Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Com'n

• Citation: 210 Conn. 646,556 A.2d 1020
• Decision Date: 11 April 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13502,13502
• Parties: BOARD OF PARDONS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

Page 1020

556 A.2d 1020

210 Conn. 646

BOARD OF PARDONS v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 13502.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 2, 1989.

Decided April 11, 1989.

Carl J. Schuman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, were Clarine Nardi Riddle, Acting Atty. Gen., and John F. Gill, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the appellant (plaintiff).

Victor R. Perpetua, Com'n Counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Mitchell W. Pearlman, General Counsel, and Marianne D. Smith, Asst. Gen. Counsel, for the appellee (named defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, GLASS and HULL, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court erroneously concluded that the plaintiff Board of Pardons (board) lacked standing to contest an order of the defendant Freedom of Information Commission (FOIC). The underlying controversy between the parties is the validity of an FOIC order requiring the board, in the future, to conduct its deliberations in public except under narrowly delimited circumstances. The FOIC's order resulted from its decision that the Freedom of Information Act did not, as a general matter, exempt prisoner records from public disclosure, and that the board had violated the act by considering such nonexempt materials in executive session. The trial court upheld the board's appeal from the FOIC order.

Without getting to the merits of the controversy, the Appellate Court determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the board's appeal because, in the Appellate Court's view, the board was not aggrieved by the FOIC's prospective order. Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 14 Conn.App. 380, 383-84, 540 A.2d 1077 (1988). The Appellate Court held that the FOIC's order did not affect a "specific and personal interest" of the board. Id., at 384, 540 A.2d 1077. The board itself was not immediately aggrieved by the FOIC's order because that order was "purely prospective." Id., at 383-84, 540 A.2d 1077. Further, the board itself was not aggrieved by the separate interests of prisoners in the confidentiality of their records. Id., 384. We granted certification to consider this issue of standing; Board of Pardons v. Freedom of Information Commission, 209 Conn. 803, 548 A.2d 436 (1988); and now reverse. ¹

Only parties "aggrieved by the decision" of the FOIC have standing to take appeals to the Superior Court. General Statutes § 1-21i(d). ² "Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962); Stern v. Stern, 165 Conn. 190, 192, 332 A.2d 78 (1973). These two objectives are ordinarily held to have been met when a complainant makes a colorable claim of [a] direct injury he has suffered or is likely to suffer, in an individual or representative capacity. Such a 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'; Shaskan v. Waltham Industries Corporation, 168 Conn. 43, 49, 357 A.2d 472 (1975); Baker v. Carr, supra, 369 U.S. at 204, 82 S.Ct. at 703; provides the requisite assurance of 'concrete adverseness' and diligent advocacy. As long as there is some direct injury for which the plaintiff seeks redress, the injury that is alleged need not be great ... [and] need not be primarily economic." Maloney v. Pac, 183 Conn. 313, 320-21, 439 A.2d 349 (1981); see University of Connecticut Chapter, AAUP v. Governor, 200 Conn. 386, 389, 512 A.2d 152 (1986).

In appeals pursuant to § 1-21i(d), we have translated these general principles into a twofold test for aggrievement that requires a showing of: (wr a specific personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the FOIC decision; and (2) a special and injurious effect on this specific interest. Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, 198 Conn. 498, 502, 503 A.2d 1161 (1986); Local 1303 & Local 1378 v. Freedom of Information Commission, 191 Conn. 173, 176, 463 A.2d 613 (1983).

The board maintains that the Appellate Court took too narrow a view of aggrievement in this case. Despite the prospective nature of the FOIC order, the board claims it has standing to appeal because it is aggrieved in two respects: the risk of criminal sanctions and the threat to the integrity of its deliberative processes. We agree with both of these claims.

A genuine likelihood of criminal liability or civil incarceration is sufficient to confer standing. Maloney v. Pac, supra, 183 Conn. at 321-22, 439 A.2d 349; Kuser v. Orkis, 169 Conn. 66, 73, 362 A.2d 943 (1975). Because the Freedom of Information Act makes noncompliance with an FOIC order a class B misdemeanor; General Statutes § 1-21k(b); ³ the individual members of the board have a "specific and personal" interest in the validity of such an order. In the future, board members face the risk of injury, in the form of criminal prosecution and sanctions, if they fail to comply with the present FOIC order. Such a risk of prosecution establishes the requisite "specific and personal interest" of the members of the board and of the board itself as their representative. Connecticut Assn. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 616, 508 A.2d 743 (1986); Zoning Board of Appeals v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 198 Conn. at 502, 503 A.2d 1161.

In addition, the board has a legitimate institutional interest in the integrity of its decision-making process. The board has advanced a colorable claim of injury...