidence gained in this brief examination, moved that any judgment on appellees' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment be delayed until after discovery was completed. The court denied appellants' motion and dismissed the action or granted summary judgment on November 10, 1975.

The first apparent ground for the court's decision was that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and that therefore appellees should have judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). 2 For purposes of this motion, we may look only at the pleadings, with all of "the well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint . . . taken as admitted," Gumer v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 516 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1974), and the complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Under this standard, appellants' complaint may not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The complaint alleges that both appellants and appellees made substantial purchases of materials, especially cement, that had been transported in interstate or foreign commerce and made sales across state or national boundaries; this is a sufficient allegation of effect on interstate commerce to state a cause of action under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Compare Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 95 S.Ct. 392, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974) (intrastate sales of asphaltic concrete for use on interstate highways are not sales "in commerce" under Clayton Act; no evidence of effects on interstate commerce). The complaint further alleges that appellees bought up appellants' source of grit and gravel supplies as part of a continuing effort to monopolize the local ready-mixed concrete industry and that, by controlling the best source of supply, the appellees were in a position to force appellants out of business with a cost-price squeeze. The complaint further indicated that the markets involved were those for gravel and ready-mixed concrete in the Buffalo or Western New York area. Taken together, these allegations were adequate to put the appellees on notice as to the nature of appellants' claim. Appellees dispute these allegations, but where there is a dispute as to material facts judgment on the pleadings is inappropriate, 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367, at 685 (1969).

Even though appellants' claims were alleged with what would ordinarily be considered sufficient specificity, appellees contend, and the court below appeared to believe, that antitrust claims, because of their complexity, must be pleaded with greater specificity than other claims. It has been clear in this circuit since Nagler v. Admiral Corp.,248 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1957) (Clark, C. J.), however, that a short plain statement of a claim for relief which gives notice to the opposing party is all that is necessary in antitrust cases, as in other cases under the Federal Rules. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 1228. Compare, e. g., Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F.Supp. 1364, 1367-68 (S.D.N.Y.1973) ("skeletal" allegations sufficient), with, e. g., Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., 463 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1972) ("a bare bones statement of conspiracy or of injury under the antitrust laws without any supporting facts permits dismissal"). The discovery process is designed to provide whatever additional sharpening of the issues may be necessary. Insofar as the court's decision rested on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12, it is reversed.

The appellees contend, however, that if the court's action be considered as summary judgment, it was appropriate under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The court apparently held as a matter of law that plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient connection with interstate commerce. 3 Unlike a Rule 12 motion, in which a party's allegations in the pleadings must be accepted, a court in considering summary judgment may look behind the pleadings to facts developed during discovery. See 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 2713 (1973). Here, however, the court had virtually nothing to look to other than the pleadings, since appellants had had little opportunity for discovery.

We hold that consideration of a summary judgment motion at this point in the proceedings was premature. In a series of recent cases, this court has repeatedly emphasized that "on a motion for summary judgment the court cannot try issues of fact; . . . it must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought, . . . with the burden on the moving party to demonstrate the absence of any material factual issue genuinely in dispute . . . ." Heyman v. Commerce & Industry Insurance Co., 524 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1975); see Gladstone v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 536 F.2d 1403, 1406 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Bosurgi, 530 F.2d 1105, 1110 (2d Cir. 1976); National Life Insurance Co. v. Solomon, 529 F.2d 59, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Home Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 528 F.2d 1388, 1390 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Jaroslawicz v. Seedman, 528 F.2d 727, 731 (2d Cir. 1975); Judge v. City of Buffalo, 524 F.2d 1321, 1322-23 (2d Cir. 1975). "This is particularly so when, as here, one party has yet to exercise its opportunities for pretrial discovery." National Life Insurance Co. v. Solomon, supra, 529 F.2d at 61; see Meetings & Expositions, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 490 F.2d 714, 717 (2d Cir. 1974). Moreover, because antitrust actions so integrally involve motive and intent to conspire and injure, they have been said to be particularly inappropriate for summary judgment treatment, Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, § 2732, at 608-10, although of course baseless antitrust claims may be dismissed before trial, see Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp., supra, 463 F.2d at 100; Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922, 92 S.Ct. 2488, 33 L.Ed.2d 333 (1972); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1972).

The consideration of these factors leads to the conclusion that a motion for summary judgment should not be entertained before discovery has been completed in antitrust cases in which the relevant facts are disputed and intent to injure is an issue. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 746, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 1853, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976) ("in antitrust cases . . . dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be granted very sparingly"); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 292, 296-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. ...

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