United States v. Nation

• Decision Date: 06 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07–1410.,07–1410.
• Citation: 129 S.Ct. 1547,77 USLW 4271,173 L.Ed.2d 429,556 U.S. 287
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. NAVAJO NATION.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

556 U.S. 287

129 S.Ct. 1547

173 L.Ed.2d 429

77 USLW 4271

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v.NAVAJO NATION.

No. 07–1410.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 23, 2009.

Decided April 6, 2009.

Syllabus^*

The Navajo Nation has long sought damages under the Indian Tucker Act (ITA) for an asserted breach of fiduciary duty by the Secretary of the Interior in connection with his failure promptly to approve a royalty rate increase under a coal lease (Lease 8580) the Tribe executed in 1964. Six years ago, this Court held that “the Tribe's claim for compensation ... fails.” United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 493, 123 S.Ct. 1079, 155 L.Ed.2d 60(Navajo I). The Court explained that in order to invoke the ITA and thereby bypass federal sovereign immunity, a tribe “must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties.” Id., at 506, 123 S.Ct. 1079. Holding that such duties were not imposed by the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), by the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMDA), or by 25 U.S.C. § 399, the Court reversed a judgment for the Tribe and remanded. The Court of Federal Claims then dismissed the Tribe's claim, but the Federal Circuit reversed, finding violations of duties imposed by the Navajo–Hopi Rehabilitation Act of 1950, 25 U.S.C. §§ 635(a), 638, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 1300(e), as well as common-law duties arising from the Government's “comprehensive control” over tribal coal.

Held: The Tribe's claim for compensation fails. None of the sources of law cited by the Federal Circuit and relied upon by the Tribe provides any more sound a basis for its lawsuit than those analyzed in Navajo I. Pp. 1554 – 1558.

(a) Navajo I did not definitively terminate the Tribe's claim. Because the Court in that case did not analyze statutes other than the IMLA, the IMDA, and § 399, it is conceivable, albeit unlikely, that another relevant statute might have provided a basis for the suit. However, Navajo I's reasoning—particularly its instruction to “train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions,” 537 U.S., at 506, 123 S.Ct. 1079—left no room for that result based on the sources of law relied on below. Pp. 1554 – 1555.

(b) Lease 8580 was not issued under § 635(a), so the Tribe cannot invoke that law as a source of money-mandating duties. Section 635(a)authorizes leases only for terms of up to 25 years, renewable for up to another 25 years. In contrast, the IMLA allows “terms not to exceed ten years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities.” § 396a. Mirroring the latter language, Lease 8580's indefinite term strongly suggests that it was negotiated and approved under the IMLA. This conclusion is not refuted by § 635(a)'s saving clause or by testimony that coal leasing was a centerpiece of the Rehabilitation Act's program. Pp. 1554 – 1557.

(c) Also unavailing is the argument that the Secretary violated § 638's requirement that he follow the Tribe's recommendations in administering the “program authorized by this subchapter.” The word “program” refers back to § 631, which directs the Secretary to undertake “a program of basic improvements for the conservation and development of the [Tribe's] resources” and lists various projects to be included in the program. The statute certainly does not require the Secretary to follow recommendations of the Tribe as to royalty rates under coal leases executed pursuant to another Act. Pp. 1556 – 1557.

(d) Title 30 U.S.C. § 1300(e) is irrelevant. That provision applies only “[w]ith respect to leases issued after” the statute was enacted in 1977. Lease 8580 was issued in 1964; § 1300(e) is therefore inapplicable. Pp. 1557 – 1558.

(e) The Government's “comprehensive control” over Indian coal, alone, does not create enforceable fiduciary duties. The ITA limits cognizable claims to those arising under, inter alia, “the ... laws ... of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1505, and Navajo I reiterated that the analysis must begin with “specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions,” 537 U.S., at 506, 123 S.Ct. 1079. If a statute or regulation imposes a trust relationship, then common-law principles are relevant in determining whether damages are available for breach of the duty, but the Tribe cannot identify a specific, applicable, trust-creating statute or regulation that the Government violated, so trust principles do not come into play here. Pp. 1557 – 1558.

501 F.3d 1327, reversed and remanded.

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SOUTER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined.

Edwin S. Kneedler, Acting Solicitor General, Washington, DC, for United States.

Carter G. Phillips, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Edwin S. Kneedler, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States.

Paul E. Frye, Lisa M. Enfield, Frye Law Firm, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, Carter G. Phillips, Virginia A. Seitz, Robert A. Parker, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, Louis Denetsosie, Attorney General, The Navajo Nation, Window Rock, AZ, for Respondent.

Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Elizabeth A. Peterson, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States.

Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

For over 15 years, the Indian Tribe known as the Navajo Nation has been pursuing a claim for money damages against the Federal Government based on an asserted breach of trust by the Secretary of the Interior in connection with his approval of amendments to a coal lease executed by the Tribe. The original lease took effect in 1964. The amendments were approved in 1987. The litigation was initiated in 1993. Six years ago, we held that “the Tribe's claim for compensation ... fails,” United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 493, 123 S.Ct. 1079, 155 L.Ed.2d 60 (2003)(Navajo I), but after further proceedings on remand the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit resuscitated it. 501 F.3d 1327 (2007). Today we hold, once again, that the Tribe's claim for compensation fails. This matter should now be regarded as closed.

I. Legal Background

The Federal Government cannot be sued without its consent. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). Limited consent has been granted through a variety of statutes, including one colloquially referred to as the Indian Tucker Act:

“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim against the United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe ... whenever such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.” 28 U.S.C. § 1505.

The last clause refers to the (ordinary) Tucker Act, which waives immunity with respect to any claim “founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” § 1491(a)(1).

Neither the Tucker Act nor the Indian Tucker Act creates substantive rights; they are simply jurisdictional provisions that operate to waive sovereign immunity for claims premised on other sources of law ( e.g., statutes or contracts). United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400, 96 S.Ct. 948, 47 L.Ed.2d 114 (1976); United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980)(Mitchell I). The other source of law need not explicitly provide that the right or duty it creates is enforceable through a suit for damages, but it triggers liability only if it “ ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government.’ ” Testan, supra, at 400, 96 S.Ct. 948 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 178 Ct.Cl. 599, 607, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (1967)); see also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983)(Mitchell II);Navajo I, 537 U.S., at 503, 123 S.Ct. 1079.

As we explained in Navajo I, there are thus two hurdles that must be cleared before a tribe can invoke jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act. First, the tribe “must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties.” Id., at 506, 123 S.Ct. 1079. “If that threshold is passed, the court must then determine whether the relevant source of substantive law ‘can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s].’ ” Ibid. (alteration in original). At the second stage, principles of trust law might be relevant “in drawing the inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a breach.” United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 477, 123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003).

II. History of the Present Case

A. The Facts

A comprehensive recitation of the facts can be found in Navajo I, supra, at 495–502, 123 S.Ct. 1079. By way of executive summary: The Tribe occupies a large Indian reservation in the American Southwest, on which there are significant coal deposits. In 1964 the Secretary of the Interior approved a lease (Lease 8580), executed by the Tribe and the predecessor of Peabody Coal Company, allowing the company to engage in coal mining on a tract of the reservation in exchange for royalty payments to the Tribe. The term of the lease was set at “ten (10) years from the date hereof, and for so long thereafter as the...