554 U.S. 164 (2008), 07-208, Indiana v. Edwards
|Citation:||554 U.S. 164, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345, 76 U.S.L.W. 4512|
|Opinion Judge:||BREYER, JUSTICE|
|Party Name:||Indiana v. Edwards|
|Attorney:||Thomas M. Fisher, for Petitioner. Michael R. Dreeben, Washington, D.C., for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Petitioner. Mark T. Stancil, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Steve Carter, Attorney General, Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General, Julie A. Br...|
|Judge Panel:||BREYER, J., ROBERTS, C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. Justice SCALIA, with whom Justice THOMAS joins, dissenting.|
|Case Date:||June 19, 2008|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued March 26, 2008.
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA No. 07-208.
After Indiana charged respondent Edwards with attempted murder and other crimes for a shooting during his attempt to steal a pair of shoes, his mental condition became the subject of three competency proceedings and two self-representation requests, mostly before the same trial judge. Referring to the lengthy record of psychiatric reports, the trial court noted that Edwards suffered from schizophrenia and concluded that, although it appeared he was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to defend himself at trial. The court therefore denied Edwards' self- [128 S.Ct. 2380] representation request. He was represented by appointed counsel at trial and convicted on two counts. Indiana's intermediate appellate court ordered a new trial, agreeing with Edwards that the trial court's refusal to permit him to represent himself deprived him of his constitutional right of self-representation under the Sixth Amendment and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562. Although finding that the record provided substantial support for the trial court's ruling, the Indiana Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the intermediate appellate court on the ground that Faretta and Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321, required the State to allow Edwards to represent himself.
The Constitution does not forbid States from insisting upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Pp. 2383-2388.
(a) This Court's precedents frame the question presented, but they do not answer it. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, and Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, set forth the Constitution's "mental competence" standard forbidding the trial of an individual lacking a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings and sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. But those cases did not consider the issue presented here, namely, the relation of that "mental competence" standard to the self-representation right. Similarly the Court's foundational "self-representation" case, Faretta, suprawhich held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments include a "constitutional right to proceed without counsel when" a criminal defendant "voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so," 422 U.S., at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525does not answer the question as to the scope of the self-representation right. Finally, although Godinez, supra, presents a question closer to the one at issue in that it focused upon a borderline-competent defendant who had asked a state trial court to permit him to represent himself and to change his pleas from not guilty to guilty, Godinez provides no answer here because that defendant's ability to conduct a defense at trial was expressly not at issue in that case, see 509 U.S., at 399-400, 113 S.Ct. 2680, and because the case's constitutional holding that a State may permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself does not tell a State whether it may deny such a defendant the right to represent himself at his trial. Pp. 2383 - 2386.
(b) Several considerations taken together lead the Court to conclude that the Constitution permits a State to limit a defendant's self-representation right by insisting upon trial counsel when the defendant lacks the mental competency to conduct his trial defense unless represented. First, the Court's precedent, while not answering the question, points slightly in that direction. By setting forth a standard that focuses directly upon a defendant's ability to consult with his lawyer, Dusky and Drope assume representation by counsel and emphasize counsel's importance, thus suggesting (though not holding) that choosing to forgo trial counsel presents a very different set of circumstances than the mental competency determination for a defendant to stand trial. Also, Faretta rested its self-representation conclusion in part on pre-existing state cases that are consistent with, and at least two of which expressly adopt, a competency limitation on the self-representation right. See 422 U.S., at 813, and n. 9, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Second, [128 S.Ct. 2381] the nature of mental illness-which is not a unitary concept, but varies in degree, can vary over time, and interferes with an individual's functioning at different times in different ways-cautions against using a single competency standard to decide both whether a defendant who is represented can proceed to trial and whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself. Third, a self-representation right at trial will not "affirm the dignity" of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-177, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122, and may undercut the most basic of the Constitution's criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial. The trial judgeparticularly one such as the judge in this case, who presided over one of Edwards' competency hearings and his two trialswill often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the particular defendant's individualized circumstances. Pp. 2385 - 2388.
(c) Indiana's proposed standard, which would deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial if he cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury, is rejected because this Court is uncertain as to how that standard would work in practice. The Court also declines Indiana's request to overrule Faretta because today's opinion may well remedy the unfair trial concerns previously leveled against the case. Pp. 2387 - 2388.
866 N.E.2d 252, vacated and remanded.
This case focuses upon a criminal defendant whom a state court found mentally competent to stand trial if represented by counsel but not mentally competent to conduct that trial himself. We must decide whether in these circumstances the Constitution forbids a State from insisting that the defendant proceed to trial with counsel, the State thereby denying the defendant the right to represent himself. See U.S. Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). We conclude that the Constitution does not forbid a State so to insist.
[128 S.Ct. 2382] I
In July 1999 Ahmad Edwards, the respondent, tried to steal a pair of shoes from an Indiana department store. After he was discovered, he drew a gun, fired at a store security officer, and wounded a bystander. He was caught and then charged with attempted murder, battery with a deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft. His mental condition subsequently became the subject of three competency proceedings and two self-representation requests, mostly before the same trial judge:
1. First Competency Hearing: August 2000.
Five months after Edwards' arrest, his court-appointed counsel asked for a psychiatric evaluation. After hearing psychiatrist and neuropsychologist witnesses (in February 2000 and again in August 2000), the court found Edwards incompetent to stand trial, App. 365a, and committed him to Logansport State Hospital for evaluation and treatment, see id., at 48a-53a.
2. Second Competency Hearing: March 2002.
Seven months after his commitment, doctors found that Edwards' condition had improved to the point where he could stand trial. Id., at 63a-64a. Several months later, however, but still before trial, Edwards' counsel asked for another psychiatric evaluation. In March 2002, the judge held a competency hearing, considered additional psychiatric evidence, and (in April) found that Edwards, while "suffer[ing] from mental illness," was "competent to assist his attorneys in his defense and stand trial for the charged crimes." Id., at 114a.
3. Third Competency Hearing: April 2003.
Seven months later but still before trial, Edwards' counsel sought yet another psychiatric evaluation of his client. And, in April 2003, the court held yet another competency hearing. Edwards' counsel presented further psychiatric and neuropsychological evidence showing that Edwards was suffering from serious thinking difficulties and delusions. A testifying psychiatrist reported that Edwards could understand the charges against him, but he was "unable to cooperate with his attorney in his defense because of his schizophrenic illness"; "[h]is delusions and his marked difficulties in thinking make it impossible for him to cooperate with his attorney." Id., at 164a. In November 2003, the court concluded that Edwards was not then competent to...
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