Knowles v. Mirzayance

• Citation: 173 L.Ed.2d 251,556 U.S. 111,129 S.Ct. 1411
• Decision Date: 24 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07–1315.,07–1315.
• Parties: Michael A. KNOWLES, Warden, Petitioner, v. Alexandre MIRZAYANCE.
• Court: United States Supreme Court

556 U.S. 111

129 S.Ct. 1411

173 L.Ed.2d 251

Michael A. KNOWLES, Warden, Petitioner

v.Alexandre MIRZAYANCE.

No. 07–1315.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Jan. 13, 2009.

Decided March 24, 2009.

Steve E. Mercer, Los Angeles, CA, for petitioner.

Charles M. Sevilla, San Diego, CA, for respondent.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General of California, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. De Nicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Kristofer Jorstad, Deputy Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer, Deputy Attorney General, Counsel of Record, Los Angeles, California, for Petitioner.

Eric Multhaup, Mill Valley, CA, Charles M. Sevilla, Counsel of Record, San Diego, CA, for Respondent Mirzayance.

Opinion

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.^*

A federal court may grant a habeas corpus application arising from a state-court adjudication on the merits if the state court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In this case, respondent Alexandre Mirzayance claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney recommended withdrawing his insanity defense. The California courts rejected this claim on state postconviction review. We must decide whether this decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. We hold that it was not. Whether reviewed under the standard of review set forth in § 2254(d)(1) or de novo, Mirzayance failed to establish that his counsel's performance was ineffective, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

I

Mirzayance confessed that he stabbed his 19–year–old cousin nine times with a hunting knife and then shot her four times. At trial, he entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI). Under California law, when both of these pleas are entered, the court must hold a bifurcated trial, with guilt determined during the first phase and the viability of the defendant's NGI plea during the second. Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 1026(a) (West 1985). During the guilt phase of Mirzayance's trial, he sought to avoid a conviction for first-degree murder by obtaining a verdict on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. To that end, he presented medical testimony that he was insane at the time of the crime and was, therefore, incapable of the premeditation or deliberation necessary for a first-degree murder conviction. The jury nevertheless convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder.

The trial judge set the NGI phase to begin the day after the conviction was entered but, on the advice of counsel, Mirzayance abandoned his NGI plea before it commenced. He would have borne the burden of proving his insanity during the NGI phase to the same jury that had just convicted him of first-degree murder. Counsel had planned to meet that burden by presenting medical testimony similar to that presented in the guilt phase, including evidence that Mirzayance was insane and incapable of premeditating or deliberating. Because the jury rejected similar evidence at the guilt phase (where the State bore the burden of proof), counsel believed a defense verdict at the NGI phase (where the burden was on the defendant) was unlikely. He planned, though, to have Mirzayance's parents testify and thus provide an emotional account of Mirzayance's struggles with mental illness to supplement the medical evidence of insanity. But on the morning that the NGI phase was set to begin, Mirzayance's parents refused to testify. After consulting with co-counsel, counsel advised Mirzayance that he should withdraw the NGI plea. Mirzayance accepted the advice.

After he was sentenced, Mirzayance challenged his conviction in state postconviction proceedings. Among other allegations, he claimed that counsel's recommendation to withdraw the NGI plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland . The California trial court denied the petition and the California Court of Appeal affirmed without offering any reason for its rejection of this particular ineffective assistance claim.People v. Mirzayance, Nos. B116856, B124764 (Mar. 31, 1999), App. to Pet. for Cert. 165–167, 200–201 (hereinafter App.). Mirzayance then filed an application for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the District Court denied without an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and ordered an evidentiary hearing on counsel's recommendation to withdraw the NGI plea. Mirzayance v. Hickman, 66 Fed.Appx. 676, 679–681 (C.A.9 2003). During that evidentiary hearing, a Magistrate Judge made factual findings that the District Court later adopted. Post–Remand Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge in No. CV 00–01388 DT (RZ) (CD Cal.), App. 38, 68; Mirzayance v. Knowles, No. CV 00–1388 DT (RZ) (CD Cal., Nov. 15, 2004), id., at 35–36.

According to the Magistrate Judge, counsel's strategy for the two-part trial was to seek a second-degree murder verdict in the first stage and to seek an NGI verdict in the second stage. This strategy faltered when the jury instead convicted Mirzayance of first-degree murder. In the circumstances of this case, the medical evidence that Mirzayance planned to adduce at the NGI phase essentially would have duplicated evidence that the jury had necessarily rejected in the guilt phase. First-degree murder in California includes any killing that is “willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 189 (West 1999). To prove NGI, a defendant must show that he was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature of his act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the offense. See People v. Lawley, 27 Cal.4th 102, 170, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461, 508 (2002). Highlighting this potential contradiction, the trial judge instructed the jury during the guilt phase that “[t]he word ‘deliberate,’ ” as required for a first-degree murder conviction, “means formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” App. 48–49.

When the jury found Mirzayance guilty of first-degree murder, counsel doubted the likelihood of prevailing on the NGI claim. According to the Magistrate Judge:

“The defense suspected that a jury's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Mirzayance] had ‘deliberated’ and ‘premeditated’ his killing of [the victim] as a practical matter would cripple [Mirzayance's] chances of convincing the jury later, during the sanity phase, that [Mirzayance] nevertheless ‘was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his ... act and of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense,’ Cal.Penal Code § 25(b), ....

. . . . .

“Any remaining chance of securing an NGI verdict ... now depended (in [counsel's] view) on presenting some ‘emotional [im]pact’ testimony by [Mirzayance's] parents, which [counsel] had viewed as key even if the defense had secured a second-degree murder verdict at the guilt phase.” Id., at 50–51 (emphasis in original; capitalization omitted).

But, as the Magistrate Judge found, on the morning that the NGI phase was set to begin, Mirzayance's parents effectively refused to testify:

“[T]he parents at least expressed clear reluctance to testify, which, in context, conveyed the same sense as a refusal.” Id., at 72 (emphasis in original).

Although the parties disputed this point, the parents' later actions supported the Magistrate Judge's finding that the parents' reluctance to testify amounted to refusal:

“Corroborating the Court's finding that [Mirzayance's] parents indicated a strong disinclination to testify at the NGI phase are the facts that (1) they did not testify later at his sentencing hearing, and (2) the reason for their choosing not to do so ... is that ... [it] would have been ‘too emotional’ for them .... If weeks after the guilty verdict and the withdrawal of their son's NGI plea, [Mirzayance's] parents' emotions still prevented them from testifying at the sentencing hearing, then surely those emotional obstacles to their testifying in the NGI phase would have been at least as potent, and probably more so.” Id., at 73 (emphasis in original).

The Magistrate Judge found that counsel made a carefully reasoned decision not to go forward with the NGI plea:

“[Counsel] carefully weighed his options before making his decision final; he did not make it rashly.... [Counsel's] strategy at the NGI phase ... depended entirely on the heartfelt participation of [Mirzayance's] parents as witnesses.... Moreover, [counsel] knew that, although he had experts lined up to testify, their testimony had significant weaknesses.... [Counsel's] NGI-phase strategy became impossible to attempt once [Mirzayance's] parents ... expressed ... their reluctance to [testify].... All [counsel] was left with were four experts, all of whom reached a conclusion—that [Mirzayance] did not premeditate and deliberate his crime—that the same jury about to hear the NGI evidence already had rejected under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. The experts were subject to other impeachment as well.... [Counsel] discussed the situation with his experienced co-counsel ... who concurred in [counsel's] proposal that he recommend to [Mirzayance] the withdrawal of the NGI plea.” Id., at 69–71.

Based on these factual findings, the Magistrate Judge stated that, in his view, counsel's performance was not deficient.

Despite this determination, the Magistrate Judge concluded that the court was bound by the Court of Appeals' remand order to determine only whether “ ‘there were tactical reasons for abandoning the insanity defense.’ ” Id., at 98 (quoting Hickman, 66 Fed.Appx., at 680). Even though the Magistrate Judge...