United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of N.Y.
| Citation | 129 S.Ct. 2230,173 L.Ed.2d 1255,77 USLW 4453,556 U.S. 928 |
| Decision Date | 08 June 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 08–660.,08–660. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES, ex rel. Irwin EISENSTEIN, Petitioner, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, et al. |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Petitioner filed this qui tam action in the name of the United States against respondent city and several of its officials under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729. The Government declined to exercise its statutory right to intervene, the District Court dismissed the complaint and entered judgment for respondents, and petitioner filed a notice of appeal 54 days later. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) require, generally, that such a notice be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment, but Rule 4(a)(1)(B) and § 2107(b) extend the period to 60 days when the United States is a “party.” The Second Circuit held that the 30–day limit applied and dismissed petitioner's appeal as untimely.
Held: When the United States has declined to intervene in a privately initiated FCA action, it is not a “party” to the litigation for purposes of either § 2107 or Rule 4. Because petitioner's time for filing a notice of appeal in this case was therefore 30 days, his appeal was untimely. Pp. 2233 – 2237.
(a) Although the United States is aware of and minimally involved in every FCA action, it is not a “party” thereto unless it has brought the action or exercised its statutory right to intervene in the case. Indeed, intervention is the requisite method for a nonparty to become a party. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304, 108 S.Ct. 586, 98 L.Ed.2d 629. To hold otherwise would render the FCA's intervention provisions superfluous, contradicting the requirement that statutes be construed in a manner that gives effect to all their provisions, see, e.g., Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166, 125 S.Ct. 577, 160 L.Ed.2d 548. The FCA expressly gave the United States discretion to intervene in FCA actions, and the Court cannot disregard that congressional assignment of discretion by designating the United States a “party” even after it has declined to assume the rights and burdens attendant to full party status. Pp. 2233 – 2235.
(b) Petitioner's arguments for designating the United States a party in all FCA actions are unconvincing. First, neither the United States' “real party in interest” status, see Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 17(a), nor the requirement that an FCA action be “brought in the name of the Government,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), converts the United States into a “party” where, as here, it has declined to bring the action or intervene. Second, the Government's right to receive pleadings and deposition transcripts when it declines to intervene, see § 3730(c)(3), does not support, but weighs against, petitioner's argument: If the United States were a party to every FCA suit, it would already be entitled to such materials under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5. Third, the fact that the United States is bound by the judgment in all FCA actions regardless of its participation in the case is not a legitimate basis for disregarding the statute's intervention scheme. Finally, given that Rule 4(a)(1)(B) hinges its 60–day time limit on the United States' “party” status, petitioner's contention that the limit's underlying purpose would be best served by applying it in every FCA case is unavailing. Pp. 2235 – 2237.
540 F.3d 94, affirmed.
Gideon A. Schor, New York City, for Petitioner.
Paul T. Rephen, New York City, for Respondents.
Jeffrey B. Wall, pro hac vice, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondents.
Gideon A. Schor, Counsel of Record, Lewis D. Zirogiannis, Wilson Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, Paul T. Rephen, Counsel of Record, Leonard J. Koerner, Andrew G. Lipkin, New York, New York, for Respondents.
The question presented is whether the 30–day time limit to file a notice of appeal in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) or the 60–day time limit in Rule 4(a)(1)(B) applies when the United States declines to formally intervene in a qui tam action brought under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the 30–day limit applies. We affirm.
Petitioner Irwin Eisenstein and four New York City (City) employees filed this lawsuit against the City to challenge a fee charged by the City to nonresident workers. They contended, inter alia, that the City deprived the United States of tax revenue that it otherwise would have received if the fee had not been deducted as an expense from the workers' taxable income. In their view, this violated the FCA, which creates civil liability for “[a]ny person who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” § 3729(a)(1). Although the United States is a “real party in interest” in a case brought under the FCA, Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 17(a), an FCA action does not need to be brought by the United States. The FCA also allows “[a] person [to] bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government,” § 3730(b)(1). In a case brought by a person rather than the United States, the FCA grants the United States 60 days to review the claim and decide whether it will “elect to intervene and proceed with the action.” § 3730(b)(2). After reviewing the complaint in this case, the United States declined to intervene but requested continued service of the pleadings. The United States took no other action with respect to the litigation. The District Court subsequently granted respondents' motion to dismiss the complaint and entered final judgment in their favor.
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal 54 days later. While the appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals sua sponte ordered the parties to brief the issue whether the notice of appeal had been timely filed. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A)-(B) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2107(a)-(b) generally require that a notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment but extend the period to 60 days when “the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party,” § 2107(b). Petitioner argued that his appeal was timely filed under the 60–day limit because the United States is a “party” to every FCA suit. Respondents countered that the appeal was untimely under the 30–day limit because the United States is not a party to an FCA action absent formal intervention or other meaningful participation.
The Court of Appeals agreed with respondents that the 30–day limit applied and dismissed the appeal as untimely. See 540 F.3d 94 (C.A.2 2008). We granted certiorari, 555 U.S. 1131, 129 S.Ct. 988, 173 L.Ed.2d 172 (2009), to resolve division in the courts of appeals on the question,1 and now affirm.
A party has 60 days to file a notice of appeal if “the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party” to the action. See § 2107(b) (); Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(B) (). Although the United States is aware of and minimally involved in every FCA action, we hold that it is not a “party” to an FCA action for purposes of the appellate filing deadline unless it has exercised its right to intervene in the case.2
The FCA establishes a scheme that permits either the Attorney General, § 3730(a), or a private party, § 3730(b), to initiate a civil action alleging fraud on the Government. A private enforcement action under the FCA is called a qui tam action, with the private party referred to as the “relator.” Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000). When a relator initiates such an action, the United States is given 60 days to review the claim and decide whether it will “elect to intervene and proceed with the action,” §§ 3730(b)(2), 3730(b)(4); see also § 3730(c)(3) ().
If the United States intervenes, the relator has “the right to continue as a party to the action,” but the United States acquires the “primary responsibility for prosecuting the action.” § 3730(c)(1). If the United States declines to intervene, the relator retains “the right to conduct the action.” § 3730(c)(3). The United States is thereafter limited to exercising only specific rights during the proceeding. These rights include requesting service of pleadings and deposition transcripts, § 3730(c)(3), seeking to stay discovery that “would interfere with the Government's investigation or prosecution of a criminal or civil matter arising out of the same facts,” § 3730(c)(4), and vetoing a relator's decision to voluntarily dismiss the action, § 3730(b)(1).
Petitioner nonetheless asserts that the Government is a “party” to the action even when it has not exercised its right to intervene. We disagree. A “party” to litigation is “[o]ne by or against whom a lawsuit is brought.” Black's Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed.2004). An individual may also become a “party” to a lawsuit by intervening in the action. See id., at 840 (...
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United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of N.Y., 08–660.
...556 U.S. 928129 S.Ct. 2230173 L.Ed.2d 125577 USLW 4453UNITED STATES, ex rel. Irwin EISENSTEIN, Petitioner,v.CITY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, et al.No. 08–660.Supreme Court of the United StatesArgued April 21, 2009Decided June 8, Affirmed. Syllabus * Petitioner filed this qui tam action in the na......