Jimenez v. Quarterman

• Decision Date: 13 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07–6984.,07–6984.
• Citation: 77 USLW 4035,129 S.Ct. 681,555 U.S. 113,172 L.Ed.2d 475
• Parties: Carlos JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

555 U.S. 113

129 S.Ct. 681

172 L.Ed.2d 475

77 USLW 4035

Carlos JIMENEZ, Petitioner,

v.Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division.

No. 07–6984.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 4, 2008.

Decided Jan. 13, 2009.

Syllabus^*

After petitioner's state conviction for burglary became final on October 11, 1996, the state appellate court held in state habeas proceedings that petitioner had been denied his right to appeal and granted him the right to file an out-of-time appeal. He filed the appeal, his conviction was affirmed, and his time for seeking certiorari in this Court expired on January 6, 2004. Petitioner filed a second state habeas application on December 6, 2004, which was denied 355 days later, on June 29, 2005. He then filed a federal habeas petition on July 19, 2005, relying on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) to establish its timeliness. Section 2244(d)(1)(A) provides that the one-year limitations period for seeking review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) begins on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Petitioner argued that his judgment became final on January 6, 2004, when time expired for seeking certiorari review of the decision in his out- of-time appeal, and that his July 19, 2005, petition was timely because the calculation of AEDPA's 1–year limitation period excludes the 355 days “during which [his] properly filed application for State post-conviction ... review ... [was] pending,” § 2244(d)(2). The District Court disagreed, ruling that the proper start date for calculating AEDPA's 1–year limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(A) was October 11, 1996, when petitioner's conviction first became final. The District Court dismissed the federal habeas petition as time barred. The Fifth Circuit denied petitioner's request for a certificate of appealability.

Held: Where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal during state collateral review, but before the defendant has first sought federal habeas relief, his judgment is not “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) until the conclusion of the out-of-time direct appeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking certiorari review of that appeal. This Court must enforce plain statutory language according to its terms. See, e.g.,Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024. Under § 2244(d)(1)(A)'s plain language, once the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reopened direct review of petitioner'sconviction on September 25, 2002, the conviction was no longer final for § 2244(d)(1)(A) purposes. Rather, the order granting an out-of-time appeal restored the pendency of the direct appeal, and petitioner's conviction was again capable of modification through direct appeal to the state courts and to this Court on certiorari review. Therefore, it was not until January 6, 2004, when time for seeking certiorari review of the decision in the out-of-time appeal expired, that petitioner's conviction became “final” through “the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” under § 2244(d)(1)(A). The Court rejects respondent's argument that using the later date created by the state court's decision to reopen direct review, thus resetting AEDPA's 1–year limitations period, undermines the policy of finality that Congress established in § 2244(d) (1). See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260. Pp. 684 – 687.

Reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Thomas C. Goldstein, for Petitioner.

Sean D. Jordan, for Respondent.

Pamela S. Karlan, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford Law School, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Stanford, CA, Scott T. Williams, Patrick G. O'Brien, J. Carl Cecere, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, Dallas, TX, Thomas C. Goldstein, Counsel of Record, Monica P. Sekhon, Won S. Shin, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, Washington, DC, Amy Howe, Kevin Russell, Howe & Russell, P.C., Bethesda, MD, for petitioner.

Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Kent C. Sullivan, First Assistant Attorney General, Eric J.R. Nichols, Deputy Attorney General for Criminal Justice, James C. Ho, Solicitor General, Sean D. Jordan, Deputy Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Rance L. Craft, Adam W. Aston, Assistant Solicitors General, Marta McLaughlin, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, Texas, for respondent.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) establishes a 1–year time limitation for a state prisoner to file a federal habeas corpus petition. That year runs from the latest of four specified dates. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This case involves the date provided by § 2244(d)(1)(A), which is “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” Petitioner contends that “the date on which the judgment became final” can be postponed by a state court's decision during collateral review to grant a defendant the right to file an out-of-time direct appeal. The District Court disagreed, holding instead that the date could not be moved to reflect the out-of-time appeal, and that petitioner's federal habeas petition was untimely for that reason. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. See § 2253(c). We now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I

After petitioner was sentenced for burglary in 1995, his attorney filed an appellate brief with the Texas Court of Appeals pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), explaining that he was unable to identify any nonfrivolous ground on which to base an appeal. ¹ He left a copy of the brief and a letter (advising petitioner of his right to file a pro se brief as set forth in Anders,id., at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396) at the county jail where he believed petitioner to be. Petitioner, however, had been transferred to a state facility and did not receive the delivery. The Texas Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on September 11, 1996, and served petitioner with notice of the dismissal at the county-jail address that, again, was the wrong address.

Petitioner eventually learned that his appeal had been dismissed. He filed an application in state court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977), arguing that he was denied his right to a meaningful appeal when he was denied the opportunity to file a pro se brief. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and, on September 25, 2002, granted petitioner the right to file an out-of-time appeal:

“[Petitioner] is entitled to an out-of-time appeal in cause number CR–91–0528–B in the 119th Judicial District Court of Tom Green County. [Petitioner] is ordered returned to that point in time at which he may give written notice of appeal so that he may then, with the aid of counsel, obtain a meaningful appeal. For purposes of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, all time limits shall be calculated as if the sentence had been imposed on the date that the mandate of this Court issues.” Ex parte Jimenez, No. 74,433 (per curiam), App. 26, 27.

Petitioner thereafter filed the out-of-time appeal. His conviction was affirmed. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied discretionary review on October 8, 2003. Time for seeking certiorari review of that decision with this Court expired on January 6, 2004. On December 6, 2004, petitioner filed a second application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court; it was denied on June 29, 2005.

Petitioner then filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus on July 19, 2005. To establish the timeliness of his petition, he relied on 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), which provides “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review” as the trigger for AEDPA's 1–year limitations period. Petitioner argued that his judgment thus became final on January 6, 2004, ² when time expired for seeking certiorari review of the decision in his out-of-time appeal. Until that date, petitioner argued, direct review of his state-court conviction was not complete.

With January 6, 2004, as the start date, petitioner contended that his July 19, 2005, petition was timely because the statute excludes from the 1–year limitations period “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner had a state habeas application pending from December 6, 2004, through June 29, 2005, so less than one year of included time—specifically, 355 days—passed between January 6, 2004, and July 19, 2005.

The District Court disagreed and dismissed the federal habeas petition as time barred. In the District Court's view, the proper start date for AEDPA's 1–year limitations period was October 11, 1996, when time for seeking discretionary review of the decision in petitioner's first direct appeal expired. The District Court concluded that it could not take into account the Texas court's later decision reopening petitioner's direct appeal because Circuit precedent established that “ ‘AEDPA provides for only a linear limitations period, one that starts and ends on specific dates, with only the possibility that tolling will expand the period in between.’ ” Order, Civ. Action No. 6:05–CV–05–C (ND Tex., Oct. 23, 2006), App. 75, 90 (quoting Salinas v. Dretke, 354 F.3d 425, 429 (C.A.5 2004)). Therefore, the District Court reasoned, the...